CONNECTICUT GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
AN INTRODUCTION

ALSO BY GARY L. ROSE
Public Policy in Connecticut, editor (2005)
Connecticut Government at the Millennium (2001)
The American Presidency Under Siege (1997)
Controversial Issues in Presidential Selection, editor,
2nd edition(1994)
Connecticut Politics at the Crossroads (1992)
Controversial Issues in Presidential Selection, editor (1991)

CONNECTICUT GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS
AN INTRODUCTION

Gary L. Rose

SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY PRESS
FAIRFIELD, CONNECTICUT
2007

Copyright 2007 by the Sacred Heart University Press
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or
parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in
writing from the publisher. For information, contact the Sacred Heart
University Press, 5151 Park Avenue, Fairfield, Connecticut 06825

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rose, Gary L., 1951Connecticut government and politics: an introduction /
Gary L. Rose.
p. cm.
Rev ed of: Connecticut government at the millennium.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-888112-16-0
1. Connecticut–Politics and government–1951- I. Rose,
Gary L., 1951- Connecticut government at the millennium.
II. Title.
JK3316.R65 2007
320.4745–dc22

2007030461

To Laurie, Garrison, and Meredith

Contents

Preface / ix
Acknowledgments / xiii
CHAPTER ONE

American Federalism:
More Than Two Centuries of Political Tension / 1
CHAPTER TWO

Constitutional Development in Connecticut / 25
CHAPTER THREE

How Blue is Connecticut? / 51
CHAPTER FOUR

Mechanisms for Political Participation / 75
CHAPTER FIVE

The State Legislature / 99
CHAPTER SIX

The Governor’s Office and Judiciary / 124

viii

CONTENTS
CHAPTER SEVEN

Connecticut’s Watchdogs / 143
Conclusion / 153
Select Bibliography / 158
Index / 161

Preface

T

he devolution of power to state governments is the reason why
this book was written. Beginning with the Reagan era and
extending to the present, a vast amount of domestic power has been
transferred from the federal to state governments. For the past
twenty-five years, states, not the federal government, have been
responsible for formulating and delivering an array of public
services that at one time seemed far beyond the capacity of state
governments. Devolution also energized state politics. This resulted
in state capitols being the new focal points for citizen activism.
Many states responded to devolution by modernizing
governing structures and expanding the number of support staff for
the three branches of government. In Connecticut, for example, a
sixty-seven million dollar Legislative Office Building was
constructed in 1987 for the purpose of assisting state lawmakers
with their daily work. The building, which is adjacent to the state
Capitol and connected to the Capitol by an underground
concourse, is an impressive state-of-the-art response to the new
responsibilities assumed by state governments.
The first edition of this book, Connecticut Government at the
Millennium, was published in 2001. My goal in writing it was to
publish a work that would serve as an introductory text on
government and politics in Connecticut. The first edition, like the
present revised version, was written with college students in mind.
The first edition addressed the historical tension between
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nationalists and states’ rights advocates, the constitutional history of
Connecticut, and the utility of the current constitution for
protecting civil liberties and civil rights. Chapters were also devoted
to political culture, party politics, interest groups, and the three
branches of government. Each chapter in the first edition featured a
lengthy interview with a political practitioner. The interviews were
designed to supplement the contents of each chapter.
By 2006, however, it became clear that a revised version was
long overdue. Within the space of only five years, the “land of
steady habits” seemed to plunge into a state of unpredictability and
political turmoil. A rash of corruption enveloped state and local
government, resulting in federal indictments and prison sentences
for a governor, two mayors, and a state senator. Even the chief
justice of the state supreme court faced a legislative inquiry because
of an ethical violation. A state once known for its ethical system of
government was now referred to by media commentators and
political pundits as “Corrupticut.”
The state’s two-party system, which had already been on the
wane, also showed further signs of decay during the past five years.
For example, in the 2006 mid-term election, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman, a lifelong Democrat, was elected as an Independent
Democrat running under the party label of Connecticut for
Lieberman. More generally, the political climate of Connecticut had
also changed over a five year span. Known for its moderate brand of
politics, Connecticut seemed to be moving in a decidedly more
liberal direction, similar in some respects to the state of
Massachusetts. In 2006, two of the three Republican members of
Connecticut congressional delegation who were seeking reelection
were defeated by liberal Democratic challengers.
The serious policy challenges that face Connecticut have also
multiplied over the course of the past five years. The percentage of
state residents without health care increased, proper care for the
elderly remained unresolved, the state economy was less than
impressive, and gridlock continued to afflict every major highway
throughout the state. Moreover, environmental hazards caused by
lightly regulated industries continued to threaten the state’s air
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and water supply, prison overcrowding grew to an alarming
degree, and the achievement gap between suburban and urban
school systems persisted, despite court rulings intended to rectify
this condition. Thus, the political and policy developments that
occurred in Connecticut during the past five years begged for a fresh
look at Connecticut politics and government.
The present book unfolds in the following manner. In Chapter
One, I examine the historical and ongoing struggle between those
who favor a more centralized and powerful national government
and those who favor decentralized power and a stronger system of
states’ rights. This issue has divided Americans into political factions
and political parties for more than two hundred years.
In Chapter Two, I explore the constitutional history of
Connecticut. In this chapter, the Fundamental Orders of 1639, the
Royal Charter of 1662, the Constitution of 1818, and the state’s
current constitution adopted in 1965 are described. I also include
recent court rulings to demonstrate how the 1965 constitution has
been harnessed to protect the civil liberties and civil rights of the
Connecticut citizenry.
In Chapter Three, I examine the political complexion of
Connecticut. I present a large body of evidence which demonstrates
that the state has become more liberal over the years. Federal and
state election results, along with the results of public opinion polls,
are discussed in this chapter.
In Chapter Four, I focus on the three traditional mechanisms
through which citizens can participate in the political process.
These mechanisms include elections, political parties, and interest
groups. The current health of such mechanisms is also reviewed in
this chapter.
I devote Chapter Five exclusively to the state legislature. Special
emphasis is placed on the bicameral structure of the legislature, the
role of legislative leaders, and the procedure for passing legislation.
Support staff and the Legislative Office Building are also described.
The increased autonomy of the legislative branch in the age of
devolution necessitates a separate and very full chapter devoted to
this institution of government.
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I explore the office of governor and the state judicial system in
Chapter Six. The constitutional powers of the Connecticut
governorship are presented, along with a discussion regarding the
importance of a governor’s public approval ratings for effective
leadership. One will discover that the office of governor in
Connecticut is similar to that of the American presidency, only on
a smaller scale. The structure of the state judicial system is also
examined in this chapter. I describe the current workload of the
court, the procedure for appealing a case to the state supreme court,
and the method by which cases are heard and opinions written. As
in the preceding chapter on the state legislature, support staff for the
office of governor and the courts are also discussed.
In Chapter Seven, I pay homage to investigative journalists and
argue in no uncertain terms why a free press is vital to good
government. This chapter also gives a broad overview of the various
forms of media in Connecticut that provide citizens with political
information, including newspapers, television and radio stations,
and the so-called blogosphere.
Those familiar with Connecticut Government at the Millennium
will notice some major differences between that work and the
present version. In addition to revising and updating information, I
have also reorganized and added material. The new text features two
entirely new chapters. I also consolidated four chapters into two,
eliminated one chapter, and divided one lengthy chapter on the three
parts of the government into two distinct and detailed chapters. The
new version adds a substantial amount of current commentary from
political practitioners, but is also a more concise work compared to
the first, especially because of the omission of the interviews that
concluded each chapter, with an eye toward making it more focused
and user friendly. (I believe that those interviews are still valuable,
and interested readers can still consult them in copies of the first
edition.) The new title, Connecticut Government and Politics: An
Introduction, more precisely reflects the thrust of the revised work
and suggests that my subject matter is not just the immediate present
but also the history of Connecticut government – and our prospects
for the future.
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CHAPTER ONE

American Federalism:
More Than Two Centuries of Political Tension

B

efore one explores the components and particulars of the
Connecticut polity, it is important to first discuss the features of
American federalism, as well as the ongoing tension between federal
and state authority throughout the course of American history. This
general overview should demonstrate the centrality of state
governments within the context of the American federal system, and
why this work has special relevance in the twenty-first century.
One of the bedrock principles of the United States Constitution
is that the power of government should be limited and restrained.
Heavily influenced by the writings of classical liberal philosophers,
most notably the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), the
Founding Fathers devised an ingenious constitutional system in
which power would never be concentrated in one branch or one level
of government.1 Limited government was viewed as a prerequisite to
individual liberty and more generally the preservation of the newlyformed republic.
The Founding Fathers’ deep belief in a system of limited
government is clearly reflected in the principle known as federalism.
Drafted during a swelteringly hot summer in Philadelphia more
than two hundred years ago, the Constitution of the United States
established a governing system in which power would be divided
between two levels of government, national and state. The principle
of federalism is among the several distinguishing features of the
American constitutional framework.
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Federalism and Divided Power
The Constitution, written in response to the failure of the
Articles of Confederation (1781-88), provides the national government with both enumerated and implied powers. The enumerated
powers of the national government are most evident in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution. Seventeen clauses outline the
enumerated powers of the United States Congress. Examples
include the power to coin money, regulate interstate commerce, and
declare war. By enumerating the powers of the United States
Congress, the Founding Fathers ensured a fairly defined yet limited
set of federal responsibilities.
The implied powers of the national government, also a
component of Article I, Section 8, are found in the “necessary and
proper clause” of the Constitution. This clause, sometimes referred
to as the “elastic clause,” provides the Congress with the authority
to make all laws that are “necessary and proper” for executing the
enumerated powers of Congress, as well as other powers granted to
the national government by the Constitution. Implied powers
provide the Congress with law-making authority that may be
employed in the interest of implementing national powers and,
more generally, advancing the national interest. Although the
“necessary and proper” clause has allowed the national government
to expand its authority over time, all laws and policies enacted by
the Congress must still be rooted in the enumerated powers of
Congress and the Constitution. Thus, limitations are still imposed
on the scope of national power despite this broad and implied grant
of constitutional authority.
States’ rights are also preserved under the Constitution. Article
IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, for example, guarantees a
republican form of government to each and every state within the
union and protects all states from foreign invasion. States are
therefore guaranteed a representative form of government as well as
federal protection.
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution serves as the legal
foundation for state power. For states’ rights advocates, the Tenth
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Amendment is sacrosanct: “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The “reserved
powers” of the states have served as the constitutional basis of state
authority throughout our nation’s history. Staunch advocates of
states’ rights have been known to carry a copy of the Tenth
Amendment on their person at all times.
Although the Constitution establishes a federal system of
government, a careful reading of this document nevertheless
raises questions regarding the scope and boundaries of national
and state power. Federalism is by no means a perfectly defined
governing principle, and there is considerable ambiguity with
respect to the division of authority between the two levels of
government. Most observers of federalism will agree that gray
areas exist concerning the exact dimensions of national and state
power. Precisely where national power ends and state power
begins is difficult to pinpoint precisely.
The lack of precise guidelines regarding the constitutional scope
of federal and state power has given rise to many controversial yet
intriguing federal court cases. The United States Supreme Court
frequently serves as the arbitrator in complex conflicts between the
two levels of government. Students who enroll in constitutional law
courses are invariably exposed to large blocks of class time devoted
to court rulings regarding the principle of federalism. Such cases are
among the most fascinating in the field of constitutional law.2 The
tension between federal and state authority, which has persisted for
more than two hundred years, has very deep historical roots.
Historical Tension
Federalists versus Antifederalists
Since the founding of the republic, clashes involving federal and
state authority have been at the heart, and perhaps soul, of
American politics. A recurring source of political tension
throughout our country’s history has been the continual
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fluctuations in the locus of power within the federal framework.
Repeatedly, intense political disputes emerge regarding which level
of governing authority should have control over domestic policies.
The debate over the scope of federal and state power has historically
divided Americans into two rather distinct political factions: those
who favor national solutions to domestic policy problems, and
those who favor states’ rights and a more decentralized approach to
governing. The former faction favors what political scientists refer
to as “nation-centered federalism,” while the latter supports “statecentered federalism.” If there is one constant debatable issue
throughout the entire span of American history, it has been the
contentious issue of where domestic power should reside.
The beginnings of the tension between national and state
governments can be traced to the bitter conflict between Federalists
and Antifederalists that erupted in 1788 during the struggle to ratify
the federal Constitution. Those who supported the proposed
Constitution were known as Federalists. Those who opposed the
Constitution, and who supported a continuation of the Articles of
Confederation, were known as Antifederalists. Patriotic Americans
and men of distinction were associated with both political factions.
On the Federalist side of the debate, examples of leading statesmen
included Alexander Hamilton and John Adams as well as the
“father” of our country, George Washington. Leading
Antifederalists included an array of political leaders, such as Patrick
Henry, George Mason, and George Clinton.3
Federalists believed that the time had arrived to strengthen
national power. According to the Federalist point of view, a more
effective and empowered national government was needed to
promote national economic development and to provide national
security. A constitution based on the principle of federalism would,
according to the Federalists, effectively resolve the pressing
economic and national security issues that were besieging the
nation. Federalists viewed the Articles of Confederation, adopted in
1781, as a seriously flawed and deficient experiment in selfgovernment. They argued that far too much power had been
afforded to the states under the Articles of Confederation,
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ultimately resulting in economic stagnation, inflation, ineffective
commerce among the states and with foreign nations, and more
generally a fragmented nation. A debtors’ revolt in 1786 against the
government of Massachusetts, led by former Revolutionary War
Captain Daniel Shays, further underscored the frailty of American
government under the existing Articles. “Shays’ Rebellion,” as it was
known, is regarded as a key event in terms of mobilizing public
support for constitutional reform and a stronger system of
government. Correspondence among Federalists during this
tumultuous time period demonstrate in no uncertain terms their
displeasure with the Articles of Confederation and their desire for a
stronger, more centralized and stable national government.
Congressman James Madison’s correspondence with Governor
James Randolph of Virginia reveals such a perspective: “Our
situation is becoming every day more and more critical . . . No
money comes into the federal treasury; no respect is paid to the
federal authority; and people of reflection unanimously agree that
the existing confederacy is tottering to its foundation.”4
George Washington, writing to Thomas Jefferson, expressed his
grave concern for the future of the republic and his desire for a new
form of government in these terms: “The situation of the General
Government (if it can be called a government) is shaken to its
foundations and liable to be overset by every blast. In a word, it is
at an end, and unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy and
confusion will inevitably ensue.”5
The Antifederalists, however, were deeply suspicious of the
newly drafted Constitution. They feared that political power would
gradually become centralized under the Constitution and that selfgovernment, which Antifederalists equated with states’ rights,
would eventually be destroyed. Antifederalists, although by no
means blind to the problems inherent in the Articles of
Confederation, still believed a confederal form of government with
sovereignty among the individual states, rather than a system of
federalism, would be more effective for securing personal liberty and
preventing tyranny. According to Antifederalists, eliminating the
Articles of Confederation and adopting an entirely new
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Constitution based on the federal principle was not only a radical
and unnecessary response to existing economic and security
problems, but a threat to freedom. Antifederalists therefore strongly
opposed ratification of the Constitution.
Between 1787 and 1788, many essays critical of the proposed
Constitution appeared in newspapers throughout the thirteen
states. The writings of “Centinel,” “The Federal Farmer,” “Cato,”
“Agrippa,” and “Brutus” are among the leading Antifederalist essays
written during this uncertain time period.6 At the heart of
practically every Antifederalist essay was a concern that the
Constitution, if ratified, would result in tyranny and the gradual
erosion of human freedom. Antifederalists feared the ambiguity and
flexibility of the proposed Constitution, and argued that the new
national government would most certainly destroy the political
sovereignty of states and local communities. They were especially
concerned that the proposed Constitution did not contain a Bill of
Rights that would impose strict limits on national power, and they
were deeply concerned with the vagueness and elasticity of
presidential power. In the view of Antifederalists, the proposed
Constitution contained many hidden dangers. The commentary of
Brutus, published in the New York Journal on November 15, 1787,
captures many of the key ideas of the Antifederalists:
In the investigation of the constitution, under your
consideration, great care should be taken, that you do not
form your opinions respecting it, from unimportant
provisions, or fallacious appearances. On a careful
examination, you will find, that many of its parts, of little
moment, are well formed; in these it has a specious
resemblance of a free government – but this is not sufficient
to justify the adoption of it – the gilded pill, is often found
to contain the most deadly poison.7
In response to Antifederalists, Federalists mounted their own
campaign. The Federalist campaign to secure support for the
proposed Constitution was most evident in the state of New York.
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At the time, the New York political climate was characterized by
strong Antifederalist sentiment, a good part of which was fueled by
New York’s governor George Clinton, an opponent of the
Constitution and, according to some constitutional historians,
author of the Antifederalist “Cato” essays.8 The controversial
governor emerged as one of the main opponents of the Federalist
movement.
In the interest of mobilizing support for the proposed
Constitution, three distinguished and learned Federalists, all of
whom were instrumental in drafting and designing the
Constitution, collaborated to write a series of essays in defense of
the document. This historic and scholarly effort resulted in eightyfive essays circulated by New York newspapers. Each essay,
identified as “Federalist 1” “Federalist 2,” and so on, was written
under the pseudonym “Publius,” a Latin word meaning “the
Public.” The essays appeared throughout a two year period, 178788, the same time period during which the Antifederalist writings
were in circulation.
To this day, the eighty-five Federalist essays, collectively referred
to as The Federalist Papers, serve as the leading reference regarding
the strengths of the United States Constitution and original intent
of the Founding Fathers. Indeed, one will find federal judges who
rely on various Federalist essays to help guide their legal reasoning
and interpretation of the Constitution.9 The authors of The
Federalist Papers were Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay, three of the nation’s most prominent Founding Fathers
and distinguished statesmen. Scholars of the Federalist Papers
conclude that Hamilton is the author of fifty-one essays, Madison
penned approximately twenty-nine, and Jay wrote five.10
The need for a stronger union and a stronger national
government is one of the central themes of the Federalist Papers.
Consider the words of John Jay in Federalist 1:
This country and this people seem to have been made for
each other, and it appears as if it was the design of
Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient
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for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest
ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous,
and alien sovereignties.11
Although the authors of The Federalist Papers adamantly
defended the powers of the proposed central government and the
concept of a strong union, it should be noted that “Publius” also
recognized the importance of state governments and states’ rights.
State power would undoubtedly be diminished under the proposed
Constitution, but state governments, in the view of Federalists, were
to remain vital units of the new federal system.
Although the Antifederalists failed in their effort to prevent
ratification of the Constitution, the conflict between nationalists
and states’ rights advocates has in many ways continued unabated
for well over two hundred years. The Federalist versus Antifederalist
debate over the proper distribution of power is one of the most
recurrent political themes in the history of the United States.
The Origin of National Parties
The first political party system in the United States (17961816) pitted Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Party against Thomas
Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party.12 The party system
emerged largely as a result of competing perspectives concerning the
distribution of power between national and state authority. The
Federalist Party, which included many strident economic
nationalists, favored a more centralized form of federalism with
broad national power. The Jeffersonians favored a more
decentralized system of federalism in which the bulk of domestic
power would be vested in state and local governments.
At the heart of this division was the highly volatile and
controversial issue regarding the formation of a national bank.
Federalists viewed the formation of a national bank as a desirable
mechanism conducive to economic development and national
prosperity. The Jeffersonians opposed the creation of a national
bank on the grounds that such an institution would destroy state
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banking interests and eventually states’ rights. Party loyalties during
the early days of the republic were heavily conditioned by
perspectives regarding the desirability of a national bank.
In some respects, the Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian visions of
government were manifestations of the Federalist versus
Antifederalist conflict that emerged during the fight for
constitutional ratification. However, it would now be political
parties, not political factions, that would carry the banners of
nationalism versus states’ rights. Moreover, the two major political
parties in subsequent years, albeit under different party labels,
would continue to embrace and espouse the Hamiltonian versus
Jeffersonian doctrines.13 The intensity of this debate would
eventually result in a tragic and extremely bloody civil war.
The Civil War: The Tension Erupts
Beginning in 1861, eleven southern states seceded from the
United States and formed the Confederate States of America.
Secession resulted in a civil war between Northern and Southern
states and the subsequent loss of more than 630,000 lives, the most
devastating war in American history. Although the issue of slavery
was at the root of this horrific conflict, the war was also the end
result of conflicting interpretations regarding the proper scope of
federal and state power. The issue of federalism and the scope of
national versus state power so deeply polarized the American
people that war was deemed the most logical alternative for
resolving the dispute.
Legal justification for southern secession was rooted in the
controversial writings and theories of states’ rights advocates, most
notably those of southern statesman John C. Calhoun (1782-1850).
Calhoun, a U.S. senator from South Carolina and former vicepresident of the United States under Presidents John Quincy Adams
and Andrew Jackson, articulated what became known as the
“doctrine of nullification.” This controversial doctrine placed states’
rights above national authority with respect to legal supremacy, in
direct contradiction of the supremacy clause located in Article VI of
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the federal Constitution. The supremacy clause in no uncertain
terms identifies the United States Constitution, national laws, and
national treaties as the supreme law of the land. However, according
to Calhoun, state law was superior to federal law by virtue of the
fact that formation of the states had preceded the formation of the
federal government. Thus, any federal law found objectionable by a
state could potentially be nullified within its own borders by the
state legislature. As Calhoun put it,
The sovereignty of the states, in the fullest sense of the
term, is declared to be the essential principle of the Union;
and it is not only asserted as an incontestable right, but also
claimed as an absolute necessity in order to protect the
minority against the majority.14
Calhoun also contended that the formation of the federal
government in 1788 was the direct result of a voluntary “compact”
between individual states. Since states had voluntarily entered into
a governing “compact” with one another to form the federal
government, it therefore legally fell within the realm of state
authority that a state, or group of states, could voluntarily withdraw
from the Union as well. In Calhoun’s view, the states had entered
into a compact with one another “with the understanding that a
state, in the last resort, has a right to judge of the expediency of
resistance to oppression or secession from the Union.”15 Such a
doctrine was more than appealing in states throughout the South
whose economies and wealth were built squarely upon the backs of
slave labor. In the view of Southern political leaders, state
sovereignty and the compact theory inherently prohibited the
federal government from interfering in the internal political and
economic policies of the states. Thus, the policy of slavery, as well as
the decision to withdraw from the Union was a prerogative of
Southern states. To understand the American Civil War, one must
first understand the intense commitment among Southerners to the
concept of states’ rights, and, most certainly, to the controversial
doctrines of John C. Calhoun.
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Although the Union victory affirmed the supremacy of the
federal constitution and federal law, the politics of the last half of
the nineteenth century continued to reflect disagreement over
matters related to federalism. Despite the outcome of the Civil
War, questions regarding the legal scope of federal and state power
persisted. While Calhoun’s doctrine of nullification and support
for state secession died with the collapse of the Southern
Confederacy, party loyalty and voting behavior continued to reflect
the ongoing debate as to whether state or national authority should
serve the needs of the American people. Political division over
matters related to federalism characterized the politics of the
twentieth century as well.
The Twentieth Century
For most of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party was
most closely identified with promoting national goals and national
power. The New Deal policies of President Franklin D. Roosevelt
initiated during the Great Depression of the nineteen-thirties shaped
a nationalist image for the Democrats. Beginning in 1933, the year
in which Roosevelt was inaugurated as president, big government
and the Democratic Party have become synonymous with one
another. To this day, many Americans still equate the Democratic
Party with expanded government and social welfare programs.
President Roosevelt’s New Deal, launched in response to a
collapsed economy, significantly expanded the economic and fiscal
responsibilities of the national government. National, rather than
state and local, remedies provided economic stimulation and relief
for millions of Americans forced into poverty by the Depression. As
a result of Roosevelt’s leadership, a large number of domestic policy
responsibilities were delegated to newly-established federal
administrative agencies. Several domestic responsibilities that prior
to the 1930s had belonged to state and local governments were
transferred to the national level. This was especially evident in the
area of social welfare policy. With the passage of the Social Security
Act in 1935, welfare policy in the United States shifted dramatically
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from state and local governments to the federal government.
According to Roosevelt, national solutions were required to resolve
America’s grave economic dilemma:
If I read the temper of our people correctly, we now realize
as we have never realized before our interdependence on
each other; that we cannot merely take but we must give as
well; that if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained
and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a
common discipline. . . . We are, I know, ready and willing
to submit our lives and our property to such discipline,
because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger
good. . . . This I propose to offer.16
An expanded and more powerful national government, in
Roosevelt’s view, was necessary to meet the needs of the American
people. As James MacGregor Burns notes, “Throughout Roosevelt’s
speeches of 1934 ran this theme of government as conciliator,
harmonizer, unifier of all major interests.”17
Support for an interventionist and powerful national
government, initiated and institutionalized under Roosevelt,
continued without interruption under subsequent Democratic
Presidents. President Harry S Truman’s Fair Deal, John F. Kennedy’s
New Frontier, and Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society each
promoted national, rather than state, solutions for resolving an array
of pressing domestic dilemmas. In addition to instituting national
economic programs, the agendas of Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson included national legislation designed to promote civil
rights. The issue of social equality henceforth became a primary
concern of American presidents and the United States government;
this development further expanded the scope of federal power.
Consistent with the effort to create equality, President Johnson
declared a “War on Poverty.” With the exception of Roosevelt’s New
Deal, Johnson’s Great Society was the most ambitious domestic
agenda in American history. During the presidency of Johnson, the
national government clearly superceded the states with respect to
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meeting the social and economic needs of the population. The
American people looked to the national government, rather than
the states, for political leadership and creative public policy
initiatives.
Declining Confidence in Federal Solutions
One of the great virtues of American government is that power
tends to be fluid. This is true not only with respect to the
distribution of power between branches of government, but also
between levels of governing authority. After more than four decades
of expanding national power, Americans began to reassess the
policy-making role of the national government within the federal
framework. By the end of the 1960s, the period of nation-centered
federalism and big government appeared to have run its course. The
cost and efficiency of federal programs funded by federal tax dollars
began to come under close scrutiny. Many Americans began to
question the costs and benefits of several federal domestic programs,
such as social welfare, as well as housing and urban renewal. As John
L. Palmer and Isabell V. Sawhill put it,
The public seemed to feel that too much money was being
spent on such programs, sometimes with too little effect,
and that too large a proportion of the population had
become dependent on federal assistance, weakening the
incentives for them to make it on their own.18
Moreover, it was during the latter part of the 1960s that many
Americans began to express serious doubts regarding the logic and
morality of the Vietnam War. In the minds of a growing number of
Americans, military intervention in a remote country in Southeast
Asia was a misguided foreign policy. The war began to be regarded
as unwinnable and an enormous waste of American resources. The
decline in public confidence was particularly acute among the
nation’s college population. In the spring of 1967, a Gallup Poll
revealed that 49 percent of college students perceived themselves as
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“hawks” with respect to the Vietnam War. By the winter of 1969,
this figure had dramatically declined to 20 percent.19
To further complicate matters, misinformation disseminated
by the federal government regarding the war’s progress and a socalled “light at the end of the tunnel” mentality created a serious
credibility gap between the American people and those in positions
of national authority. Negative perceptions toward the war, the
judgment of national political leaders and military generals, and
growing concerns over wasteful federal spending resulted in a
dramatic erosion of trust and confidence in the federal
government.
The presidencies of Richard Nixon (1969-74), Gerald Ford
(1974-77), and Jimmy Carter (1977-81) did little to ameliorate
negative attitudes toward federal authority. During the first term of
the Nixon presidency, the war in Vietnam continued to escalate in
spite of the President’s campaign promise to seek peace. More than
500,0000 American troops were stationed in Vietnam during the
first years of the Nixon administration, more troops than at any
other time in the war’s history. President Nixon’s abbreviated second
term was consumed by the Watergate scandal, which resulted in his
resignation from the Oval Office in August of 1974, the first
presidential resignation in American history. Although President
Nixon had attempted to improve the efficiency of government,
most notably in his domestic reform proposal known as “New
Federalism,” and despite his masterful success in establishing
diplomatic ties with Red China, trust and confidence in the federal
government continued to plummet.
Trust continued to decline during the Ford and Carter
administrations as well. President Ford’s highly controversial pardon
of President Nixon cast a cloud of suspicion over the Ford
presidency. Many accused Ford of cutting a private deal with Nixon,
thereby allowing the former president to escape federal prosecution.
Although it was never proven that a pardon had been prearranged
prior to Nixon’s resignation, Ford’s decision to pardon the disgraced
president was nevertheless viewed by many as yet another reason not
to trust the federal government.
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President Carter, elected in the aftermath of the Watergate
scandal, pledged to restore trust and confidence in the presidency
and the national government. However, despite high hopes on the
part of the American electorate, Carter’s ineffectiveness as a
domestic and foreign policy leader did little to reverse the public’s
negative perception of the federal government. Carter’s failed
attempts at reforming energy policy, an economy racked by
inflation, and American embassy personnel held hostage in Tehran
for more than a year only served to reinforce the public’s antipathy
toward the federal government. By 1980, trust and confidence in
the federal government had declined to alarmingly low levels. The
following table documents this trend.
Table 1
Trust in the National Government
1964 1968 1972 1976 1980
Percent Saying:
Always/Most of time
Some of the time

76
22

61
36

53
45

36
61

33
63

Source: Steffen W. Schmidt, Mack C. Shelley, II, and Barbara Bardes,
American Government and Politics Today (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,
1997), Table 7-2, p. 233. Question: How much of the time do you think
you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right: just about
always, most of the time, or only some of the time? Data based on New
York Times/CBS News Surveys, the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center, National Election Studies, and the Washington
Post/Kaiser Family Foundation. Reprinted with permission.

As the data reveal, trust in the national government from 1964
to 1980 plummeted precipitously. In 1964, three-quarters of the
American adult population expressed trust and confidence in the
nation’s central government. By 1980, this figure had declined to a
mere one-third of the adult population. It is evident that
perceptions of wasteful federal spending, the war in Vietnam,
Watergate, a controversial pardon, and ineffective presidential
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leadership had seriously altered perceptions of Americans toward
their national governing institutions. There can be no denying that
attitudes shifted in dramatic fashion during this time period. In
light of such a trend, it should come as no surprise that by 1980 the
conservative political rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, the Republican
nominee for president, appealed to millions of Americans. Reagan’s
strong support for states’ rights, combined with relentless criticism
of federal power, effectively connected with the American electorate.
Although the Republican Party’s support for states’ rights had begun
well before the election of Ronald Reagan, it was now more than
evident that the Republican Party was in fact the party that
advocated decentralized solutions to domestic policy problems and
the restoration of state sovereignty.
The Reagan Revolution and New Federalism
Long before his bid for the presidency in 1980, Ronald Reagan
had established himself as a leading spokesperson for conservative
values and states’ rights. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Reagan
was one of the most persistent and visible conservative figures in
American politics. In 1964, Reagan campaigned diligently for the
Republican Party’s arch-conservative and pro-states’ rights
presidential nominee, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater. As a twoterm governor of California (1966-74), Reagan continued to
espouse the doctrine of states’ rights and routinely criticized big
government, federal taxation, and the liberal social policies of the
Democratic Party. As a presidential candidate, first in 1968 and
again in 1976, Reagan castigated the growth and power of the
federal government and urged, in no uncertain terms, a restoration
of state power in domestic affairs.
Decentralized power, in Reagan’s view, was also conducive to
free enterprise and economic growth. By devolving power to the
states, business would be subject to less government regulation.
Thus, states’ rights, according to Reagan, would directly benefit
American business activity as well society in general. Even during
the 1950s, well before his entry into state and national politics,
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Reagan had established himself as an engaging and dynamic
spokesperson for states’ rights and limited government. His support
for limited government was also evident during his days as a public
relations spokesperson for General Electric, a position that evolved
from his job as host of General Electric Theater on television.
Although political support for Ronald Reagan was routinely
firm among Republican conservatives, it was not until the latter part
of the 1970s that the ideals expressed by Reagan began to appeal to
a broader cross-section of the American electorate. By election year
1980, the American people, who had lost much faith in the national
government, seemed willing to experiment with a more
decentralized form of self-government. While economic inflation,
economic recession, and the humiliating Iranian hostage situation
during the Carter administration certainly contributed to Reagan’s
presidential victory in 1980, millions of voters were also attracted to
the theme of limited government so eloquently and charismatically
articulated by the former California governor. Many Americans
seemed willing to experiment with Ronald Reagan’s “New
Federalism,” as noted by George E. Peterson:
One of the president’s most consistently articulated
criticisms has been that the national government has
usurped responsibilities and authority that belong to the
states. He entered office promising to redress this
imbalance by setting the states free to pursue their own
policy goals under their own management and by bringing
government “closer to the people.”20
“Devolution” was the term that became synonymous with the
Reagan presidency, meaning, quite simply, the transfer or return of
federal domestic responsibilities to state and local levels of
government.21 To “devolve” governing power is to reverse the
direction in which power has “evolved.” With his inauguration in
1981, devolution clearly became one of the main priorities of
President Reagan’s domestic agenda. Reagan’s commitment to
devolution was more than evident in his inaugural address of
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January 20, 1981, delivered with eloquence on the western, not
eastern, steps of the nation’s Capitol:
Our government has no power except that granted it by the
people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of
government which shows sign of having grown beyond the
consent of the governed. It is my intention to curb the size
and influence of the federal establishment and to demand
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted
to the federal government and those reserved to the States
or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that the
Federal Government did not create the States; the States
created the Federal Government.22
The Reagan administration’s attempt to devolve power could
be observed in a number of policy areas, including but not limited
to social services, business regulation, judicial power, and the
manner in which federal grant money would be managed. For
example, in fiscal year 1982, the Reagan administration
consolidated seventy-six federal categorical grant programs into
nine large block grants. By consolidating categorical grants into
these block grants, Reagan intended to provide individual state
governments with more discretion and flexibility over the control
and expenditure of federal money.23 Although federal guidelines
still accompany block grants, such guidelines are broad and
general, unlike the stringent, tightly-defined guidelines associated
with categorical grants.
While it is beyond the scope of this work to empirically evaluate
the success of President Reagan’s attempt to establish a new model
of federalism, most observers are willing to agree that a new trend
in federal and state relations did commence with his election. State
governments were substantially revitalized, and states, as units of the
American federal system, seemed to acquire new life and energy.
David Osborne, a domestic policy advisor to President Clinton and
author of Laboratories of Democracy, offered this perspective on the
Reagan era:
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The 1980s have been a decade of enormous innovation at
the state level. For those unfamiliar with state politics – and
given the media’s relentless focus on Washington, that
includes most Americans – the specifics are often startling.24
According to Osborne, the creation of public investment funds for
the purpose of providing business loans, technological innovation,
reforms in public education, the emergence of collaborative
tripartite arrangements between management, labor, and
government, as well as the revitalization of regional industries are
policy areas where states have demonstrated exceptional innovation
and creativity in recent years.25
In Goodbye to Goodtime Charlie, a penetrating work concerning
innovative trends in state leadership, Larry Sabato summarized the
Reagan era in these terms: “The most significant of the patterns is
that the states, responsible in good part for their own earlier federal
ostracization, have begun to fulfill their proper role in the federal
scheme of government.”26 According to Sabato, in recent years states
have acquired “the will to act, to cooperate, and at the same time to
compete with the national government for power and
responsibility.”27 In addition to the emergence of professional and
efficient state governors, other trends identified by Sabato include
the development of efficient and modern state legislatures,
revitalized two-party competition at the state level, and the
transformation of the National Governor’s Conference from a
largely symbolic organization into a powerful voice on behalf of
state governments.28
The trend toward states’ rights continued under President George
H.W. Bush (1989-93), yet another Republican president supportive
of state-centered federalism, as well as under President William J.
Clinton (1993-2001), the first Democratic president in many
decades who looked favorably on the governing authority and
potential of states’ rights. Clinton’s commitment to states’ rights
marked a dramatic departure from the agenda of previous
Democratic presidents and further revealed his serious effort to
redefine the goals and priorities of the Democratic Party. To argue
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that the Democratic Party under Clinton’s leadership had become a
states’ right party similar to that of the Republican Party would be
misleading, although it was clear that under Clinton’s leadership,
the Democrats exhibited an uncharacteristic appreciation for the
place of states within the federal framework. Clinton’s approval of a
sweeping welfare reform bill in 1996 returning a vast amount of
welfare control to state governments suggested a fresh perspective
toward states’ rights on the part of the Democratic Party. The bill
was described as the most comprehensive reform effort with respect
to the delivery of social services since the passage of the Social
Security Act in 1935. Although the welfare reform bill reflected the
efforts of congressional Republicans who had won control of the
House of Representatives in 1994, it was nevertheless a Democratic
President who eventually supported this legislation and who signed
it into law.
The Twenty-First Century and President George W. Bush
The political rhetoric of Republican President George W. Bush,
inaugurated on January 20, 2001, suggested a continuation of
presidential support for state power and state experimentation,
although there are legitimate reasons to question the President’s
commitment to decentralized government. The war on terror
(which commenced following the devastating terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001) inevitably resulted in a more powerful federal
government, and critics of the Bush Administration have suggested
that such power has expanded well beyond constitutional limits.
The PATRIOT Act, for example, vastly expands the domestic
surveillance power of the federal government over private citizens,
which raises questions about President Bush’s commitment to
limited government. Under the Bush Administration, the
Department of Homeland Security was also established, thus
bringing the number of federal cabinet departments to fifteen, and
billions of dollars have been spent by the federal government to
support a controversial war in Iraq. Moreover, President Bush’s
educational reform initiative known as “No Child Left Behind”
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imposes federal mandates on local schools across the land, which
further calls into question this Republican President’s support for
state sovereignty. Additionally, efforts by the Bush Administration,
along with many Republicans in Congress, to keep an incapacitated
woman, Terri Schiavo, alive through a forced feeding tube, over the
objections of her husband, continued to contradict the Republican
Party’s rhetorical insistence on limited government. As federalism
scholar John Kincaid notes: “Despite having a governor, George W.
Bush, in the White House, the federal system has not been a more
congenial environment for the states.”29
Nevertheless, despite apparent contradictions between
President Bush’s political rhetoric and federal policy, the fact of the
matter is that American government is still in a decentralized mode.
The current vitality of states continues to reflect in many ways the
historic Reagan Revolution and President Reagan’s vision of
devolution. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, most
of the innovative and creative domestic policy-making within the
federal framework continues to take place at the subnational level of
the political system. Within this decentralized era of federalism,
state legislatures, state governors, and state judicial systems have
assumed enlarged and vitally important roles. Special interest
groups and lobbyists, not surprisingly, have also multiplied at the
state level and their presence is more pronounced in the halls and
committee rooms of state capitols.
State constitutions have also acquired new life in an age of
devolved power. So important have state constitutions become in
recent years that one would be remiss in a work on state government
not to devote considerable attention to such vital documents. The
Connecticut Constitution is therefore the focus of Chapter Two.

Notes
1. The seminal work of John Locke which has direct bearing on the
American political tradition and constitutional framework is clearly
Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government published in 1689, the same
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time period during which Great Britain was involved in its own revolution,
known as “the Glorious Revolution.” Although Locke’s writings were not
by any means the only intellectual influence on the perspectives of the
Founding Fathers, he nevertheless occupies a very special place among
those philosophers whose works served as theoretical underpinnings of the
Declaration of the Independence and the U.S. Constitution.
2. A plethora of U.S. Supreme Court rulings exist regarding federal
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Congress very broadly, thus allowing the national government to regulate
a range of economic activity which at one time belonged exclusively to the
states. An example of a court ruling reflective of this judicial perspective
would be U.S. v. Darby 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In recent times, the Court
has taken a more restricted view of Congress’ power to regulate economic
activity within the states and has issued rulings that are favorable towards
the states. U.S. v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995) would be a prime example
of the Court’s restricted view of national power vis-à-vis the states.
3. Herbert J. Storing suggests that far too little attention has been
devoted to the Antifederalists. In Storing’s view, Antifederalists, although
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found their way into the Constitution itself. The Bill of Rights, for
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of defined rights that would limit the power of the federal government. For
a synthetic treatment of the Antifederalists, see Herber J. Storing, ed. The
Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 1-5.
4. “Madison to Randolph, February 25, 1787,” in The Debates of the
Several State Conventions, ed. Jonathan Elliot, 2nd ed. (New York: Franklin,
Burt Publishers, 1888-96), 5:107. Correspondence quoted in Richard M.
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Fox’s view, the President’s pardon power, defended by Alexander Hamilton
in Federalist 74, was intended to heal the nation in the aftermath of an
insurrection. The Watergate crisis, in Fox’s view, was tantamount to an
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CHAPTER TWO

Constitutional Development in Connecticut

S

tate governments across the land are currently characterized by a
resurgence of political energy and bold experimentation in
public policy making. This is especially evident in the vitality of
state legislatures, the recent emergence of dynamic and creative state
governors, the modernization of state judicial systems, the
organization and intensity of citizen activist groups, and the
reinvigoration of political party organizations. In addition to these
trends, there has been an increasing amount of attention to and
reliance placed on those obscure and dusty documents which for
more than two centuries have served as the fundamental law at the
subnational level of the governing process: state constitutions. The
extent to which state constitutions have been reactivated is perhaps
one of the most fascinating and interesting developments in
American federalism.
State constitutions have been part of the American republic for
more than two centuries. Indeed, state constitutions have a longer
and richer history than the federal constitution. Prior to the
American Revolution, colonial charters granted to individual
colonies by the King of England were employed for the purpose of
colonial governance. When America declared independence from
England in 1776, a number of colonies proceeded to draft their own
state constitutions. State constitutions thus supplanted the old
colonial charters that had been granted to the colonies by the King.
Generally speaking, the year 1776 marked the beginning of
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meaningful self-government among the thirteen states. In many
states, the Declaration of Independence and the writing of state
constitutions coincided with one another. State constitutions
adopted during this era were inevitably replaced by constitutions in
subsequent years that were more reflective of institutional
developments in the governing process and changes within the state
polity. The Massachusetts state constitution, penned by Founding
Father John Adams and adopted in 1780, is the one exception. The
original constitution has continued to serve as the supreme law for
the state of Massachusetts for more than two hundred and twenty
years, irrespective of the fact that one hundred and twenty
constitutional amendments have been added. The people of
Massachusetts have great reverence not only for the wisdom of John
Adams, but also for their historic state constitution.1
Connecticut’s Constitutional Heritage
The Fundamental Orders of 1639
Unlike other colonies, Connecticut had for many years enjoyed
an impressive degree of political sovereignty. Long before the
American Revolution and the emergence of state constitutions
among the thirteen states, Connecticut had established for itself a
self-governing document very similar to that of a constitution,
known as Connecticut’s Fundamental Orders. The Fundamental
Orders is regarded as one of the oldest self-governance documents
in American history. There are those who regard the Fundamental
Orders as the first written constitution known to mankind and the
fount of constitutional government in the Western world. Adopted
more than three hundred and fifty years ago, the Fundamental
Orders is the reason why Connecticut license plates bear the
inscription The Constitution State.
The Fundamental Orders was drafted in 1639 by farmers from
the rural Connecticut river towns of Hartford, Wethersfield, and
Windsor. Prior to the writing of the Fundamental Orders, issues
affecting the three Connecticut towns were resolved in a governing
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assembly known as the General Court. The General Court,
established in 1637, met periodically to conduct public business in
a small building known as the Hartford Meeting House.
Many issues affecting the three communities were resolved in
the General Court, including the somewhat notorious decision to
wage war on the hostile Pequot Indian tribe. According to Albert E.
Van Dusen,
In the river towns many felt they no longer could tolerate
the Pequot menace. On May 1, 1637, the General Court at
Hartford voted to wage an offensive war and summoned
ninety men – forty-two from Hartford, thirty from
Windsor and eighteen from Wethersfield. They selected
John Mason as commander and voted one hogshead of beer
for the men.2
As the towns grew in size, it became clear that a more effective
and representative system of self-government was required. Thus,
on May 31, 1638, Hartford’s Founding Father, the Reverend
Thomas Hooker (1583-1646) formally proposed that the three
Connecticut towns enter into a new and more structured political
compact. At the Hartford Meeting House, Hooker, in what is now
regarded as one of the most historic sermons in American political
history, urged the residents of Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield
to adopt a representative form of government based on the consent
and free will of the people. In Hooker’s words, “The foundation of
authority is laid in the free consent of the people. . . . As God has
given us liberty, let us take it.”3
Hooker’s personal past and pivotal role in Connecticut political
history should be specifically noted:
The son of a respectable middle-class landholder, he was
born north of London. At college he became a religious
radical, then a spell-binding preacher, was marked for death
by the Anglican Church, fled with his family to New
England, led the first westward migration from
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Massachusetts to Connecticut, founded a new town, and
alongside of his devotion to moral law laid the basis for civil
law that launched a new nation on the road to
representative government.4
Following Hooker’s urgent call for a representative system of
government, Roger Ludlow of Windsor proceeded to draft a selfgoverning document known simply as the Fundamental Orders.
The Fundamental Orders consisted of a preamble and eleven orders,
and was subsequently adopted by delegates from the three
Connecticut towns on January 14, 1639, at the Hartford Meeting
House.5 Connecticut’s long tradition of self-government based on a
written constitution had thus begun.
The historic dimension of Connecticut’s Fundamental Orders
cannot be overstated. Consider two important facts: First, the
Fundamental Orders was adopted only nineteen years after the
Pilgrims drafted the Mayflower Compact. The Fundamental Orders
was therefore one of the very first attempts at elf-government in
America. As Vincent Wilson, Jr., notes,
Particularly significant is the absence, in the Fundamental
Orders, of any reference to England or the authority of the
Crown or Parliament. In the wilderness along the
Connecticut River, the three towns had, in fact, come close
to creating an independent commonwealth.6
Second, the Fundamental Orders was adopted approximately one
hundred and fifty years prior to the writing of the federal
constitution in Philadelphia. Although the federal constitution is
by no means modeled after the Fundamental Orders, it is not an
exaggeration to suggest that the profound respect the American
people have historically exhibited toward written constitutions
can be traced to Connecticut’s Fundamental Orders of 1639, for
it is here that we discover the roots of the American
constitutional tradition. The preamble to the Fundamental
Orders not only reflects the belief of Connecticut’s Founding
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Fathers in self-government, but also a firm belief that religion and
God should guide the course of public affairs. Unlike the federal
Constitution, which would be written many years later,
Connecticut’s Fundamental Orders clearly merged church and
state. The Puritan heritage of Connecticut’s Founding Fathers is
especially evident:
For as much as it hath pleased Almighty God by the wise
disposition of his divine providence so to order and dispose
of things that we the Inhabitants and Residents of Windsor,
Hartford and Wethersfield are now cohabitating and
dwelling in and upon the River of Connectecotte and the
lands thereunto adjoining; and well knowing where a
people are gathered together the word of God requires that
to maintain the peace and union of such a people there
should be an orderly and decent Government established
according to God, to order and dispose of the affairs of the
people at all seasons as occasion shall require; do therefore
associate and conjoin ourselves to be as one Public State or
Commonwealth.
Reflecting on the Puritan heritage of Connecticut’s Founding
Fathers, R. Bryan Bademan, a scholar of American religious history,
described it in these terms:
The delegates who drafted the Fundamental Orders were
Puritans of a similar stamp as those who settled the
Massachusetts Bay Colony that same decade. Their concern
with good order in society and politics reflected their
deeply-held conviction that, while all of life was lived under
the sovereign rule of a wise and benevolent God, the reality
of human sin made communal discipline and oversight
necessary for continued growth and godliness. That the
Orders could be ratified without reference to the King of
England does not so much suggest their democratic
modernity as much as it suggests Puritan interest in the
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ancient tradition of covenant-making found in the biblical
texts and recently rejuvenated by some Protestant
reformers.7
The Royal Charter of 1662
In 1662, the Fundamental Orders was replaced by a Royal
Charter granted to the colony of Connecticut by King Charles II. It
was Connecticut’s Governor John Winthrop, Jr., of Saybrook who
presented Connecticut’s Charter to the King for approval.
According to most accounts, Winthrop’s charisma, political
connections in England, diplomatic skills, and sheer persistence
were central to Connecticut’s success in obtaining the coveted
Charter. Winthrop personally crossed the Atlantic Ocean in his
effort to secure the Charter from the King.8 Although the newly
granted Charter of 1662 superseded the Fundamental Orders of
1639, it would be incorrect to suggest that the Charter actually
replaced the Orders as the new body of law.
Under the Fundamental Orders, self-government had already
been firmly established as part of Connecticut’s political tradition.
What the Charter essentially did was guarantee, rather than
establish, a system of self-rule that had been in place for more than
twenty years. Connecticut colonists had acquired such a deep
reverence for the Fundamental Orders that elements and principles
of this document were woven into the 1662 Charter. Perspectives
regarding the relationship between the Fundamental Orders and the
Charter are offered by two Connecticut historians. Christopher
Collier offers this view:
It is usually said that the Fundamental Orders was subsumed
into the Charter, but perhaps it is more accurate to say that
the Orders continued as a parallel though secondary level of
fundamental law – quasi-constitutional, if you will.9
Richard J. Purcell, in his classic work, Connecticut in Transition:
1775-1818, originally published in 1918, provides this observation:
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This Charter in substance was similar to the eleven
Fundamental Orders of 1639, which had been drafted by
representatives of the river towns as their rule of
government. This similarity has enabled certain writers to
maintain that the Charter was royal only in form, but
otherwise a restatement of republican principles.10
Under the Charter the business of Connecticut government was
now to be conducted in a General Assembly. The Charter provided
for the annual election of an upper legislative chamber consisting of
a governor, a deputy governor, and twelve assistants. The upper
chamber was required to meet twice a year along with the lower
house of the General Assembly, which consisted of two elected
colonists from each Connecticut town. The General Assembly was
given broad discretion in its lawmaking capacity, and was allowed to
pass any law, as long as the law did not clash or conflict with the
laws of England.11
Upon Winthrop’s return from England, the Charter was
formally presented in Hartford on October 4, 1662. In the words of
W.H. Gocher, “It was declared to belong to them and their
descendants forever.”12 So cherished was the Royal Charter by the
political leadership and citizenry of Connecticut that the document
was secreted in an oak tree when Sir Edmund Andros, a former
British military commander and Royal Governor of New York, was
dispatched to Connecticut by the King of England in 1686 for the
purpose of confiscating the Charter and consolidating Connecticut
and other New England colonies into a Dominion of New England.
The Charter was therefore never relinquished to Andros and
remained a living and functional governing document even while it
remained in seclusion.13
Although Andros did establish a New England Dominion, his
rule over the New England colonies was rather short-lived. In 1688,
England experienced a political crisis known as the Glorious
Revolution. The crisis that beset England is a long and complicated
story, but in summary, the Glorious Revolution involved a power
struggle between the British monarchy and the British Parliament.
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The end result was the abdication of the highly unpopular King
James II, and the subsequent emergence of Parliament as a more
powerful force within the context of British government. The
Glorious Revolution was an important turning point for the
development of British constitutionalism. The supremacy of
representative government and an expansion of rights for British
subjects would be the end result. Moreover, England’s Glorious
Revolution would have a far-reaching impact on the character of
colonial politics. With respect to Connecticut, the removal of King
James II from the English throne weakened the authority of
Edmund Andros, thereby forcing Andros to relinquish his control
over the New England colonies. The events in England that led to
Andros’s departure from the region encouraged the Connecticut
General Assembly in 1689 to formally reestablish Connecticut
government under the Charter of 1662.14 The Charter would
remain as Connecticut’s governing document until 1818.
New Haven Colony
Any discussion of the Royal Charter of 1662 and the political
development of Connecticut as a colony during this time period
must recognize the important, but often forgotten, colony of New
Haven. Formed in 1638, New Haven Colony functioned as an
autonomous political entity until its inclusion into the more
dominant Connecticut Colony in 1665. The original six towns of
New Haven Colony consisted of New Haven, Milford, Guilford,
Branford, Stamford, and the Long Island town of Southold.
Protection against hostile Indians appears to have been the principal
motive behind the formation of the six town colony.15 At the time
of its incorporation into Connecticut Colony, New Haven Colony
had expanded to include nineteen towns, the same number of towns
as that in the colony of Connecticut.16
Although the Royal Charter officially joined New Haven
Colony with Connecticut, the initial merger of the two colonies was
far from harmonious. Upon learning of the merger, the political
leaders of New Haven Colony were deeply resentful. They felt that
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the decision to forge a union had been made without consultation
or consent. New Haven colonists also feared that the merger would
result in a dramatic loss of power over matters unique to towns
within the colony. Moreover, there was a concern, particularly
among New Haven Colony’s political elite, that Connecticut
Colony’s decision to allow freemen privileges to individuals not
affiliated with a church would potentially serve to weaken the
relationship between church and state.17
Although political tension existed between the two colonies
after the granting of the Royal Charter, the various towns within
New Haven Colony eventually deemed it advantageous to support
the union. In 1665, New Haven Colony formally agreed to unite
with Connecticut Colony, thus ending New Haven Colony as an
autonomous governing entity. This is not to suggest, however, that
New Haven Colony’s influence within the context of the
Connecticut political process was suppressed with the merger in
1665. Several Connecticut governors were chosen from towns
within the original New Haven Colony, including William Leete of
Guilford in 1676, Robert Treat in 1683, and Jonathan Law of
Milford in 1742.18 New Haven’s political influence could also be
observed with the legislative enactment on May 8, 1701 to rotate
state legislative sessions between the towns of Hartford and New
Haven. Prior to this, the General Assembly was convened for the
May and October legislative sessions in Hartford. With the
enactment in 1701, the General Assembly would meet in Hartford
for the May session and convene in New Haven for the October
session.19 This political arrangement continued until the 1870s.
The Constitution of 1818
The Royal Charter of 1662 served as the principal governing
document for the state of Connecticut until 1818, the year in which
Connecticut adopted a state constitution. The Constitution of 1818
served as Connecticut’s fundamental law until 1965, when the
current state constitution was adopted. Although the Constitution
of 1818 was a somewhat dramatic departure from the Royal Charter
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of 1662, it is important to once again note that elements of the
Charter, as well as its predecessor, the Fundamental Orders of 1639,
were blended into the new governing document. The same holds
true for the Constitution of 1965. Thus, rather than viewing
Connecticut’s constitutional development as a series of new and
distinct stages, it is perhaps best to approach the state’s
constitutional history as an evolving and unfinished story.
The Constitution of 1818 was fundamentally different from
the Royal Charter in several important respects. First, church and
state were now separated. The formal and legal association between
government and the Congregational Church was legally severed
with the adoption of the new constitution. According to
Connecticut historian Christopher Collier, “Many people in
Connecticut were not Congregationalists and didn’t like paying
taxes to support a church.”20 Thus, the long-established policy in
Connecticut of supporting Congregationalism through local taxes
came to an end. Tolerance of different religious faiths and sects was
now emerging in Connecticut. Describing the profound religious
impact of the new constitution, historian Jarvis Means Morse put
it this way:
The new constitution swept away all special privileges of a
religious nature, declaring that no preference should be
given by law to any Christian sect or mode of worship.
Congregationalism was thus put on a level with other
faiths; its ministers could no longer get together to march
in procession, drink rum, and decide who was to be
governor of Connecticut.21
A second important feature of the new constitution concerned
the establishment of a three-branch governing system, similar in
several respects to the model in place at the federal level. The state
legislature, the governor, and state judges now functioned within
their own independent spheres of constitutional authority. The
separation of executive and legislative authority was an important
development, as it directly enhanced the leadership capacity of the
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Connecticut state governorship. It had become apparent that a
stronger chief executive was needed (although as Morse notes, the
state legislature, even with adoption of the new constitution, still
remained the dominant element of state government). State
governors were given a substantial number of formal powers, but
in reality few of these powers were vigorously exercised. Prestige
and custom rather than legal authority proved to be the most
important sources of gubernatorial authority for a good part of the
nineteenth century.22
The separation of the judiciary from the legislature was also
quite significant. The highest organ of judicial power in
Connecticut was now located in an independent judiciary
consisting of a Supreme Court of Errors and a Superior Court. With
the exception of smaller, inferior courts (which still remained under
the jurisdiction of the state legislature), the judiciary now enjoyed
considerable autonomy from the state legislature.23
In addition to religious and governmental reform, the
Constitution of 1818 extended voting rights to previously
disenfranchised citizens. Prior to the adoption of the new
constitution, property requirements were associated with voting
rights, and political power rested with a property-owning political
elite. John Adams’s observation on the Connecticut political scene
concisely captured this condition:
The state of Connecticut has always been governed by an
aristocracy, more decisively than the empire of Great
Britain is. Half a dozen, or, at most a dozen families, have
controlled that country when a colony, as well as since it
has been a state.24
With the adoption of the new constitution, voting rights were
now extended to white males twenty-one years of age or older who
had paid taxes, lived in the state for at least six months, or had
served in the state’s militia. The Connecticut electorate was thereby
significantly expanded. With adoption of the Constitution of 1818,
democratic government, albeit in modified form, began its
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evolution within Connecticut politics. Collier notes that the 1818
Constitution was also in many ways Connecticut’s first constitution
in the true sense of the term. Unlike the Royal Charter and
Fundamental orders, the 1818 Constitution met what had become
the “standards of constitutionalism in the United States.”25
The adoption of a new constitution in 1818 needs to be
understood within the context of three important developments:
the social and economic transformation of the state itself; the steady
rise of the Democratic-Republican Party and resulting partisan
realignment; and the political savvy and popularity of a reformminded state governor. As the nineteenth century progressed, it
became clear to political reformers that the state was in need of a
governing document that could accommodate the rapidly changing
social and economic environment. Economic modernization
seemed to require a new style of government with greater decision
making capacity. Indeed, the forces of economic modernization had
begun to emerge in the small state of Connecticut shortly after the
Revolutionary War.
Approaching the end of the eighteenth century, Connecticut,
unlike many other former British colonies, had experienced a
dramatic economic transformation. Buttons were manufactured in
Waterbury, a toll road had been constructed between New London
and Norwich, banks had been chartered in New London and
Hartford, and the first insurance companies had emerged in
Hartford.26 Eli Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin in 1793 along
with his pioneering efforts in musket manufacturing had far-reaching
and profound implications, not only for Connecticut’s economy but
also for the economies of the thirteen states. By 1818, sixty-seven
cotton mills were operating in the state.27 Additional economic
developments included a robust whaling industry in New London,
gin and brandy production in Hartford County, and a silk industry
in the town of Mansfield.28 As the state’s economy changed, so too did
the needs of the state’s population. A new constitution and a
government with broader capacity seemed to be the sensible solution.
Change within the fabric of Connecticut politics also
contributed to constitutional adaptation. The Federalist Party,
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which had practically dominated the state’s politics since the
1790s, was by the second decade of the nineteenth century in a
state of rapid disintegration and decline. As Richard Hofstadter
notes, “party warfare was dying out altogether, as the Federalists
continued to dwindle both in states and nation.”29 The Federalist
Party was losing its control over American politics, including
states in New England which had served as a stronghold for
Federalist candidates. The Democratic-Republican Party,
associated with the ideals and presidencies of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison, had by 1818 clearly eclipsed the Federalist
Party at practically all levels of the political system – national,
state, and local. In Connecticut, Democratic-Republican
candidates were being elected to the General Assembly and town
councils, and with this partisan development a new and fresh
perspective towards government emerged. As Wesley W. Horton
put it, “In anticipation of a Republican victory in the spring
elections, in late 1817 and early 1818 the various towns passed
resolutions calling for a convention.”30
In addition to partisan change and important socio-economic
developments, the emergence of the new constitution in 1818 can
be attributed directly to Connecticut’s newly-elected and reformminded governor, Oliver Wolcott, Jr. Elected to the state
governorship in 1817 as the leader of the Toleration Party, a thirdparty coalition consisting of Democratic-Republicans and
Episcopalians who had become disillusioned with Federalist rule,
the highly popular Wolcott was able to generate significant support
for constitutional reform. Wolcott’s father and grandfather had both
served as governors of Connecticut, and the prestige associated with
the Wolcott name clearly bolstered the governor’s power and
successful call for constitutional change.31 Wolcott was a central
figure in the drive for constitutional reform.
The Constitution of 1818 served as the supreme governing
document for the state of Connecticut until 1965. In many ways,
the 1818 Constitution admirably served as a pillar of stability for
the state during periods of great economic growth, as well as periods
of deep and dark economic depression. By the early nineteen-sixties
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however, it was apparent that constitutional reform was once again
in order for the state of Connecticut. In the view of reformers, a new
governing document seemed necessary to guide Connecticut
through the remainder of the twentieth century and beyond. Thus,
in 1965 a new constitution was proposed, written with great care,
and formally adopted. At the time of this writing, the Constitution
of 1965 has served as the supreme law for the state of Connecticut
for more than forty years. Precisely how long the constitution will
remain in place is impossible for any observer to predict. Based on
Connecticut’s experience with the Constitution of 1818 however, it
seems reasonable to predict that this constitution, like its
predecessor, will have a very long life indeed.
The Constitution of 1965
By the nineteen-sixties, pressures for constitutional reform once
again emerged in Connecticut. This time, the single most important
factor behind the demand for reform was the issue of legislative
reapportionment. This issue had been festering in Connecticut
politics for some time, and it was inevitable that such a volatile issue
would result in demand for meaningful constitutional change.
The issue of legislative reapportionment rose to the surface in
Connecticut as a result of a widening population disparity between
rural and urban communities. During the eighteenth century and
the early decades of the nineteenth century, populations of towns in
Connecticut did not differ vastly. The population was, to some
extent, evenly distributed across the state and among individual
local communities. In 1800, excluding the extremes such as the
little town of Union with 767 inhabitants, and Stonington with a
population of 5,437, the population difference between
Connecticut towns was at most only 4 persons to 1, with the
majority of towns falling comfortably within this range.32 Older
towns in Connecticut each elected two members to serve in the
Connecticut House of Representatives, while newer towns, which
had fewer inhabitants, were allowed one representative each. Thus,
a fair system of equal representation characterized legislative politics
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in Connecticut during this particular period and, generally
speaking, there was little demand or need for legislative
reapportionment.33
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the growing
population imbalance between Connecticut’s urban and rural
communities raised questions of fair legislative representation. More
specifically, heavily populated cities began to emerge in
Connecticut, but, unfortunately for residents of urban areas,
legislative representation did not correspondingly increase. The
formula of one or two representatives per local community
remained fixed regardless of the community’s population growth.
Disproportionate legislative representation was now characteristic of
Connecticut politics, and the weight of individual votes was
extremely unequal. The vote cast by a resident of a small, rural town
in Connecticut had far more power and weight than the vote cast
by a resident of one of Connecticut’s expanding cities. Although
there were some minor adjustments and legal tinkering with
Connecticut’s legislative reapportionment formula during the
decades immediately following the Civil War, residents of
Connecticut’s urban communities remained underrepresented in
the General Assembly compared to residents of rural communities.
As Horton put it, “By the 1890s, the Connecticut system of
representation was a national scandal.”34
By 1900, the city of New Haven, which had grown to 108,000
inhabitants, was allotted only two state representatives, while
Union, with a population of 428, also had two representatives.
Moreover, examination of the population among cities and towns,
when compared with the number of representatives allocated,
reveals that small, rural towns in Connecticut completely
dominated heavily populated cities in legislative politics. According
to Horton, “44 towns, with a population of about 30,000, could
legislatively overwhelm the four largest cities, with a population of
about 300,000.”35
In 1902 there was a feeble attempt by political reformers to
rectify the grossly malapportioned legislative districts. A
constitutional convention was convened, and over the course of five

40

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CONNECTICUT

months a new constitution was written. The proposed constitution
failed to win approval among the Connecticut electorate, with more
than two-thirds of voters rejecting the document. Rural voters
viewed the proposed constitution as a threat to their political power,
while voters in urban areas regarded it as an inadequate attempt to
increase their political power within the context of legislative
politics. Thus, a politically unjust and fundamentally unfair system
of legislative politics persisted in Connecticut for a good part of the
twentieth century.36
By the early nineteen-sixties, the issue of legislative
reapportionment could no longer be ignored by lawmakers and
constitutional reformers. The issue of legislative reapportionment
had now become one of the hottest political issues, not only in
Connecticut, but in states across the land. Voters in rural towns
were routinely controlling a majority of seats in the state legislatures.
Empirical evidence during this period demonstrates serious political
inequality with respect to legislative representation. In Alabama, it
was theoretically possible for a minimum of 27.6 percent of the
population to elect a majority of the state senate, while 37.9 percent
of the state’s population could elect a majority of representatives to
the state house of representatives. In Connecticut, 32 percent of the
state’s population could theoretically control a majority of seats in
the state senate, while a mere 12 percent could elect a majority of
representatives to the state house. In Iowa, 35.6 percent of the
population could elect a majority of the state senate, while 27.4
percent of the population could elect a majority of the lower house.
Apportionment in Nevada was among the most perverse, with only
8.0 percent of the population controlling a majority of the seats in
the state senate, while a majority of seats in the state house were
controlled by 29.1 percent of the state’s population.37
In addition to raising questions related to representative
democracy and, more fundamentally, the concept of political
equality, malapportioned legislative districts also raised questions of
fairness concerning taxation and allocation of public resources. By
the nineteen-sixties, urban communities were providing the lion’s
share of tax revenue. Unfortunately, public policies and public
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resources were rarely directed toward urban centers. The needs and
concerns of urbanites were seldom addressed in state legislative
committees or on the floors of state assemblies, despite the fact that
the bulk of many state operating budgets was based on urban tax
dollars. A report issued by the Conference of Mayors during the
controversy over reapportionment noted that urban dwellers were
for all intents and purposes treated by state lawmakers as “secondclass citizens.”38
Thus, mounting pressure in favor of legislative
reapportionment was inevitable. Connecticut, like other states
across the land, would be forced to undergo legislative reform. In
Connecticut, a new constitution would also be written to
accommodate this important objective. To more fully understand
the impetus behind legislative reform in Connecticut and the
writing of a new state constitution, the significance of several
historic and monumental rulings issued by the United States
Supreme Court regarding the controversial issue of legislative
reapportionment must be examined. To understand such rulings is
to understand the connection between court rulings on
constitutional law and the development of representative democracy
in the United States.
Initially, the Supreme Court was reluctant to become involved
in matters pertaining to legislative reapportionment. In the view of
the Court, the issue was more a political than a legal question, and
therefore best left to the elected branches of government to resolve.
The Court’s position on legislative reapportionment reflected a
long-standing and revered judicial tradition that maintains that law
and politics should not be intertwined. Thus, for the Supreme
Court to accept a case the issue must in the Court’s view be
“justiciable,” i.e., a controversy that appropriately belongs before
the Court. This is fundamentally different from what the Court
regards as a “political” issue, i.e., a matter best left to the legislative
and executive branches of government.
The Supreme Court’s position that legislative reapportionment
was a political and therefore non-justiciable issue was articulated
quite clearly in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). The ruling

42

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CONNECTICUT

did little to correct the inequitable state of representative democracy
in American politics. Malapportioned congressional districts in the
state of Illinois were the subject of dispute. Population shifts over a
forty-year period had resulted in wide discrepancies between
Illinois congressional districts, with a low of 112,116 residents in
one district to a high of 914,053 residents in another. Those
residing in the most populated congressional districts, it was
estimated, had approximately one-ninth the voting power of
residents in the least populated districts.39 The Supreme Court,
however, failed to see how malapportioned legislative districts
constituted a justiciable issue. Justice Felix Frankfurter, one of the
Court’s strongest proponents of judicial restraint, and the author of
the Court’s majority opinion in Colegrove, addressed the issue in
the following terms:
In effect this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct
the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may be
adequately represented in the councils of the Nation. . . .
Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns
matters that bring courts into immediate and active
relations with party contests. From the determination of
such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in
the politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if
such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest
be dressed up in the abstract phases of the law. . . . Courts
ought not to enter this political thicket.40
Malapportioned legislative districts, in the view of Justice
Frankfurter, should be corrected by Congress and the state
legislatures, not the Supreme Court. The Colegrove ruling of 1946
made clear the Supreme Court’s position on the issue of legislative
reapportionment: the issue was political and therefore
nonjusticiable. As a result of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to
resolve legislative malapportionment, political inequality continued
to persist in American politics.
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The historic breakthrough came sixteen years after Colegrove,
with the landmark Supreme Court ruling of Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). In the years following the Colegrove ruling, new
judges, with a decidedly liberal perspective toward civil rights and
political equality, were appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Two
appointments made by President Dwight Eisenhower were
especially relevant: Earl Warren replaced Fred Vinson as chief
justice in 1952, and William Brennan was appointed as an
associate justice in 1957. It was clear that one of the chief
objectives of the Warren Court was to employ judicial power so as
to strengthen and advance the principle of equality. With a
majority of the justices on the Warren Court subscribing to
judicial activism rather than Frankfurter’s logic of judicial
restraint, it was only a matter of time before the issue of
malapportioned legislative districts was deemed justiciable rather
than political.
Malapportioned legislative districts in the state of Tennessee
came before the U.S. Supreme Court in the Baker case. Population
shifts over time, along with the reluctance of the Tennessee
legislature to redraw districts to conform to an equal population
formula, resulted in terribly unbalanced and politically inequitable
legislative districts across the state. However, rather than let judicial
precedent set in Colegrove stand, the Supreme Court ruled that the
issue of malapportioned legislative districts was justiciable. The
issue, in the Court’s view, involved the constitutional principle of
equal protection under the law as guaranteed in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and thus belonged
before the federal courts. As Robert B. McKay notes, “Baker v. Carr
disposed of all the preliminary jurisdictional barriers which had
earlier prevented Supreme Court determination of appropriate
constitutional standards for state legislative apportionment.”41 With
reapportionment now considered justiciable, the door had been
opened to a broad variety of legal complaints involving inequitable
legislative representation. In the years immediately following the
Baker ruling, the Supreme Court issued a series of landmark judicial
rulings that remain the law of the land to this day.
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In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), which was not
technically a legislative reapportionment case, the Court addressed
the county unit system of nominating statewide officials in the state
of Georgia. Rural dominance in statewide elections troubled the
Court, and in striking down the Georgia plan the Court articulated
the importance of the one person-one vote principle. Like Baker,
the Gray case served as a foundation ruling for subsequent
reapportionment decisions.42
The following year, in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964),
malapportioned congressional districts were ruled by the Court to be
in violation of the Constitution. This ruling extended the one personone vote principle to federal representation. In the same year, the
Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 573 (1964), extended
the one person-one vote principle to both chambers of the state
legislature. The Reynolds case is often identified as a leading example
of the Supreme Court’s firm belief that every person’s vote should be
equal in power. According to the Court, states should make every
effort to prevent discernible population variance from one legislative
district to the next. Voting equality and equal representation depend
on periodic legislative redistricting, and population figures must
guide the final shape and configuration of legislative districts.
Also in 1964, a case concerning malapportioned legislative
districts in Connecticut was heard in federal court. Butterworth v.
Dempsey, 229 F. Supp 754 D. Conn. (1964), decided by a panel of
three federal judges, further confirmed the position of the United
States Supreme Court regarding the reapportionment issue. The
panel ruled that any state legislative election in Connecticut would
be considered legally invalid in the absence of a comprehensive
redistricting plan coordinated and enacted by the Connecticut
General Assembly. The Butterworth ruling was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S.
564 (1964). The Butterworth ruling placed Connecticut’s
malapportioned legislative districts under the judicial microscope:
That defendants . . . are enjoined from doing any act or
taking any steps in furtherance of nominating or holding
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elections of senators or representatives to the Senate or
House of Representatives of the State of Connecticut, and
said defendants are further enjoined from certifying or in
any manner declaring that the results of any such
nominations or elections are valid or that the legislature of
the State of Connecticut is properly or legally constituted,
unless all senators and representatives are nominated and
elected to the Senate and House of Representatives of the
State of Connecticut pursuant to a redistricting of the
Senate and a reapportionment of the House to be effected
promptly by the General Assembly so that the voting
rights of plaintiffs in the choice of members of both houses
as guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
will not be impaired.43
As one can see, the federal courts traveled quite far with respect
to advancing the cause of political equality. In 1946, the Court’s
position was that the issue of legislative reapportionment was too
political. In 1962, the Court ruled that legislative reapportionment
was justiciable. In 1964, the Court issued a series of rulings
requiring reapportionment in federal and state legislative districts.
Judicial activism, not judicial restraint, was clearly the better
approach to correcting the problem of grossly malapportioned
legislative districts.
The rulings described above exerted direct influence upon
national and state politics, Connecticut’s included. The rulings of
the Supreme Court, as noted earlier, were directly related to the call
for a constitutional convention in Connecticut and the writing of
an entirely new constitution in 1965. Connecticut’s
malapportioned legislative districts had been found to be in
violation of the U.S. Constitution. However, instead of minor
repair and political tinkering, the best remedy seemed to be political
reform through the creation of a new state constitution. The new
constitution was approved by Connecticut voters in a popular
referendum on December 14, 1965, and formally proclaimed by the
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governor as the official and supreme body of law for the state of
Connecticut on December 30 of the same year. Connecticut’s
current constitution consists of Fourteen Articles and, at the time of
this writing, thirty Amendments.44
A State Constitution that Protects Rights and Liberties
Although the federal constitution over the years has served as a
principal foundation for American civil liberties and civil rights, it
is nevertheless imperative to emphasize the growing importance of
state constitutions as documents that also preserve and protect the
freedoms of the American people. Far too little is known about this
fairly recent development in the field of constitutional law, yet it is
one of the most fascinating developments within the context of
American jurisprudence. The trend appears to have started in
earnest with a seminal article published by U.S. Supreme Court
Justice, William J. Brennan, in The Harvard Law Review, in January,
1977.45 Brennan’s article revolutionized the means by which civil
liberties and rights would be protected.
After serving twenty years on the U.S. Supreme Court, Brennan
had arrived at the conclusion that the federal courts had become
deficient with respect to advancing the cause of civil liberties and civil
rights. The conservative trend in federal judicial rulings, precipitated
by the appointment of conservative judges to the federal bench during
the six-year Nixon presidency, was a troubling development to Justice
Brennan, who over the years had acquired a reputation as a liberal
Justice. In response to judicial conservatism at the federal level,
Brennan urged civil liberties and civil rights lawyers to argue their cases
by utilizing provisions in state constitutions, rather than similar
provisions in the federal constitution. State constitutions contain more
rights compared to the federal constitution and state judges are allowed
to interpret liberties contained in state constitutions above and beyond
the federal standard. Moreover, state constitutional rulings cannot be
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. In Justice Brennan’s view, state
constitutions would therefore afford more protection for American
civil liberties than would the federal constitution.
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Justice Brennan’s law review article would serve as the chief
catalyst behind a wide range of innovative, creative, and
controversial state constitutional cases in years to come.46 In
Connecticut, the use of the state constitution to advance civil
liberties and rights would result in a series of remarkable and very
liberal state supreme court rulings. Such rulings would extend rights
well beyond the federal standard. Equalized spending for public
schools in suburban and urban school districts,47 the use of
Medicaid funds to pay for an indigent woman’s abortion,48 extended
protection of the right to legal counsel,49 additional safeguards
against police searches and seizures,50 as well as the controversial
ruling that the state of Connecticut, not the local community, was
constitutionally obligated to provide a quality and equal education
to minority children who attended public school in the
impoverished city of Hartford,51 were among the several state
supreme court rulings based on the state constitution that were
reflective of Justice Brennan’s revolutionary strategy for advancing
civil liberties and civil rights.
This is not to suggest that the Connecticut supreme court is
permanently embarked on a liberal path with regard to state
constitutional interpretation. The tenure of a state supreme court
judge in Connecticut is for eight years. Although judges can be
reappointed, personalities on the court do change and the ideology
of the court can potentially be transformed due to the outcome of
gubernatorial elections. Nevertheless, despite changes in court
personnel, one can be assured that Connecticut’s constitution will
continue to serve the needs of the state’s citizenry well into the
twenty-first century.
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CHAPTER THREE

How “Blue” is Connecticut?

P

rior to the presidential election of 2000, the electoral maps used
by the major networks during their election night coverage
would designate states carried by Republican presidential candidates
as blue, while those states in which the Democratic candidates won
were colored red. Beginning with the election of 2000, the colors
were inexplicably reversed, with states voting Republican designated
as red and those voting for the Democratic ticket shaded in blue. It
was also during the 2000 election that states began acquiring red and
blue labels not only to portray a state’s presidential voting pattern,
but also to identify a state’s ideological orientation. In addition to
voting Republican for president, a red state was now considered a
conservative state with a citizenry that was right of center. Blue states
were where Democratic candidates would fare well, and where many
liberal and left of center voters resided. “Red state” and “blue state”
labels remained in place during the presidential election of 2004, and
continue to be used by political pundits when analyzing voting
patterns and political leanings among the fifty states. Indeed, red
state and blue state labels have practically become an accepted part
of the American political vocabulary. Such designations often mask
the complexity of state politics, but in the world of sound bites and
journalistic commentary the colors serve to simplify and organize
political analysis.
The state of Connecticut, not long ago regarded as a swing state
in presidential politics, is now described by political observers as a
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blue state. Connecticut is predicted to vote for the Democratic
presidential ticket every four years and elect U.S. senators and
members of Congress who are moderate to liberal in their political
beliefs. Candidates for governor, as well as candidates for statewide
constitutional offices, are advised to embrace moderate and liberal
causes if they wish to have a political future in Connecticut,
regardless of party affiliation. Although there are still some local
communities in Connecticut that elect conservative Republican
state lawmakers, such communities are relatively few in number.
The state of Connecticut is now among those states in the
Northeast, the upper Midwest, and the Pacific Rim that are
designated “blue.”
Two major bodies of evidence should be explored in order to
document the political persuasion and ideological orientation of a
particular state. Such evidence includes a range of election results, as
well as public opinion among the state’s voting age population.
Although there is every reason to believe that Connecticut has
become a more liberal state, it is still necessary to explore data that
may, or may not, document this general characterization.
Presidential Election Results
Prior to the collapse of the stock market and the advent of the
Great Depression in 1929, Connecticut was a very Republican state.
As electoral college maps reveal, Connecticut supported Republican
presidential candidates in fifteen of the twenty presidential contests
from 1856, the first presidential election in which the Republican
Party fielded a presidential candidate, through 1932. However, with
the Republican Party and Republican President Herbert Hoover
blamed for the nation’s economic collapse, the country’s political
landscape, Connecticut included, underwent a major partisan
realignment.1 As a result of a dramatic shift in party allegiance
among millions of voters, the Democratic Party under the
leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt thus became the nation’s
dominant party. In many states where the Democratic Party had
been overshadowed by the Republican Party, the Democrats were
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able to eclipse the Republicans as the state’s majority party, or at the
very least compete with the Republicans on an equal basis.
In Connecticut, the new pattern that emerged during the
Depression was one of vibrant two-party competition. From 1932
through 1960, Democratic and Republican presidential candidates
were each able to win the state of Connecticut four times, a
perfectly even split in the number of election victories.2 Healthy
two-party competition would continue in presidential elections over
the course of the next thirty years. In the elections of 1960, 1964,
and 1968, Connecticut voted for the presidential candidates of the
Democratic Party. However, in the presidential elections of 1972,
1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988, Connecticut voted for the Republican
presidential candidates. From 1960 through 1988, the Democrats
carried the state of Connecticut in three presidential election
contests, while the Republicans were victorious in five.
Several presidential contests in Connecticut between 1960 and
1988 were exceptionally competitive, while several were landslide
elections. In the presidential election of 1960, Massachusetts
Senator John F. Kennedy won 53.7 percent of the vote in
Connecticut, while Richard M. Nixon, a former California senator
and vice-president under President Dwight Eisenhower, won 46.3
percent of the vote, a 7.4 point margin of victory for the
Democratic candidate. Both Kennedy and Nixon were regarded as
centrist presidential candidates. The election of 1964 was a
Democratic landslide. President Lyndon B. Johnson, a former Texas
senator and vice-president under President Kennedy, and who
succeeded to the presidency following Kennedy’s assassination,
secured 67.8 percent of the vote in Connecticut, compared to 32.1
percent won by conservative Arizona Republican Senator Barry
Goldwater. This was an enormous 35.7 point margin of victory for
the incumbent president. In 1968, Hubert Humphrey, a former
Minnesota senator and vice-president under Johnson, won 49.5
percent of the vote in Connecticut, while Nixon won 44.3 percent,
a somewhat narrow 5.2 point margin for the centrist Democrat.
Third-party candidate George Wallace, a charismatic states’ rights
governor from Alabama who supported racial segregation, won 6.1
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percent of the total vote in Connecticut in 1968. The election of
1972 recorded yet another landslide, with President Nixon winning
58.6 percent of the vote compared to South Dakota Senator George
McGovern’s 40.1 percent, an 18.5 point margin between the two
candidates.3 McGovern was regarded as one of the most liberal
presidential candidates ever to be nominated by the Democratic
Party. The election of 1976 was once again highly competitive.
President Gerald Ford, a moderate Republican, won 52 percent of
Connecticut’s vote while Georgia Governor and moderate
Democrat Jimmy Carter won 47 percent, a slim 5 point margin for
the Republican candidate. The election of 1980 was nearly a
landslide in Connecticut with conservative Republican Ronald
Reagan, a former California governor, winning 48.2 percent of the
state’s popular vote compared to 38.5 percent for the besieged
President Carter. This was a 9.7 percent margin of victory for
Reagan. Third-party candidate John Anderson, a moderate
Republican Congressman from Illinois, received 12.3 percent of
Connecticut’s total vote in 1980. As in 1964 and 1972, the election
of 1984 was also a major landslide. President Reagan, running for
reelection, received 60.7 percent of the vote in Connecticut, while
liberal Democrat Walter Mondale, the former Senator from
Minnesota and vice president under President Carter, polled only
38.9 percent. Reagan’s 21.8 percentage point margin of victory in
Connecticut exceeded that recorded for Nixon in 1972. Intense
two-party competition returned with the election of 1988. George
Bush, a moderately conservative Republican who had served two
terms as Reagan’s vice president, garnered 51.9 percent of
Connecticut’s vote compared to 46.9 percent for Massachusetts
Governor Michael Dukakis, a 5 point difference.4 Like Mondale,
Dukakis was also considered one of the more liberal Democrats
during that point in time.
Beginning in 1992, the Connecticut electorate began voting for
Democratic presidential candidates on a routine and predictable
basis. In 1992, Arkansas governor Bill Clinton, considered one of
the most talented governors in the nation, received 42.2 percent of
the state’s popular vote, while President George Bush received 35.7
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percent of the vote, a 6.5 percent margin of victory. The mercurial
and populist H. Ross Perot, running as a third-party candidate,
won 21.5 percent of the vote, an extraordinary showing for a thirdparty presidential candidate. The election of 1992 would prove to
be the last competitive presidential contest in Connecticut for
quite some time.
In 1996, Connecticut voted overwhelmingly to reelect
President Bill Clinton. President Clinton won 52.9 percent of the
state’s popular vote, while the conservative Kansas Senator Bob
Dole secured only 34.6 percent. President Clinton’s 18.3 point
margin was practically identical to that of President Nixon’s in
1972. Perot, running once again as a third-party candidate, received
only 10 percent of the state’s vote, less than half of what he received
in the previous election.
In election year 2000, Al Gore, a former U.S. senator from
Tennessee and vice president under President Clinton, won 55.9
percent of the vote in Connecticut. Gore’s running mate was the
U.S. Senator from Connecticut, Joe Lieberman. Conservative Texas
Governor George W. Bush, who would win the presidency
following an unprecedented U.S. Supreme Court ruling concerning
a disputed recount in Florida, received only 38.4 percent of
Connecticut’s vote. Gore’s 17.5 percentage point margin over Bush
in Connecticut could be attributed not only to Lieberman’s
popularity with Connecticut voters, but also to the liberal drift of
the state’s population in recent years.
In 2004, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, known for his
liberal stance on multiple policy issues, won 54.3 percent of
Connecticut’s popular vote. President Bush, who would win his
reelection bid, received 43.9 percent of the state’s vote. Kerry’s 10.4
percent landslide win over Bush was revealing with respect to
Connecticut’s political and ideological posture.5
As we examine the results for Connecticut, it is evident that of
the four most recent presidential elections, only the election of 1992
resulted in less than a ten point margin of victory for the
Democratic candidate. The 1996, 2000, and 2004 elections in
Connecticut were Democratic landslides, with margins of 18.3,
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17.5 and, 10.4 percentage points respectively. Three landslide
Democratic victories in a row, two of which were overwhelming
victories, suggest a state that has become exceptionally hospitable to
Democratic presidential candidates.
Democratic presidential candidates have also done very well
with little variation among the state’s congressional districts. In
1992, Bill Clinton won congressional districts one, two, three, and
six.6 Congressional districts four and five were won by President
Bush.7 However, in the election of 1996, President Clinton won
the most votes in each of Connecticut’s six congressional districts.
In the 2000 presidential election, Al Gore also carried every
congressional district in Connecticut. In 2004, John Kerry, like
Gore and Clinton before him, won every congressional district,
which now numbered five.8 In essence, every congressional district
in Connecticut for the past three presidential contests could have
been colored “blue.”
Connecticut’s Congressional Delegation
Heading into the 2006 congressional mid-term election,
Connecticut’s congressional delegation consisted of three
Republicans and two Democrats. While this might seem odd in a
state designated as blue, and one in which Democratic presidential
candidates have been winning every congressional district, the fact
of the matter is that Connecticut’s congressional Republicans were
a far cry from the ideologically conservative Republicans elected
from the red states of the West and South. In the tradition of
“Rockefeller Republicanism,”9 the three congressional Republicans
were for all intents and purposes moderate in their politics and
policy pursuits. The moderate political center describes the political
orientation of former Congresswoman Nancy L. Johnson of the
fifth congressional district. Former Congressman Robert R.
Simmons of the second congressional district was also described as
a very moderate Republican. Congressman Christopher H. Shays of
the fourth congressional district was and is more moderate than
Johnson and Simmons. Shays is in fact frequently described as a
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“liberal” Republican. The moderate to liberal positions embraced
by the three Republican members of Congress explain their
electoral success.10
Ratings published by the Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA), a liberal lobbying organization founded in 1947, reveal
how moderate Connecticut’s Republican congressional delegation
was compared to their Republican counterparts in Congress. On
a scale of 0-100, with 0 representing the most conservative rating
and 100 the most liberal, ADA’s average rating for Republicans in
the U.S. Congress, which includes the House and Senate, is 12.11
Clearly, the vast majority of Republicans in Congress vote in a
conservative direction on legislative roll calls. A collective rating of
12 is also a reflection of the intense partisan polarization currently
present in Congress. In contrast, however, Connecticut’s
Republican congressional delegation received an average ADA
rating of 56. Congressman Simmons was rated 55, Congressman
Shays 70, and Congresswoman Johnson 45. Very few Republicans
in Congress received similar ratings. Indeed, Congressman Shays
was rated as the most liberal of all House and Senate Republicans.
The only Republicans with ratings of 45 or higher included
Representative Michael Castle from Delaware (50), Representative
James Leach from Iowa (55), Representative Mark Kirk from
Illinois (45), the two Senators from Maine, Olympia Snowe (65)
and Susan Collins (45), Representative Charles Bass from New
Hampshire (45), Senator Arlen Specter from Pennsylvania (45),
Rhode Island Senator Lincoln Chafee (55), and Representative
Ronald Paul from Texas (50). The ADA ratings indicate that among
the twelve most moderate Republicans in Congress, one-fourth are
from the state of Connecticut.
With regard to the Democratic House and Senate members
from Connecticut, the ADA ratings suggested that Christopher J.
Dodd is one of the most liberal members of Congress with a score
of 100. Senator Joseph Lieberman received an ADA rating of 75,
which is certainly on the liberal side of the continuum, but
considerably less liberal than the rating for the state’s senior senator.
Congresswoman Rosa L. DeLauro, who represents Connecticut’s
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third congressional district, received an ADA rating of 100, an
identical score to that of her mentor and former boss Senator
Dodd.12 Congressman John B. Larson, who represents
Connecticut’s first congressional district, also received a perfect
liberal rating of 100. The ratings of Connecticut’s Democratic
House and Senate members further support the frequent assertion
that Connecticut is a very blue state.
State Politics
Presidential election results and the ideological orientation of a
state’s congressional delegation are both useful indicators of a state’s
political leanings. Federal politics tend to involve a range of
domestic and foreign policy issues that manifest themselves in value
judgments on the part of the American people. The polarization of
the American electorate in the twenty-first century and the current
red state versus blue state dichotomy is a reflection of the highly
contentious character of national rather than state politics.
Nevertheless, in the United States politics is both a national and
subnational affair, and to capture the political predisposition of a
state one must also examine dimensions of political activity below
the federal level. Gubernatorial and state legislative politics are
useful for this purpose.
The Governorship
Connecticut’s governors for the past fifty years, regardless of
party stripe, have been moderate in their views and stances.
Democratic governors Abraham Ribicoff (1955-61), John Dempsey
(1961-71), Ella T. Grasso (1975-80), and William A. O’Neill
(1980-91) were essentially moderate Democrats who governed
without ideological agendas. They were Democrats in the
traditional sense in that they favored a somewhat expanded role of
government and looked to unions, urban areas, minority groups,
and the working class for political support. Republican governors
John Davis Lodge (1951-55), Thomas J. Meskill (1971-75), John G.
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Rowland (1995-2004), and M. Jodi Rell (2004 to the present) drew
their political support from the suburbs, wealthier voters, business
interests, and the white-collar class. Nevertheless, Connecticut’s
Republican governors, in the tradition of Rockefeller Republicans,
were also moderate in their approach to governance. Years of a state
legislature under the control of the Democratic Party also
encouraged Republican governors to embrace centrist and at times
liberal causes. Even Governor Rowland, who had gained a
reputation as a brashly conservative congressman, endorsed liberal
positions on social and moral issues. His unparalleled support for
urban renewal in several of Connecticut’s cities was also surprising,
given his Republican credentials.
As the state’s Lieutenant Governor, M. Jodi Rell succeeded to
the governorship following Governor Rowland’s resignation from
office, the end result of a scandal that consumed the Rowland
administration and several close associates. During her tenure in
office Governor Rell has enjoyed extraordinarily high public
approval ratings, which have hovered between 75 and 80 percent.
Governor Rell’s support is also uniform across the eight counties
of Connecticut and very high among Republicans, Democrats,
and unaffiliated voters. She is also popular among both women
and men.13
Although Governor Rell’s unpretentious and down-to-earth
persona is relevant to her approval ratings, it is really the governor’s
politics more than any other variable, including a healthy state
economy during her tenure in office, that explains her broad base of
popular support. Governor Rell, not surprisingly, supports positions
that reflect the moderate to liberal character of the state’s
population. For example, Governor Rell supported legislation that
allows for civil unions in Connecticut. Moreover, the Governor
endorsed campaign finance reform, along with legislation that
would expedite stem cell research. Support for civil unions,
campaign finance reform, and stem-cell research are positions
traditionally embraced by Democratic politicians, not Republicans.
Governor Rell’s support for such issues clearly coincides with the
values of the Connecticut citizenry. The Governor is also pro-choice

60

HOW “BLUE” IS CONNECTICUT?

on the abortion issue. Governor Rell’s popularity among the
Connecticut citizenry was more than evident in the 2006 election.
The Governor received 63 percent of the vote compared to 35
percent for Democratic challenger and Mayor of New Haven, John
DeStefano.14
Prior to the Rowland/Rell Administration, Connecticut
experienced one of the most liberal and free-thinking governors in
modern times. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (1991-95), elected as a thirdparty candidate, embraced numerous liberal causes. In addition to
his liberal stance on moral issues, Governor Weicker was an
adamant supporter of public school desegregation in Connecticut,
even to the point of urging a radical redrawing and merging of local
urban and suburban school districts. It was also Weicker who
engineered Connecticut’s highly controversial personal income tax,
a policy that led to a massive and quasi-violent public protest on the
lawn of the state Capitol. Formerly a three term Republican Senator
and well known for his “maverick” political style, Weicker’s conduct
as a United States senator and as Connecticut’s governor personified
in many ways the brand of moderate to liberal politics endorsed by
a sizeable contingent of the Connecticut electorate. Weicker was the
quintessential Rockefeller Republican.15
State Legislative Elections
State legislative elections provide additional proof of a state’s
political complexion. From 1967 to the present, the Democratic
Party in Connecticut has enjoyed dominance over the state house of
representatives. With the exception of 1973-74 and 1985-86, the
Democrats have consecutively won a majority of seats in the lower
house of the General Assembly. From 1987 to 2005, the Democrats
on average have occupied 62 percent of the seats, a most
comfortable margin of power. In the mid-term election of 2006, the
Democrats increased their power in the state house by garnering 70
percent of the seats. To further complicate matters for the
Republicans, shortly after the election, Republican state
representative Diana Urban from North Stonington, who represents
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the forty-third legislative district, announced that she had decided
to switch parties and join the Democratic caucus. Urban’s defection
increased the Democrats’ share of seats in the house to 71 percent.
Democrats have also enjoyed control over the state senate,
although the ratio of Democrats to Republicans has been much
closer. Like their Republican colleagues in the state house, senate
Republicans occupied a majority of seats in 1973-74 and again from
1985-86. The Republicans also held a majority of senate seats from
1995-96. However, from 1997 to the present, the Democratic Party
has ruled the senate, with the ratio of Democrats to Republicans
expanding during this time period. From 1997 through 2000,
Democrats controlled 52 percent of the seats, while the Republicans
occupied 48 percent. In raw numbers, this was only a two seat
margin. From 2001 to 2004, however, the average percentage of
Democratic seats grew to 56 percent, while in 2005-06, the
percentage Democratic seats increased to 64 percent.16 In the
election of 2006, the Democrats won 67 percent of the senate seats.
The 2006 election therefore resulted in a veto-proof Democratic
majority in the Connecticut General Assembly, yet another
indication of a state that has become very “blue.”
It should also be noted that while there are safe legislative seats
within both political parties, the evidence shows a distinct
advantage for the Democratic Party in this regard. In the 2004 state
legislative elections, 82 percent of seats in the state house of
representatives were either uncontested by one of the major political
parties, or won by a margin of 10 or more percentage points. Of
those house seats in either the uncontested or “safe” category, 68
percent were held by the Democrats. The same pattern appeared in
the 2004 state senate contests. Eighty percent of senate seats were
either uncontested or won by margins of 10 or more points, and
within this category of non-competitive seats, two-thirds were won
by Democratic candidates.17 Granted, state legislative elections are
very localized election contests and normally not characterized by
the “wedge issues” that dominate national politics. Nevertheless,
Democratic and Republican candidates for the Connecticut state
legislature disagree on issues, most notably taxing and spending
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priorities, and while the ideological orientation of Connecticut
politics may not be fully gauged from the results of such localized
contests, the data still shed light on the political leanings of the
state’s electorate.
Public Opinion in Connecticut
One of the very best measures of a state’s political orientation
involves the attitudes of its citizens towards social, political, and
economic issues. Collectively, such attitudes comprise a state’s
“public opinion.” Public opinion polls are the most common
means of evaluating where the residents of a state stand on a range
of policy issues. Public opinion polls are scientifically conducted
and by using refined and time-tested methodologies they allow one
to generalize about the orientations of a state’s population from a
relatively small but representative sample of adults. For the purpose
of this inquiry, the polling results of the Quinnipiac University Poll
should prove instructive.
Released on April 7, 2005, a Quinnipiac Poll based on a sample
of 1,541 registered voters discovered that a majority of Connecticut
residents were very tolerant with regard to the contentious issue of
civil unions. Fifty-six percent of persons surveyed favored a law that
would support same sex unions in the state of Connecticut. Thirtyseven percent of persons were opposed to such legislation.
Connecticut residents, however, were found to be less tolerant
towards gay marriage, with 53 percent of respondents opposed to a
law that would establish this right. Forty-two percent of persons
polled favored a law protecting gay marriage. On both issues,
however, the residents of Connecticut were more liberal than the
nation as a whole.18
With respect to the highly volatile and politically divisive issue
of abortion, a Quinnipiac Poll released on May 2, 2006, discovered
that 31 percent of Connecticut residents believed that abortion
should be legal in “all cases,” while 38 percent supported legalized
abortion in “most cases.” The two figures combined suggest that a
very large majority (69 percent) of the state’s adult population favor
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the right to abortion. Beyond support for abortion, 78 percent of
persons polled also expressed support for a law that would require
Connecticut hospitals, including those of a Catholic denomination,
to provide victims of rape with emergency contraception. Support
for legislation requiring emergency measures in hospitals was also
evident across demographic groups. The poll discovered 69 percent
of Republicans, 85 percent of Democrats, 79 percent of
Independents, 75 percent of men, 81 percent of women, and 84
percent of Catholics in agreement with such a law.19
The public’s attitude towards the war in Iraq and President
George W. Bush’s job performance are additional indicators of a
state’s political posture. In Connecticut, it should come as no
surprise in light of the state’s presidential voting pattern that a
large majority of residents are both opposed to the war in Iraq and
have serious doubts about the competency and judgment of
President Bush. A Quinnipiac Poll released on June 8, 2006,
found that 63 percent of respondents were of the opinion that the
war in Iraq was the “wrong thing to do.” This was an eleven point
increase in the level of opposition to the war over the course of the
past two years. Moreover, attitudes towards President Bush seemed
closely related to attitudes towards the war. Seventy-two percent of
persons polled stated that they disapproved of George W. Bush’s
performance as president.20
Public opinion polls leave little doubt that Connecticut’s
citizens are moderate to liberal in their political orientations.
The 2006 Congressional Mid-Term Election
Lieberman versus Lamont: The Historic Democratic Primary
Perhaps no other event in recent years demonstrates more
convincingly how blue Connecticut has become than the August 8,
2006, Democratic primary election between incumbent U.S.
Senator Joe Lieberman and challenger Ned Lamont. Lamont, a
millionaire from Greenwich, who made his fortune in cable
television contracts with colleges and universities, decided to
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challenge Lieberman, who was seeking his fourth term in office.
The central issue in the primary campaign was clearly the war in
Iraq. Lamont opposed the war and advocated an American
withdrawal. Lieberman supported the war and favored continued
American involvement until the Iraqi government could be
stabilized, essentially the same position as that of President Bush.
In the very early stages of the campaign, it appeared that
Lieberman faced little opposition from Lamont and was once again
coasting to reelection. A Quinnipiac Poll released on May 2, 2006,
showed Lieberman with 65 percent support among likely
Democratic voters to Lamont’s 19 percent.21 At this point in time,
Lamont had little name recognition and his campaign was in an
embryonic stage.
The Lamont campaign eventually went on the offensive with
very dynamic campaign ads featuring the candidate surrounded by
energetic young voters enthusiastically endorsing his candidacy.
Lamont depicted the war in Iraq as a misguided foreign policy
venture in terms of lives lost, lives ruined, and billions of dollars
squandered. Lamont’s anti-war message resonated with voters. A
Quinnipiac Poll among likely Democratic voters released on June 8
showed Lieberman’s support at 55 percent compared to Lamont’s
40 percent. The Lamont campaign was clearly gaining momentum.
In an effort to reverse the tide of growing support for Lamont,
Lieberman forcefully defended his eighteen years as a United States
senator. He emphasized his experience, seniority, and impressive
record of constituency service. Lieberman not only stressed his long
record of public service as a state lawmaker, state attorney general,
and his tenure in the Senate, but also his deep roots within the
Democratic Party.
Sensing a possible loss to Lamont in the Democratic primary
scheduled for August 8, Senator Lieberman began a petition drive
that would allow him to run as a third-party candidate in the
November election in the event he lost the primary. Connecticut
election law required that a petition with the requisite number of
signatures be presented to the Secretary of State’s Office on August
9, one day after the primary election. Throughout his political
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career in Connecticut, Lieberman had received strong support
among moderate Democrats, Republicans, and unaffiliated voters.
Thus, in Lieberman’s view, he could win the general election,
despite a defeat in the Democratic primary.
By the middle of the summer, the primary campaign between
Lieberman and Lamont had become the focus of national attention.
Media commentators, political pundits, and columnists were
describing the primary contest as a “referendum” on the war in Iraq.
Some analysts went so far as to describe Connecticut’s primary as a
referendum on the Bush presidency, due to Lieberman’s close
association with the president. Supporters of Lamont were quick to
remind voters of how President Bush embraced and kissed Joe
Lieberman on the floor of the House of Representatives following
the President’s 2005 State of the Union Address. “Remember the
Kiss,” became one of the rallying cries of the Lamont campaign.
A spirited and combative televised debate on the evening of July
6 between the two Democrats further elevated the status of
challenger Lamont. Although the political novice seemed
outmatched at the start of the debate in terms of poise and
substance, he quickly gained confidence and composure as the
debate wore on. Much to the surprise of debate watchers, Lamont
demonstrated a command over an array of domestic issues in
addition to foreign policy. Although opposition to the Iraq war was
the centerpiece of the Lamont campaign, it was now evident that
the challenger was not a single-issue candidate. The debate served to
bolster Lamont’s bid for the Democratic Party’s nomination. A
Quinnipiac Poll released on July 20, 2006, showed Lamont at 51
percent among likely Democratic voters with Lieberman at 47
percent. The challenger had eclipsed the incumbent.
Following the debate, both campaigns went into overdrive.
Both candidates feverishly crisscrossed the state, delivering speeches
before large crowds and airing powerful campaign ads. Several ads,
as expected, castigated the opponent in derisive terms. Both
candidates engaged in negative campaigning. As the August 8
primary approached, it became evident that Lamont’s campaign
strategy and anti-war message had effectively mobilized many
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Democratic voters. A Quinnipiac Poll released on August 3, only
five days prior to the primary, showed Lamont with a commanding
lead among likely Democratic voters, 54 percent to 41 percent.
Some pundits suggested that a landslide primary victory for Lamont
was a distinct possibility.
The 13 point lead, however, provided to be somewhat fleeting.
On August 7, the day before the primary, a Quinnipiac Poll showed
Lamont’s lead cut to 6 points, 51 percent to 45 percent. It was
evident that a portion of Democratic voters who might have
initially turned against Lieberman were now reevaluating their
support for the inexperienced challenger. Leading political
personalities also appeared in Connecticut on behalf of both
candidates during the final days of the primary campaign. President
Clinton visited Connecticut to endorse Lieberman, while Jesse
Jackson, Al Sharpton, and California Congresswoman Maxine
Waters campaigned on behalf of Lamont. The primary election was
intensely covered by all the major networks, especially MSNBC’s
Chris Matthews. Throughout the summer of 2006 the tiny state of
Connecticut, with slightly more than three million residents, was
the epicenter of American politics.
Ned Lamont won the August 8 primary with 52 percent of the
vote to Lieberman’s 48 percent. The Secretary of State’s office
reported voter turnout in the August primary at 43 percent of
registered Democrats, an unprecedented level of participation in a
primary election in Connecticut. Although the election was very
close, the primary contest was nevertheless a momentous event and
described as a major upset. A three-term incumbent Senator, who
had run for President in 2004 and who had had been tabbed as the
Democratic Party’s vice-presidential running mate in 2000, was
defeated in a primary election by a political neophyte. In American
politics, such a development is almost without precedent. Ned
Lamont’s powerful anti-war message, which reflected the mood of
the Democratic Party in Connecticut, combined with a masterful
campaign meticulously directed by Lamont’s campaign manager,
Tom Swann, resulted in Lamont’s stunning primary victory. It was
a historic primary election with potentially national implications.
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In a less than magnanimous concession speech, Senator
Lieberman congratulated Lamont on his primary victory, but
quickly added that the election results reflected political
polarization and the politics of the past. Comparing the Senate
contest to a sporting event, Lieberman stated that the Lamont
campaign had won the first half of the game, while the second half,
which was just now beginning, would be won by him. The Senator
announced that he would continue his campaign for reelection to
the U.S. Senate as an “Independent Democrat.” The following day,
in compliance with state law, Lieberman’s petition for a third-party
candidacy with the required number of signatures was filed with the
Secretary of State’s Office. His “third party” was officially named
“Connecticut for Lieberman.”
With respect to voting behavior within the primary election,
there appeared to be a very clear class division within the
Democratic Party. Lamont received a significant portion of his
support from young, well-educated, and liberal anti-war
Democrats, many of whom were located in the more affluent towns
of Connecticut. Liberal bloggers were also strong supporters of the
Lamont campaign, although it is difficult to determine if blogs such
as “My Left Nutmeg,” “Firedog Lake,” and the “DailyKos” merely
reinforced the views of young voters or actually structured political
orientations towards the two candidates. Several pundits have
suggested that the “blogosphere” propelled the Lamont candidacy,
although such generalizations need to be supported with additional
research. The appearance of Internet bloggers was first observed
during the 2004 presidential campaign of liberal Democrat and
former Vermont governor Howard Dean.
Senator Lieberman was supported in the primary by moderate
and older Democrats, organized labor, and urban voters. The
Connecticut chapter of the AFL-CIO had endorsed Lieberman at
its state convention, although the endorsement was for the primary
only, not the general election. Lieberman’s close association with the
Bush administration explains why the unions issued a qualified
endorsement. Unlike Lamont’s support among the affluent
Connecticut suburbs, Lieberman’s principal base of support
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appeared to be Connecticut’s cities. Election results revealed that the
only communities in Connecticut where Lieberman actually won
the most votes were the five cities with populations of over 100,000.
This included the cities of Hartford, Waterbury, New Haven,
Bridgeport, and Norwich. The class division in the Democratic
primary contest was acute.22
Following the Democratic primary, the race for the U.S. Senate
was predicted to be very close. A post-primary Rasmussen Poll of
500 likely voters conducted during August 9-10 and released on
August 12 showed Lieberman with a 5 point lead over Lamont, 46
percent to 41 percent. Alan Schlesinger, the Republican nominee,
was supported by only 6 percent of likely voters. Schlesinger, a
former state lawmaker and mayor of Derby, was never considered a
viable candidate after it was learned that he had gambled at one of
Connecticut’s casinos under the alias Alan Gold. It was also revealed
that Schlesinger was sued by a New Jersey casino over a gambling
debt. Despite the Republican establishment’s plea for Schlesinger to
withdraw his candidacy, and despite the fact that President Bush
refused to endorse his bid for office, the combative Schlesinger
remained in the race.
The campaign themes of the three candidates were somewhat
predictable. Senator Lieberman continued to stress his experience
and emphasized his bipartisan approach to governing. The Senator
presented himself as an experienced and practical consensus builder
in an age of destructive party polarization. Ned Lamont continued
to criticize the war in Iraq and the Bush administration’s foreign
policy. At the same time, Lamont attempted to expand his appeal
beyond his Democratic base by discussing domestic issues, such as
Social Security, education and job growth. Schlesinger, who
performed remarkably well in the three debates, presented himself
as the only true conservative in the race. Schlesinger tried to rally
Republican voters on his behalf by depicting both Lieberman and
Lamont as liberal Democrats.
On election day, Senator Lieberman prevailed in a fairly
convincing fashion, thus winning a fourth consecutive term to the
U.S. Senate. His strategy of forming a third party and running as an
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“Independent Democrat” proved to be successful. The incumbent
senator won 50 percent of the vote, while Lamont received 40
percent, thus leaving Schlesinger with a mere 10 percent.23
Lieberman’s emphasis on experience and his bipartisan approach
resonated with voters across the political spectrum, particularly
among Republicans and Independents. Exit polls indicated that 70
percent of Republican, 54 percent of Independent, and 33 percent
of Democratic voters opted for Lieberman. Sixty-five percent of
Democratic voters supported Lamont, along with 35 percent of
Independents, and only 8 percent of Republicans. Lamont had
limited success in expanding his base beyond the Democratic Party.
Twenty-one percent of Republican voters supported Schlesinger,
along with 10 percent of Independent and only 2 percent of
Democratic voters.24 Schlesinger appealed to a very small slice of
conservative voters who chose to remain loyal to the Republican
Party’s official candidate. Although Senator Lieberman was and is a
supporter of the ongoing war in Iraq, the 2006 U.S. senate election
was in reality a contest between a very liberal Democrat (Lamont)
and a moderately liberal Democrat (Lieberman); in essence a
contest between two Democrats. The conservative Republican
candidate Alan Schlesinger for all intents and purposes was a
marginal presence in the campaign. Generally speaking, the
Republican Party was barely noticeable.
The Five House Seats
The races for the five seats for the House of Representatives
continue to document a steady and growing liberal pattern of
politics in Connecticut. Two of the three moderate Republicans
were defeated in their bid for reelection by liberal Democrats. In the
fifth congressional district, Republican Congresswoman Nancy
Johnson, who at the start of the campaign seemed certain to win
reelection, lost to thirty-two year old Democratic state senator
Christopher Murphy. These results were shocking. Murphy won 57
percent of the vote to Johnson’s 43 percent, a landslide victory for
the youthful Democrat.25 Connecting Johnson to President Bush
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and emphasizing the Congresswoman’s close association with special
interest groups was at the core of Murphy’s strategy. While such a
strategy certainly contributed to Murphy’s victory, the deciding
factor, in this author’s view, appeared to be Johnson’s own distasteful,
personal, and negative ads, which undoubtedly caused many voters
to question her sense of ethics and fair play. Johnson’s ads, which
were orchestrated by the Republican Congressional Campaign
Committee, resulted in Murphy winning the fifth congressional
district. Congresswoman Johnson self-destructed in 2006.
Republican Congressman Rob Simmons in the second
congressional district lost his seat to Democrat Joseph Courtney, a
former state representative who had previously challenged Simmons
in 2002. The election was the closest of all the House races in the
United States, with Courtney winning 50.1 percent of the vote to
Simmons’ 49.9 percent. The legally required recount revealed
several inaccurate tallies in the original results. However, after
several days of carefully recounting ballots, Courtney was awarded
the seat by a margin of 91 votes. The election in Connecticut’s
second congressional district lends further credence to the old adage
that every person’s vote truly matters. In 2006, Courtney’s portrayal
of Simmons as an ally of President Bush seemed to be the deciding
factor. Like many House races across the land, the Democrats had
successfully nationalized the contest for Connecticut’s second
congressional district.
The results in the fourth congressional district proved to be a
surprise to many political pundits, for it was here that the
Republican incumbent was deemed to be the most vulnerable
compared to his counterparts in the fifth and second districts.
Nevertheless, Republican Congressman Christopher Shays
prevailed by winning 51 percent of the vote to Diane Farrell’s 48
percent. Farrell, who had served as First Selectwoman of Westport,
had also challenged Shays in 2004, losing that contest by only 4
percentage points. Throughout the campaign, Shays was deemed an
endangered incumbent due to his unwavering support for the war
in Iraq. Pundits speculated that Farrell’s strategy of linking Shays to
the war, and more generally the Bush administration, would result
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in the incumbent’s political demise. Why Congressman Shays won
reelection is difficult to precisely pinpoint, although several
variables seemed relevant. In this author’s view, the major reason
why Shays was able to win reelection was due to his late summer
announcement following his fourteenth fact finding trip to Iraq that
he would entertain the possibility of timetables for a phased U.S.
withdrawal from the war. His support for timetables suggested to
swing voters that the Congressman was flexible and adaptable
regarding his position on the Iraq war. This was key to his survival
in the fourth congressional district.
Additional variables were also at work in this contest. The
working class city of Bridgeport, a bastion of Democratic politics,
failed to deliver a large vote for Farrell. The Democratic Party
machine was less than enamored of the well-to-do former
selectwoman from the wealthy town of Westport. Moreover, Shays,
who is originally from Stamford, is now a homeowner and resident
of Bridgeport. Although not a native of the city, the Congressman
managed to forge important ties with the city’s political
establishment. One can also point to the favorable perceptions many
voters have towards Chris Shays as a person. He is well-liked by his
constituents and deemed by many to be an ethical and thoughtful
public servant. One is hard pressed to find a person in the fourth
congressional district who dislikes Chris Shays. Many people know
the Congressman and respect him. Additionally, one needs to cite
the Congressman’s exceptionally effective staff located in the city of
Bridgeport. For many years the Congressman’s personal staff has met
the needs of his constituents. Finally, Shays’s strong support for
campaign finance reform, which was at odds with his party’s
congressional leadership, further contributed to his support among
reform-minded voters. Voters in the Fourth Congressional District
appreciated Congressman Shays’s “maverick spirit.” Thus, a
confluence of factors seemed to contribute to Congressman Shays’s
reelection victory. His reelection was surprising to many, but in
retrospect it was an understandable outcome.
The two races in the first and third congressional districts were
foregone conclusions and for the most part received very little
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media coverage. Both seats are extremely safe Democratic seats, with
the results never in doubt. Congressman John Larson in the first
congressional district won 75 percent of the vote compared to
Republican challenger Scott MacLean’s 25 percent. In the third
congressional district, Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro won 76
percent of the vote, while the Republican challenger Joseph Vollano
received only 22 percent. Republican congressional candidates are
essentially sacrificial lambs in both districts with little possibility of
staging an upset. The socio-economic and political demographics of
both congressional districts and the popularity of both Larson and
DeLauro among their constituents explain the overwhelming
Democratic landslides.
The results of the 2006 federal and state elections should leave
little doubt that Connecticut politics has become very favorable
towards the Democratic Party. With some rare exceptions, such as
Governor Rell and Congressman Shays, Connecticut is firmly in the
Democratic column. Conservative and even moderate Republican
office-holders are now a very distinct minority. Can the Republican
Party stage a comeback? What will it take to revitalize the GOP?
These are legitimate questions that face Republican Party strategists
in the years ahead.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Mechanisms for Political Participation

F

or a democratic political system to function effectively, it is
essential for citizens to have opportunities to participate in the
political process. Thus, a government “for and by the people”
requires political mechanisms that facilitate citizen involvement.
The most effective way in which citizens can engage in and thus
exert influence on the political process is by participating in
elections, political parties, and interest groups. In this chapter, I
explore each of these mechanisms.
Elections
Voting in elections is the most basic and least demanding means
of participating in the political process. The opportunity to vote is
one of the many freedoms enjoyed by the American people. Voting
is a civil right that should never be taken for granted. Indeed, the
existence of this right is what separates free countries from those
under the yoke of totalitarian rule.
Like other states across the land, Connecticut politics is
characterized by routine and frequent elections. During oddnumbered years, eligible voters can participate in local elections.
Elections for a wide variety of local governmental posts occur in
every one of Connecticut’s 169 municipalities. Due to the home
rule provision in the state constitution, towns and cities in
Connecticut are allowed to create their own unique form of local
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government. Local government charters adopted by communities
reflect the form of government that best serves the inhabitants of
individual towns and cities. On occasion, a local community will
adopt a new model of government in response to the town’s
changing economic, social, and political conditions. For example,
the residents of Stratford in 2005 voted to change their local charter
from a Council-Manager to a Council-Mayor form of government.
Stratford now features a strong mayoral office with the mayor
elected to a four year term.
In addition to electing mayors, councilors, or selectmen, local
communities typically elect a variety of board members and
commissioners. For example, local Boards of Education are elected
in most Connecticut communities, along with Planning and
Zoning Commissioners. Although town managers are appointed by
town councils in several of Connecticut’s communities, there is still
no escaping the fact that local elected officials are the primary
persons who structure and determine the quality of life in
Connecticut’s towns and cities. Elected local officials determine
many policies, including mill rates, property taxes, school budgets,
support for sports teams, additions to public schools, local school
curricula, and community development. Local elections are critical
events that directly affect a community’s way of life.
During even-numbered years, the citizens of Connecticut have
the opportunity to elect state and federal public officials. At the
state level, candidates for the state house of representatives and state
senate are directly elected by the people every two years. One
hundred and fifty-one seats in the state house of representatives and
thirty-six seats in the state senate are elected. As noted in the
previous chapter, many of these seats, unfortunately, are either
uncontested or non-competitive; this has become a troubling trend
in Connecticut politics.
Every four years, the residents of Connecticut also elect the
state governor and lieutenant governor, both of whom run on the
same ticket. At the same time, several statewide public officials who
occupy offices established in the state constitution are also elected.
The “constitutional offices,” as they are known, include the offices
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of attorney general, secretary of state, state treasurer, and state
comptroller.
In addition to elections for state offices, federal elections for the
U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, and the American
Presidency will also take place during even-numbered years. Such
elections are conducted coterminously with the state elections.
To vote in a general election in Connecticut, one must be a
registered voter and a minimum of eighteen years of age. Registering
to vote in Connecticut is a fairly simple process. Voter registration
cards, readily available in government offices and public libraries,
can be completed and mailed to the attention of the Registrar of
Voters in one’s hometown. Individuals can also register in person at
their local town clerk’s office, or download and complete a
registration form from the Internet. Moreover, persons can register
by completing the appropriate information on the form supplied by
the Department of Motor Vehicles when applying for or renewing
their driver’s license. The latter registration process is the result of
the National Voter Registration Act signed into law by President
Clinton in 1993. The law, intended to stimulate voter turnout in
the United States, was commonly referred to as the “Motor Voter
Act.” When registering as a voter, individuals can declare a party
affiliation or select the unaffiliated category. Connecticut law
requires that mailed registration forms be postmarked or received at
an appropriate registration office at least fourteen days prior to an
election. In-person registration must be completed at least seven
days before election day.1 Connecticut does not have “same day” or
on-site voter registration.
Voter participation is more restricted in primary elections than
in the general election. Despite calls to conduct “open primaries,”
in which unaffiliated voters would be allowed to vote, Connecticut’s
political parties continue to conduct “closed primaries.” The
decision to conduct open or closed primary elections was once
determined by the state legislature. However, due to a U.S. Supreme
Court ruling that emanated from Connecticut, the determination
now belongs exclusively to the parties themselves.2 In Connecticut,
to be eligible to participate in a party’s primary election a voter must
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be registered with the party. An individual who is registering as a
voter for the first time, or who is registered as an unaffiliated voter
and would like to register with a party for the purpose of voting
in the party’s primary, can register in person on the last business
day before the party conducts its primary election. Thus, if the
party’s primary is on a Tuesday, which is likely, then a new voter
or unaffiliated voter can register with the party as late as 12:00
noon on Monday, the day before the primary. If, however, a
person wishes to switch party affiliation from Democrat to
Republican, or Republican to Democrat, then he or she must
register with the party at least three months prior to the party’s
primary election.3
Registration procedures in Connecticut, along with party
nominating rules, have been criticized by political reformers for
having a restrictive impact on voter participation. Reformers argue
that little reason exists to require a specified time frame for voter
registration prior to the day of the general election. Reformers have
also urged state lawmakers to repeal the current registration law
and legislate “same day” voter registration in Connecticut.
Reformers also criticize the parties for conducting closed primaries,
and recommend instead a system of open primaries in which all
eligible voters irrespective of party allegiance are allowed to
participate. As reported by the Office of Secretary of State on
October 25, 2005, there were 699,502 registered Democrats
(33%), 453,715 registered Republicans (22%), and 929,005
registered unaffiliated voters (44%) in the state of Connecticut. A
total of 4,387 individuals (1%) were registered with minor political
parties. Thus, over forty percent of Connecticut’s electorate was
disenfranchised during the 2006 nominating process, unless they
chose, as 14,000 unaffiliated voters did, to register with a party
prior to the primary. Thus, state laws and party rules will
undoubtedly remain under much scrutiny at the state Capitol and
in party circles in years to come.
It should be noted, however, that while political reformers
advocate a more open and robust system of electoral politics in
Connecticut, voter turnout in Connecticut is still somewhat
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respectable when compared to the national average. According to
results published by the United States Elections Project, voter
turnout in Connecticut among the eligible voting population in the
2004 presidential election was 65.2 percent, while the national
average was recorded as 60.9 percent. Compared to other states,
Connecticut ranks in the top 50 percent of states in terms of voter
turnout, with only fifteen states recording higher levels of turnout
in the 2004 election.4
Turnout in primary election contests in Connecticut varies
depending on the nature of the nominating contest. Turnout in
presidential primaries has not been impressive, with a mere 5.7
percent of Democrats voting in the March 2, 2004, presidential
primary and 15 percent in the March 7, 2000, Democratic and
Republican primaries.5 The abysmal turnout in presidential
primaries is more attributable to the competitive status of the
presidential nominating contest in March than party rules or state
election laws. For all intents and purposes the presidential
nominating contest in recent elections had been decided by the time
Connecticut conducted its presidential primary. Voters thus saw
little reason to vote in a contest that was essentially over.
However, Connecticut voters will vote in very large numbers in
primary contests when the campaign is contentious and the
outcome uncertain. As noted in the previous chapter, on August 8,
2006, the Secretary of State’s Office reported that 43 percent of
registered Democrats voted in the Democratic primary that pitted
challenger Ned Lamont against incumbent Senator Joe Lieberman
for the Democratic Party’s nomination for U.S. Senate.
It should also be noted that voting machines in Connecticut
will soon be relegated to a historical footnote. In the Old Judiciary
Room of the state Capitol on August 4, 2006, Secretary of State
Susan Bysiewicz announced that beginning in 2006 and extending
into 2007, voting machines in Connecticut will be replaced by an
electronic optical scan voting system. The new system will feature
scantron sheets similar to those used by students on standardized
exams. After an extensive review of new voting systems and
presentations by several companies, the Secretary of State’s office
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selected LHS Associates from Massachusetts to receive the state
contract. Additionally, beginning in 2007, more than 200,000
Connecticut residents with disabilities will be allowed to vote at the
polling place with the assistance of a specially installed phone
system. IVS, a company based in Louisville, Kentucky, received a
one-year contract to provide this innovative service.
In order to evaluate the efficiency and accuracy of the new
electronic system, the Secretary of State’s office has entered into a
partnership with the Department of Computer Science and
Engineering at the University of Connecticut. The department’s
faculty served as consultants during the search for a new voting
mechanism and concluded that security standards had been met to
guard against hacking and manipulation of voting results. In a press
release issued on August 4, 2006 by the Secretary of State’s office,
Secretary Bysiewicz was quoted as follows:
Of all the concerns raised by citizens, academics, and
advocates, security was No. 1. UConn has played an integral
role in our decision-making up to this point. They have
reviewed vendor proposals, tested equipment, and made
recommendations for maintaining the highest level of
security in our election process. We look forward to drawing
upon their tremendous expertise as we move forward.
Connecticut’s decision to adopt new technology for voting and
to enfranchise the disabled complies with the “Help America Vote
Act,” a federal law imposed on states in the aftermath of the
controversial 2000 presidential election. Although the new
technology has been successfully field-tested in the towns of
Windsor and Vernon, time will tell if the optical scan system and
phone system for the disabled are in fact superior to conventional
voting machines. An editorial in the Hartford Courant on August
14, 2006, regarding the new voting system was entitled “Dawn of a
New Age in Voting.” By 2007, the residents of Connecticut will
know whether democracy has been enhanced by the
implementation of new voting technology.
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Political Parties
In addition to elections, political parties are also important and
vital participatory mechanisms. Political parties are not mentioned
in the United States Constitution and President George
Washington warned the American people of the divisive impact of
parties in his historic farewell address. Nevertheless, it was not long
after the American republic was formed that the two-party system
emerged. Although the names of parties and voter identification
with parties have changed throughout the years,two-party
competition has characterized American politics for over two
hundred years. At the same time, it is more than evident that
political parties, rather than corrode our country’s politics, as
President Washington suggested, have served to enhance and
cultivate the quality of American democracy. In the oft-quoted
words of E.E. Schattschneider:
The rise of political parties is indubitably one of the
principal distinguishing marks of modern government.
The parties, in fact have played a major role as makers of
government; more especially they have been makers of
democratic government. Political parties created
democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in
terms of the parties.6
Although political party organizations and their respective
leaders are nowhere near as powerful as they once were, the parties
nevertheless still perform critical tasks essential to the functioning of
a democratic system.7 Moreover, for citizens who wish to participate
in the political process, the political parties continue to provide a
direct and convenient avenue for meaningful and immediate
political participation. Thus, it is important to grasp the continued
significance of parties, despite their diminished power.
Within the context of local, state, and national politics, political
scientists have identified several critical electoral functions that are
performed by political party organizations: political parties
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nominate candidates for public office; wage campaigns; and
structure choice for the voting public at election time.8
The Nominating Process
Every election year, political parties are expected to nominate a
slate of candidates. Whether it is a federal, state, or local election
year, the parties present a team of Democratic and Republican
candidates who are prepared to serve the public should they be
elected in the general election.
Parties in Connecticut have a somewhat unique way of
nominating candidates for public office. The nominating system,
which has been in place since 1955, is a hybrid process that involves
a nominating convention followed by the possibility of a primary
election. In Connecticut, the primary is referred to as a “challenge
primary.” Connecticut was the last state in the country to adopt a
primary election law and the primary system that was finally
adopted was designed to dissuade candidates who did not have the
support of the party organization from waging a primary contest.
The mechanics of Connecticut’s hybrid nominating system are
relatively simple. Delegates are selected to attend the party’s
nominating convention. If the candidates to be nominated are
running for statewide office, such as the office of governor,
lieutenant governor, attorney general, or the U.S. Senate, then the
party will hold a statewide convention, normally in Hartford. The
convention is run by the party’s central committee and is presided
over by the party’s state chairperson. Democratic or Republican
delegates from Connecticut’s 169 local communities are chosen to
attend the convention. If the candidates are running for a districtlevel office, such as U.S. Congress, state senate or state house of
representatives, then smaller district based conventions will take
place with delegates chosen to attend from towns within the district.
In short, the process thus begins with a party convention. In most
communities, delegates selected to attend the conventions are local
town committee members along with local party activists. The
delegates are often handpicked by local party chairs to attend the
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convention. If an individual who has not been selected by the town
chair wishes to attend the convention as a delegate on behalf of a
candidate, that individual has the right to wage a “delegate
primary” within his or her party for the purpose of becoming a
convention delegate.
At the nominating convention, a roll call will take place among
the delegates. The candidate who wins the most votes at the
convention is regarded as the “convention endorsed candidate.”
Candidates who do not receive the most votes at the convention, yet
who receive a minimum of fifteen percent of the convention vote
can, if they so desire, challenge the convention endorsed candidate
in a primary election, hence the term “challenge primary.”
It should be noted, however, that a recent reform significantly
modified the challenge primary system in Connecticut. More
specifically, a candidate who does not win 15 percent or more of the
convention vote still has the option of challenging the convention
endorsed candidate in a primary by petitioning his or her way onto
the primary ballot. Thus, primaries can now occur in Connecticut
due to the outcome of the convention vote, or through the petition
process. The number of signatures required on petitions varies
depending on the office that is being contested. State election law
(Connecticut Public Act No. 03-241) requires a minimum of 2
percent of signatures among registered party members for statewide
and congressional offices. A candidate for a statewide office, such as
governor or U.S. senator, can collect signatures throughout the state,
while a congressional candidate must collect signatures within the
contested district. For the offices of state senator, state representative,
and Judge of Probate, the threshold is 5 percent of registered party
members, providing the districts are multi-town in scope.
Primary elections have been on the rise in Connecticut. Gone
are the days when a powerful party leader could intervene in a
nominating contest and dissuade a candidate from forcing a
primary. Moreover, the 15 percent rule is hardly a difficult threshold
for a candidate to overcome and the added option of petitioning
one’s way onto the ballot serves to encourage, rather than
discourage, challenges to convention-endorsed candidates.
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In 2006, primaries occurred for multiple offices in
Connecticut, suggesting that the internal cohesion of the two major
parties had become rather fractious. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the most high profile primary occurred within the
Democratic Party. Incumbent Senator Joseph Lieberman, seeking
his fourth term of office, was challenged by Ned Lamont, a
millionaire entrepreneur from Greenwich, Connecticut. The key
issue in this primary was clearly the war in Iraq.
Two Democratic candidates for governor also faced one another
in a primary contest. The mayor of New Haven, John DeStefano,
Jr., and the mayor of Stamford, Dannel Malloy, engaged one
another in a policy-centered campaign. Malloy had narrowly won a
majority of delegates at the Democratic Party’s nominating
convention, yet lost to DeStefano in a close primary contest.
Although the primary was between two successful, thoughtful;, and
innovative mayors, the gubernatorial nominating contest received
scant attention, due to the Lieberman versus Lamont primary
contest. Moreover, it was well understood that regardless of which
candidate the Democrat’s ultimately nominated as their
gubernatorial candidate, neither could defeat defeat the popular
incumbent Republican governor, M. Jodi Rell, in the general
election. Forecasts by political pundits proved to be correct, with
Governor Rell winning well over 60 percent of the popular vote.
In addition to Democratic primaries for the U.S. senate and the
governor’s office, Democratic primaries were conducted for the
position of lieutenant governor, ten state Assembly districts, two
judges of probate districts, and in two towns for the registrar of
voters. The Republican Party also held primaries in Congressional
District One, and in two state Assembly districts. In total, twenty
primary elections were conducted in election year 2006.9 The
increase in the number of primaries reflects the diminished role of
party organization leaders in Connecticut with respect to
structuring the outcome of the nominating process. The party’s
rank-and-file, rather than the party leadership, increasingly
determines which candidates will represent the party in the general
election.
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The General Election Campaign
Following the nomination of candidates for public office, the
parties in Connecticut move into campaign mode. All efforts are
oriented towards winning the general election. However, with
regard to the campaign function, it is evident that party
organizations now supplement, rather than direct, the campaign
efforts of the candidate’s own organization. At one time, campaigns
in Connecticut were organized, funded, and coordinated by the
Democratic and Republican party organizations. Campaigns were
very “party-centered.” However, due to the rising cost of campaigns,
as well as the increased availability of media as a voter mobilization
tool, candidates at practically all levels of the state’s political system
began forming their own “candidate-centered” organizations and
essentially waging their own campaigns.10 Rather than resist such a
development, the party organizations had little choice but to
acquiesce in the new mode of campaigning. This is not to suggest
that candidates for public office divorce themselves from their party
during the election. Instead, there seems to be a mutual
understanding between the party organization and their slate of
candidates that the candidate, not the party, is primarily responsible
for the management and coordination of the campaign. The party
organization will, however, provide supplemental campaign services
to candidates upon request.
According to Republican State Chairman George Gallo, the
Republican State Central Committee in Connecticut provides an
array of campaign services to Republican candidates, which in
Gallo’s words is similar to an “a la carte” menu.11 Such services
include assistance with fundraising, voter mobilization efforts, and
consultation for effective messaging. In 2006, the efforts of the
Republican State Central Committee were geared towards the
gubernatorial and congressional elections, although Republican
candidates for the General Assembly who were in closely contested
races also received services from the State Central Committee.
Chairman Gallo also emphasized how modernized the
Republican State Central Committee has become during the
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past several years. In particular, a sophisticated voter file has
been developed and is routinely used by Republican candidates
for voter mobilization purposes. The file precisely identifies the
party registration of individuals in every one of Connecticut’s
169 towns, and pinpoints who the likely voters are on election
day. The file is exceptionally helpful to candidates for the
purposes of targeting campaign messages prior to election day
and for knowing which voters to contact and which voters to
bypass.12 Gallo mentioned that computer software and hardware
at state headquarters have also been upgraded. Full-time staffing
has increased as well. During the 2006 election year, the
Republican State Central Committee was staffed by eight fulltime employees. Following the election, the full-time staff was
trimmed to five, including the chair, executive director, finance
director, political director, and office manager.13 Although Gallo
fully acknowledged that party organizations no longer control
the course of election campaigns in Connecticut, he did stress
that the services provided to candidates still contribute to an
important party presence within the context of Connecticut’s
electoral politics.
The Democratic Party in Connecticut has also modernized its
state central headquarters, and appears to be providing similar “a la
carte” services to Democratic candidates during election years.
According to Nancy DiNardo, chairwoman of the Democratic State
Central Committee in Connecticut, the voter file is clearly one of
the most important services offered to candidates by the central
committee.14 She described the file as “state of the art” and
frequently used by candidates at all levels of elections to identify
their base of support as well as swing voters. Like the Republicans,
the Democratic State Central Committee has a paid full-time staff
consisting of six individuals who provide various services to
candidates with fundraising strategies as well as the development of
campaign websites. For some campaigns, the party will also provide
money to candidates in need of additional assistance.
Like the Republican Chairman, Chairwoman DiNardo
recognized that politics in Connecticut has become candidate-
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centered with the party organization primarily performing
supplemental campaign services. Although the Democratic State
Central Committee no longer controls the course of individual
campaigns in Connecticut, in DiNardo’s view the party
organization still remains a valuable resource for Democratic
candidates.
Choice at Election Time
In theory, political party organizations should also provide
voters with a set of distinct choices at election time. The party
label affixed to candidates should represent a particular
philosophy of government. Theoretically, when voters enter the
voting booth the party label should denote whether or not
candidates are conservative or liberal on an array of policy
matters. Moreover, once elected, parties should enact a
coherent set of public policies. This is how political parties
should govern according to the “doctrine of responsible
parties.” 15 Party platforms at one time served to structure the
choices voters made between Democratic and Republican
candidates. While state and national platforms are still issued
by the parties, most people are quite unfamiliar with the
contents of such platforms.
In Connecticut, platforms are occasionally issued by parties,
but such documents tend to remain obscure. If platforms are issued,
very few individuals ever lay eyes on them. Candidates, as noted
above, are largely on their own with regard to campaign strategy and
candidate platforms clearly supersede the party platform at election
time. If voters feel there is significant ideological choice at election
time, this is due to the positions articulated by the individual
candidates in their own campaign literature, which is tantamount to
a platform, rather than broad philosophical statements crafted by
the party organization. Quite frankly, due to the moderate to liberal
leaning of the Connecticut electorate, one is hard pressed to find
any real evidence of an ideological chasm between the two major
parties. The differences that do exist seem to concern taxing and
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spending priorities. However, on social and moral issues, the two
major parties in Connecticut are largely in agreement. Compared to
party politics at the national level, Connecticut’s two-party system
is less ideologically and politically polarized.
Interest Groups
Involvement with interest groups is yet another means
through which citizens in Connecticut can participate in politics.
For those individuals who wish to promote a specific cause, or set
of causes, joining an interest group should prove to be a satisfying
experience. Interest groups have become particularly important as
political parties have receded in influence. As Burdett A. Loomis
and Allan J. Cigler put it, “The weakness of political parties has
helped to create a vacuum in electoral politics since 1960, and in
recent years interest groups have aggressively moved to fill it.”16
Although this quotation appeared in a volume published in 1983,
the notion of a “vacuum” resulting from party decline is perhaps
even more relevant in 2006.
Interest groups in Connecticut, as well as in other states, can be
categorized as either “special interest groups” or “public interest
groups.”17 Special interest groups exist to promote the interests of a
specific group or class of people, or perhaps a specific cause. The
Connecticut chapter of the AFL-CIO (American Federation of
Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations) is a prime example of
a special interest group that has been operating for many years in
Connecticut politics. This is the umbrella organization that
represents the interests of specific labor unions. Several large labor
organizations are members of the AFL-CIO, including the
American Federation of State and County Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), the Firefighters Union, the American Federation of
Teachers, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, the
International Association of Machinists, and several building trade
unions, such as the Carpenters’ Union. In total, the AFL-CIO
represents approximately 210,000 union workers within the state of
Connecticut.18 The AFL-CIO has a clearly defined legislative
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agenda aimed at protecting the economic rights and living standards
of the working class. In 2006, the organization’s agenda at the
Connecticut state Capitol included the preservation of statutes that
protect binding arbitration, preventing corporate attempts to shift
the cost of health care insurance onto workers, opposing job
outsourcing, and protecting retiree benefits.19 The Connecticut
chapter of the AFL-CIO, like the national organization, is closely
allied with the Democratic Party. In 2006, delegates to the AFLCIO’s state convention endorsed Democratic candidate John
DeStefano for governor, and offered a lukewarm endorsement for
incumbent Senator Joseph Lieberman.
Business interests are also well represented at the Connecticut
state Capitol. Like the AFL-CIO, business interest groups have a
clearly defined set of legislative priorities. Several organizations
representing a broad array of business interests are a discernible
presence at the Connecticut state Capitol.
One example of a business organization with a defined
legislative agenda is the Chamber of Commerce. There is no state
umbrella organization for the Chamber of Commerce in
Connecticut. Instead, towns and cities have their own local
chambers and, if needed, their own director of government affairs.
The New Haven Chamber of Commerce, for example,
represents over nineteen hundred businesses throughout New
Haven County. The businesses range from very large enterprises,
such as Yale New Haven Hospital and AT&T, to small business
operations, such as Allied Health Rehabilitation and Hula Hanks
Restaurant in New Haven. Most of the activity of the New Haven
Chamber of Commerce in 2006 was aimed at defeating legislation
that was unfriendly towards business, rather than proposing new
laws that favored business activity. For example, the Chamber
opposed legislation that would restrict employers from conducting
staff meetings with their employees to discuss matters of politics
and religion. Such meetings are known as “captive audience
meetings.” The Chamber also opposed “pay or play” legislation
that would impose a tax on businesses with a certain number of
employees if the businesses were not providing their employees
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with health care coverage. The Chamber also opposed “neutrality
agreements,” which would ban employers of businesses that
receive state financial assistance from discussing the effects of
unionization on their companies with employees. Legislative
restrictions on eminent domain for the purpose of commercial
development were also opposed by the Chamber of Commerce.20
The Chamber of Commerce generally supports Republican
candidates at election time.
Apart from special interest groups that represent economic
interests, such as the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce,
there are a plethora of interest groups currently in Connecticut that
exist for the purpose of protecting very specific causes. Special
interest groups with very narrow agendas are commonly known as
“single issue interest groups.” Examples in Connecticut include the
Connecticut Motorcycle Riders Association, the Connecticut
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Planned Parenthood of
Connecticut, Friends of Animals, and the Marijuana Policy Project.
In addition to special interest groups, one also finds an array of
“public interest groups” attempting to influence the state policy
process. Public interest groups are organized to serve the public’s
interest, rather than a particular segment of society. Organizations
concerned with environmental or consumer protection, as well as
those organizations that seek to improve the quality of democracy
in America, can be classified as public interest groups. Examples of
public interest groups that are active at the Connecticut state
Capitol include Common Cause, The League of Women Voters,
Environmental Defense, and End Hunger. Data generated from the
State Ethics Commission reveal that well over 700 organizations
were present at the Connecticut state Capitol in 2003-04 for the
purpose of influencing the lawmaking process.
Lobbyists
In order to exert influence over the state lawmaking process,
most interest groups hire lobbyists and, if possible, contribute
money to election campaigns. The term “lobbying,” according to
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most accounts, originated under the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant.
President Grant, at his wife’s insistence, would smoke his cigars in
the Willard Hotel lobby, rather than in the White House. While at
the hotel, Grant would meet with individuals who would often seek
to influence his position on issues and obtain favors from the
President. Individuals who met with President Grant at the hotel
thus became known as “lobbyists.”21
Lobbyists can be classified under two categories: “client
lobbyist” and “contract lobbyist.” The client lobbyist is an
individual who is an employee of one organization and is designated
as the organization’s lobbyist. The individual therefore lobbies
exclusively on behalf of his or her client organization and is paid a
salary by the organization. The individual is essentially an “inhouse” lobbyist.
The contract lobbyist is an individual who operates a
lobbying consulting firm and who lobbies on behalf of several
organizations for a set fee.22 The contract lobbyist is not an
employee of the organization, but instead provides lobbying
services on a contractual basis. Based on reports, it appears that
most contract lobbyists charge their clients an annual, monthly,
or retainer fee. In Connecticut, the consulting firms of Betty
Gallo and Co., DePino Associates LLC., and Sullivan and
LeShane are leading examples of active, well-connected, and very
prosperous lobbying consulting firms. State Ethics Commission
data report that Betty Gallo and Co. represented twenty
organizations, DePino Associates, LLC. eighteen organizations,
and Sullivan and LeShane thirty-eight organizations during the
two year period of 2003-04. A review of registered lobbyists, or
“communicators,” as they are technically known, suggests that
contract lobbying firms are proliferating at the Connecticut state
Capitol. Moreover, lobbying in Connecticut and in other states
has become an exceptionally lucrative business. According to a
2004 report issued by the Center for Public Integrity, of the
forty-two states that reported lobbying expenditures,
Connecticut ranks eighth in the nation with regard to fees and
salaries paid to lobbyists. The Center reported a figure of
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$27,161,810 paid to Connecticut lobbyists. California ranks first
in the nation with lobbying fees and salaries reported at
$212,695,872.23
Lobbying a lawmaker is a fine art that requires excellent
personal and communication skills. The successful lobbyist is
one who knows how to present facts in a succinct and wellorganized fashion, without being overbearing, deceitful, or in
any way threatening. Careful preparation is essential to effective
lobbying. What lawmakers value most from a lobbyist is reliable
information that will assist them in casting an intelligent vote on
proposed legislation. Generating reliable and of course
persuasive information is one of the key ingredients for a
successful lobbying effort. Moreover, the successful lobbyist
must know how to forge political coalitions on a particular issue,
and he or she must understand the art of compromise.24 In the
words of Louise DiCocco-Beauton, a lobbyist for the Greater
New Haven Chamber of Commerce, effective lobbying at the
Connecticut state Capitol requires “identifying, analyzing, and
in some cases, researching the impact pending legislation will
have on various business organizations, and successfully
communicating your position to legislators to secure passage or
defeat of legislation.”25
At the Connecticut state Capitol, lobbyists can be found
discussing pending legislation with lawmakers outside the house
and senate chambers, in the offices of lawmakers, in the atrium or
cafeteria of the Legislative Office Building, and in the committee
rooms where they frequently provide testimony on bills. It is not at
all difficult to identify who the lobbyists are at the state Capitol, as
the state ethics law requires all registered lobbyists to wear a badge
that clearly identifies them as such. Outside of the state Capitol,
lobbyists working on behalf of interest groups might also organize a
public relations campaign on behalf of a public policy issue. State
residents might be encouraged through direct mail or other forms
of advertising to phone or e-mail lawmakers in order to influence
the outcome of a bill before the legislature. Political scientists refer
to this strategy as “grassroots lobbying.”
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While many associate the term “lobbyist” with behind-thescenes legislative deals, secretive negotiations, and perhaps political
corruption, the fact of the matter is that lobbyists perform a vital
role within the context of the lawmaking process. State Senator Bill
Finch offers this perspective:
I can’t imagine how the legislative process would work
without professional advocates for the various points of
view. The legislature deliberates, in a general way, like a
court, in that information is provided by opposing interests
to help reach a decision. The legislative process is much
more informal and rough and tumble than a court, but
nonetheless we have to process a lot of information,
separating fact from fiction, and we need help. Special
interests from oil companies and insurance companies to
birdwatchers and child advocates all have lobbyists at the
Capitol. It is important to remember who is paying the
advocate and be up front with them about their interest in
the outcome.26
Campaign Contributions
Campaign contributions are another method by which interest
groups attempt to influence the Connecticut lawmaking process.
Interest group money, individual contributions, the candidate’s own
money, and party money, all help to finance Connecticut election
campaigns.
Contrary to popular belief, campaign contributions from
interest groups do not determine a lawmaker’s views on legislation.27
Instead, campaign contributions appear to facilitate a group’s access
to elected officials. If an elected official, either in the legislative or
executive branch, receives a campaign contribution from an interest
group, it is well understood that the group is at least entitled to an
audience with the official at some point in the future. Access, rather
than manipulation, appears to be the end result of a campaign
contribution from a special or public interest group.28
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Similar to federal politics, interest group money in Connecticut
election campaigns has become quite substantial. A significant
portion of interest group money has been funneled to legislative,
gubernatorial, and constitutional office candidates by both lobbyists
and Political Action Committees.
Political Action Committees are either connected to
organizations and serve as their political fundraising arms, or
operate as freestanding committees not connected to any specific
organization. An example of a “connected” PAC would be the one
operated by the American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
Company. Freestanding or “nonconnected” PACs tend to be those
with single issue or ideological agendas.29 Nonconnected PACs are
essentially a group of like-minded people who feel very strongly
about an issue or cause and have formed a PAC for the purpose of
promoting a clearly defined goal. Connecticut’s N.O.W. (National
Organization for Women) PAC would be one such example.
Also present in Connecticut are PACs that are under the control
of political parties within the state legislature, known as “caucus
PACS.” There are also Legislative Leadership PACs (LLPs) that are
directed by the party’s legislative leaders. Such PACs are not to be
confused with interest group PACs operating outside of the General
Assembly. In total, there were more than 700 PACs registered with
the Secretary of State’s Office in 2006.30
Similar to the federal level, and other states across the land,
PAC contributions in Connecticut tend to be directed towards
incumbents, rather than challengers. As Alan Rosenthal notes,
“Given their high reelection rates, incumbents are most likely to
win, so they are the best bets for access-motivated giving.”31
Legislative leaders and committee chairs are often the main
recipients of PAC contributions.
There are exceptions to the rule in every state legislative
election. Take for example the 2006 state legislative campaign
waged by Republican challenger Christopher DeSanctis. DeSanctis,
challenged one term Democratic incumbent Tom Drew for the
132nd General Assembly district located in the town of Fairfield.
DeSanctis raised $19,000 by the beginning of August and was
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among the top fundraisers for state legislative candidates. DeSanctis
received contributions from a variety of supporters, including
personal donations and legislative PACs. The fact that the 132nd
district was regarded as a “swing” district, and Representative Drew
was perceived as a vulnerable incumbent, encouraged donors to
direct campaign dollars to the DeSanctis campaign. Commenting
on his extraordinary fundraising success, DeSanctis put it this way:
Fundraising is just a matter of asking. We all have friends
and relatives that need to be solicited. The bottom line is
no one wakes up in the morning saying to themselves, ‘I
have to donate to this or that campaign.’ They need to be
continually reminded until they give or say no.”32
However, despite DeSanctis’s extraordinary success at fundraising,
as well as his energetic grassroots campaign, the power of
incumbency proved too much for the challenger. Drew received 61
percent of the vote while DeSanctis won 39 percent.33
It is difficult to determine precisely the percentage of special
interest money present in Connecticut politics vis-à-vis other forms
of political money, and it is well beyond the scope of this work to
describe the details of Connecticut’s campaign finance code.
Nevertheless, it is clear that interest group money has become an
important element in Connecticut election campaigns and
contributions to office holders have, at the very least, facilitated
access to the corridors of power at the Connecticut state Capitol.
Precisely what will become of special interest money is difficult to
gauge and fully assess at this point in time.
The corruption and scandals that enveloped Connecticut
politics, particularly the administration of Governor John G.
Rowland, which resulted in Rowland’s resignation and
imprisonment, served as the catalyst for lobbying reform.34
Investigations into Rowland’s association with the Tomasso
Construction Company revealed how ingrained special interests
and contractors had become at the state Capitol. In 2005, a
sweeping campaign finance reform law was passed by the
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Connecticut General Assembly and signed into law by Governor
Rell. The new law provides for public funding of statewide and
legislative campaigns and severely restricts the role of lobbyists and
contractors with respect to campaign contributions. The new law
went into effect in 2007. As with most campaign finance codes,
loopholes will inevitably be found and exploited that will lead to
additional calls for reform.
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CHAPTER FIVE

The State Legislature

T

he Connecticut Constitution of 1818, regarded as a critical
turning point in the history of Connecticut’s rich constitutional
tradition, established a three-branch system of state government. Each
branch of government was given its own independent sphere of
constitutional authority and each branch was empowered to impose
checks on the others. The separation of powers doctrine, combined
with a system of checks and balances, was firmly embraced and
maintained in the Constitution of 1965. Beginning with the
devolution of power to state governments in the early 1980s and
extending to the present, the three branches of government have been
dramatically modernized to accommodate the growing needs of
Connecticut’s diverse population. Connecticut’s residents currently
expect a high level of performance from their state government, and
rather than ignore and dismiss such expectations, the three branches of
government have responded by modernizing their operations in
practically every respect.1 The end result is a state government with
more capacity and hence more ability to effectively meet the changing
and growing needs of the state’s population. The modernization of the
Connecticut state legislature will be the focus of this chapter.
The Connecticut State Legislature
Although still a part-time legislature, the Connecticut General
Assembly in many ways exhibits the same characteristics as those of
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the United States Congress. This can be observed in the
extraordinary structural changes that have taken place at the state
Capitol during the 1980s, as well as the vast proliferation of staff
personnel and support services provided to Connecticut
lawmakers. Moreover, many state lawmakers, although still
considered “citizen legislators,” have in reality become full-time
professional legislators. A sizeable number of state lawmakers
always seem to be present at the state Capitol, regardless of whether
the General Assembly is in session.
A State-of-the Art Legislative Office Building
A League of Women Voters’ tour of the Connecticut state
Capitol is the most instructive way of learning about the physical
and operational dimensions of the state Capitol.2 The tour will
begin in the building adjacent to the Capitol, what is known as the
Legislative Office Building or LOB. A 500-foot underground
concourse connects the LOB. with the main Capitol building.
Completed in 1987, the five-story LOB. is one of the most
technologically sophisticated legislative office buildings in the
United States. The offices of state lawmakers and legislative support
staff are housed in the LOB. The ornate building is also home to ten
state-of-the-art committee hearing rooms. Hearing rooms, the
offices of state lawmakers, and the two legislative chambers in the
Capitol building are all interconnected through an intricate and
complex system of electronic cables and computer monitors.
Lawmakers unable to attend legislative hearings or floor debate can
follow proceedings on monitors designed for this purpose. The
technology of the LOB was also designed to serve the needs of the
Connecticut public. Should public attendance at hearings exceed
seating capacity, video screens and monitors located in additional
hearing rooms permit the public to observe the proceedings. The
LOB. is lavish in its décor and architectural detail, perhaps to the
point of extravagance. A question sometimes asked by tour
participants, not surprisingly, is “how much did this building cost?”
The answer is $67 million.
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The LOB, more than any other government building at the
state Capitol, symbolizes Connecticut’s long-term commitment to
meeting the varied and proliferating demands of the state’s 3.4
million inhabitants. The technology offered to state lawmakers
most certainly enhances the legislature’s capacity for efficient and
responsive lawmaking. While technological support alone may not
guarantee effective legislative performance, such technology is
nevertheless a tremendous asset for the purposes of knowing, and
responding to, the needs of the Connecticut public.
Support Offices and Legislative Staff
In addition to sophisticated technology and a state-of-the-art
legislative office complex, state lawmakers have also come to depend
quite heavily on state employed personnel located in legislative
support offices and legislative staffs. The activity of support office
and staff personnel has in recent years become indispensable with
respect to assisting state legislators with the many complex
dimensions associated with lawmaking.
Twelve nonpartisan support offices, which report to the Joint
Committee on Legislative Management, provide an array of
critical services to state lawmakers. Four offices in particular serve
major legislative functions. The Office of Legislative Research
serves as the research and information arm of the state legislature.
The Office of Fiscal Analysis analyzes the fiscal dimensions and
financial implications of legislative proposals. The Program
Review and Investigations Committee assists lawmakers with the
difficult task of administrative oversight. This involves the
periodic review of executive agency activity to determine if in fact
agencies are implementing laws in accordance with the intent of
the law. The Legislative Commissioners Office offers consultation
to lawmakers on the legal language of bills and potential conflicts
between legislative statutes and the Connecticut Constitution.
Non-partisan offices are in close and daily contact with state
lawmakers throughout the legislative session and have become
integral to the development and implementation of laws. In 2006,
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non-partisan personnel accounted for 54 percent of all full-time
staff at the state Capitol.3
Legislative staffs, which are also under the direction of the Joint
Committee on Legislative Management, have also proliferated at
the state Capitol, a trend similar to that of the United States
Congress. Like congressional staffs, legislative staffs in Connecticut
have assumed multiple functions related to lawmaking. Legislative
staffs at the Capitol have been established to assist legislative
standing committees and, more generally, the political parties
within the legislature. Even the most casual observer cannot help
but notice the highly visible and fast-paced movement of legislative
staff personnel throughout the corridors and offices of the LOB and
Capitol building. Legislative staff workers, unlike those who work
in support offices, are classified as partisan staff. Partisan staff
workers currently account for 46 percent of all full-time personnel
at the state Capitol.4
The partisan legislative staffs are formally connected to the four
party caucuses in the state Capitol: the House Democrats, the
House Republicans, the Senate Democrats, and the Senate
Republicans. Some staffers work directly for a caucus, while others
are assigned to the twenty-two legislative committees. Some staffers
work at the Capitol in a full-time, year-round capacity, while others
are full-time employees only while the legislature is in session.
Seventy-six individuals are full-time committee staffers while the
legislature is in session and approximately twenty-five to thirty
individuals are full-time throughout the year. The extent to which
legislative staffers have become central to the operation of the state
legislature is best expressed in the words of legislative aides Gary
Turco and Jason Bowsza. Turco, a legislative aide to Speaker of the
House James Amann, described a staff worker’s job in these terms:
“Elected officials need to be knowledgeable in a variety of areas that
affect the lives of constituents. Staff members become experts in
different policy areas and serve as a constant source of information
for elected officials.” Jason Bowsza, a legislative aide to state senator
Bill Finch, co-chair of the General Assembly’s Environment
Committee, offers this perspective on the role of a staff worker:

THE STATE LEGISLATURE

103

Staffers in the Connecticut state senate generally focus on
constituent work, as well as issuing press releases, tracking
legislation, attending meetings with lobbyists and offering
advice on policy and politics to our senators. Each staffer
serves their senator in a unique way, but always following
their senator’s example.5
Generally speaking, the number of support personnel at the
Connecticut State Capitol has become quite significant. As of 2006,
there are more than 570 paid support personnel working at the
Connecticut state Capitol during the legislative session. This figure
includes 412 year round, full-time non-partisan and partisan
employees, and 160 full-time “temporary/sessional/interim” staff.
Add to this figure the 120 or so non-paid legislative interns who also
work at the state Capitol during the legislative session and one
discovers that Connecticut’s 187 lawmakers are assisted in one form
or another by close to 700 support personnel.6 The number of
persons now working at the Connecticut state Capitol suggests a
state legislature inundated with diverse, complicated, and pressing
demands. The number of support personnel further suggests a state
legislature prepared and willing to confront the complex policy
challenges of the twenty-first century.
The Capitol
The underground escalator, known as the “Concourse,”
connects the Legislative Office Building to the state Capitol
building. It is within the historic state Capitol building where one
finds the two legislative chambers: the House of Representatives and
the Senate. The House and Senate collectively comprise the
Connecticut General Assembly. The offices of state legislative
leaders, the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, as well as
the offices of the constitutional officers, such as the Secretary of
State are also located in the Capitol building. It is in the state
Capitol where the laws that govern the state of Connecticut are
formally introduced and passed. The state Capitol building,
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completed in 1879, is registered as a National Historic Landmark.
Prior to construction of the Capitol building, the Old State House
in downtown Hartford served as the Capitol building.7
Like the United States Congress and state legislatures across the
land, with the exception of Nebraska, which is unicameral, the
Connecticut state legislature is a bicameral institution. The House
of Representatives, located on the second floor of the Capitol
building, is at times referred to as the “lower house,” and the Senate,
located on the third floor, is sometimes referred to as the “upper
house.” Such terms however have become someone antiquated
within the lexicon of legislative politics. Although both chambers
are equal in power and both assume responsibility for passing laws,
they are nevertheless very different from one another in terms of
structural design, legislative procedure, and formality.
The House of Representatives: The People’s Chamber
Located on the second floor of the state Capitol building, the
Connecticut House of Representatives is in theory where the passions
and will of the Connecticut citizenry are most closely represented.
Following the 2000 federal census, state legislative districts were
redrawn and adjusted to rectify population imbalance and account for
population growth. Population growth was rather minimal compared
to states in other regions of the country, most notably the South and
West. For the first decade of the twenty-first century, House legislative
districts were redrawn to contain approximately 29,000 people. As
previously discussed in Chapter Two, the Supreme Court cases of
Baker v. Carr (1962), Reynolds v. Sims (1964), and Butterworth v.
Dempsey (1964) have ensured that state legislative districts consist of
roughly the same number of people.
Every ten years, following the federal census, a reapportionment
committee established within the state legislature is assigned the
responsibility of redrawing legislative districts to reflect the “oneperson one-vote” principle. Although one discovers elements of
“gerrymandering” in the legislative reapportionment process, a term
used to describe the redrawing of district lines to benefit the
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reelection chances of the party in power, Connecticut’s
reapportionment process is for the most part fair. Amendment XVI
of the Connecticut Constitution, which describes in detail the
entire reapportionment procedure, requires that the final draft of a
reapportionment plan be approved by at least two-thirds of each
house of the state legislature. Thus, the two-thirds vote inherently
prevents the majority party, currently the Democrats, from
rendering the minority party, currently the Republicans, powerless
during the reapportionment process. The two-thirds rule allows the
minority party in the state legislature to veto a reapportionment
plan perceived as grossly unfair. In the 2006 election, the
Democrats captured two-thirds of the seats in both the House and
Senate. Whether they will still control two-thirds of the seats during
the next reapportionment process following the 2010 federal census
remains to be seen. Should the legislature fail to adopt a
reapportionment plan, a bipartisan commission will be convened to
resolve the matter and arrive at a compromise. In the event the
commission fails to develop a compromise plan, the state supreme
court under the direction of the chief justice will supervise and
coordinate the reapportionment process.
According to the state constitution, a state representative must
be at least eighteen years of age. Representatives are elected to a term
of two years, with no limit placed on reelection. Since 1967, the
Connecticut House of Representatives, and subsequently the state’s
legislative agenda, has been under the control of the Democratic
Party. Name recognition of House incumbents, effective use of
legislative staffs for constituent service, fundraising capabilities of
incumbents, the fact that Connecticut is a “Blue” state, as well as
reapportionment and elements of gerrymandering have secured for
the Democratic Party many years of political control over the state
House of Representatives. The only exceptions to this long period
of Democratic dominance were the legislative sessions of 1973-74
and 1985-86. President Nixon’s landslide reelection in 1972 and
President Reagan’s reelection landslide in 1984 resulted in political
coattails for Republican state legislative candidates and short-lived
Republican majorities in the House. Following the legislative
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election of 2006, the Democratic Party in Connecticut controlled
107 seats (71 percent), while the Republican Party occupied 44
seats (29 percent).
House Leadership
A small group of party leaders controls the legislative business
of the House of Representatives. The key leadership posts include
the Speaker of the House, the House majority leader, House
majority whip, House minority leader, and House minority whip.
The Speaker of the House is the presiding officer of the entire
House of Representatives. The Speaker controls floor proceedings,
interprets parliamentary rules of procedure, recognizes lawmakers
during floor debate, and refers bills to committee.8 Unlike other
legislative leaders in the House, the Speaker is required to perform
a dual role. The Speaker is first and foremost the chief representative
and symbol of the Connecticut House of Representatives. In this
capacity, the Speaker must ensure fairness during floor debate and,
more important, protect the autonomy and integrity of the House
chamber. As the presiding officer of the House of Representatives,
the Speaker is formally elected by a vote of the entire House
membership, although he or she is always a member of the majority
party. The Speaker, therefore, will undoubtedly advance the
interests and agenda of the majority party, while at the same time
ensuring fairness to the opposition party. The post of Speaker of the
House is a complex office. Speakers are normally individuals with
many years of legislative experience, political savvy, and a broad
network of allies within the House chamber. For example, the
current Speaker of the House, James Amann, an eight-term
Democrat from Milford, served as Assistant Majority Leader,
Deputy Majority Whip, and House Majority Leader prior to his
election as House Speaker. Speaker Amann describes the complexity
of the Speaker’s role in this way: ”Assuring proper rules and
procedure are followed, especially when it comes to constitutional
questions, is the top priority. The Speaker is much like a referee,
guaranteeing fairness and non-partisan debate from the dais.”9
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For many years, tradition dictated that the Speaker of the House
would serve for one two-year term. The one-term tradition ended in
1971 with the reelection of Democratic House Speaker William
Ratchford to a second consecutive term.10 Since Ratchford’s
reelection, it is not unusual for Speakers to serve two consecutive
terms, with two terms now considered the norm for House Speakers.
The extent to which state lawmakers guard against
encroachment of the two-term tradition was more than evident in
1989, when Speaker of the House Irving J. Stolberg, a Democrat
from New Haven, decided to seek a third consecutive term. In
response to this unprecedented development, an anti-Stolberg
faction of Democrats, who had become extremely weary of Stolberg’s
leadership style, liberal politics, and political ambitions, secretly
colluded with House Republicans to deny the controversial Speaker
the necessary majority needed for reelection. This most unusual
political alliance of anti-Stolberg Democrats and Republicans,
unthinkable in years past, coalesced to elect Democrat Richard
Balducci to the post of Speaker. This was the first time in
Connecticut history that a Speaker of the House was elected by a
bipartisan coalition of Democrats and Republicans. The bipartisan
alliance was further proof that party membership no longer dictates
legislative behavior in the Connecticut General Assembly.
Republicans working with Democrats to elect the Speaker is in some
respects a reflection of a much larger phenomenon regarding the
declining significance of political parties as governing instruments.
The House majority leader is the floor manager for the majority
party and serves as the key spokesperson for the majority party’s
legislative agenda. The majority whip is responsible for maximizing
attendance during legislative roll calls and for persuading party
members to work as a team. The term “whip” is an old British term
used to describe the person responsible for managing the foxhounds
during a fox hunt: the “whipper-in” of the hounds. The term was
subsequently applied to those persons responsible for promoting
party cohesion within the British Parliament.11 Both the majority
leader and majority whip are elected in the party caucus prior to the
start of a new legislature.
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The minority leader and minority whip have functions similar
to those of the majority leader and majority whip. Representing the
legislative agenda of the minority party, speaking on behalf of the
minority party, and maximizing party cohesion among minority
party members are among the principal tasks associated with the
minority party leadership posts. Minority party leaders are elected
in the minority party caucus at the start of a new legislature.
In addition to the chief leadership posts within the majority
and minority parties, both party caucuses in the House of
Representatives elect deputy leaders and several assistant leaders.
Deputy and assistant leaders perform a number of specific legislative
tasks designed to help promote the agenda of the party hierarchy.
Deputy and assistant leadership positions are normally reserved for
lawmakers who have demonstrated loyalty to the party’s legislative
leadership. In the view of one lawmaker I spoke with, who wished
to remain anonymous, the post of assistant leader is also useful for
the purpose of advancing political careers: the title is impressive, yet
the position seldom involves substantive responsibilities.
Any House Democrat or House Republican who wishes to
introduce a legislative proposal is advised to secure the backing of
legislative leaders within his or her respective party. In the
Connecticut House of Representatives, a significant portion of the
legislative agenda is controlled by a relatively small hierarchy of
legislative leaders. Freshmen lawmakers are quick to learn that
legislative proposals, including those of great merit, must obtain the
approval of their party’s legislative leadership in order for the
proposal to be deemed viable. Moreover, the legislative agenda is
established fairly early in the legislative session, and for all intents
and purposes reflects the goals of legislative leaders. This is not to
suggest that newly-elected representative are powerless with respect
to lawmaking. Freshmen lawmakers do introduce bills and receive
important committee assignments. However, to have a meaningful
voice in the Connecticut House of Representatives, it is essential for
the newly-elected lawmaker to work with and gain the support of
the party’s legislative leadership. The party’s leadership has the
authority to filter legislative proposals.
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The State Senate: A Governing Council
The state Senate is located on the third floor of the state Capitol
building. With respect to structure, procedure, and custom, the
state Senate is quite unlike the House of Representatives. Compared
to the House, the Senate is a much smaller chamber consisting of
only thirty-six members, less than one-fourth the size. In terms of
structure, the Senate has the appearance of a deliberative council,
with senators positioned in a large circle, as opposed to the formal
rows of desks found in the House chamber. In the House of
Representatives, the two parties sit on opposite sides of the aisle,
which gives the House chamber a more partisan flair with respect to
appearance. In the Senate chamber, senators are positioned
according to the number of their senatorial district, which allows
Democratic and Republican senators to sit, discuss bills, and vote
on proposals while they are adjacent to one another. The state
Senate is thus a very different chamber compared to the House with
regard to collegiality.
Like House members, state senators are elected to two-year
terms, with no limit placed on reelection. Any individual who seeks
a Senate seat must be a minimum of 18 years of age. A Connecticut
state senator currently represents a legislative district consisting of
approximately 91,000 persons. In both population and geographical
size, senatorial districts are substantially larger than House districts.
State senators must therefore understand the needs of diverse
constituencies in several contiguous towns. Compared to House
members, senators, due to the nature of their districts, must acquire
a broader working knowledge of state and local policy matters.
As in the state House of Representatives, the Democratic Party
has controlled the business of the state Senate for many years.
Democratic dominance appears to have begun as far back as 1959,
with only three exceptions, 1973-74 and 1985-86, the same years in
which the Republican Party won a majority of seats in the state
House, and 1995-96, a reflection of the 1994 congressional election
in which the Republicans gained control over the U.S. House of
Representatives. Following the 2006 legislative election, the
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Democrats controlled 24 seats (67 percent), while the Republicans
held 12 seats (33 percent).
Similar to the House of Representatives, incumbents in the
state Senate tend to be reelected with relative ease. Like House
incumbents, incumbents in the Senate can employ legislative staffs
for constituency service and have higher name recognition
compared to challengers. Moreover, Senate incumbents have a clear
advantage over challengers with regard to fundraising. Thus, many
state senators have safe seats. The power of incumbency and the
emergence of safe legislative districts in both House and Senate
elections does not bode well for two-party competition. The decline
of competitive legislative districts in Connecticut was treated in
detail in Chapter Three. Landslide elections and safe seats have
become the norm in state legislative elections.
Legislative process in the state Senate is more informal than that
of the House of Representatives, and there is more reliance on
legislative customs rather than strict parliamentary procedure. Unlike
the party caucuses in the House, the party caucuses in the Senate are
where many crucial policy decisions are made. Wayne Swanson’s
definitive study of the Connecticut state legislature discovered that it
was in the party caucus, not on the floor of the Senate, where major
decisions were reached regarding the fate of bills. Due to the intimacy
of the Senate chamber, freshmen senators, compared to their
counterparts in the House, were also discovered by Swanson to have
more of a voice in the legislative process.12 Judge Robert Satter, a
former state representative, confirms Swanson’s observation of the
Senate caucus and notes that compared to the House, more bills are
placed on the Consent Calendar: “The Senate usually finishes its work
first and waits around for the House to send up business.”13
Senate Leadership
Although the state Senate is a more intimate and informal
legislative chamber than the House, and freshmen senators exert
more impact in the lawmaking process than House freshmen, there
is nevertheless a small group of party leaders in the Senate who

THE STATE LEGISLATURE

111

exercise considerable power over the chamber’s internal affairs.
Senate leaders, like House leaders, perform important managerial
and leadership functions.
The president of the state Senate is the state’s lieutenant
governor. As the official presiding officer of the Senate, the
lieutenant governor interprets rules of Senate procedure, recognizes
senators who wish to speak, and refers bills to legislative
committees. The lieutenant governor only votes in the event of a tie.
Unlike the Speaker of the House, the lieutenant governor’s position
in the Senate is more ceremonial than political. The lieutenant
governor is elected with the governor on the same ticket, and thus
presides over the Senate by virtue of his or her constitutional
position. The lieutenant governor is not elected from among the
ranks of the Senate membership, nor while presiding over the
Senate is he or she considered a member of the “club.” The
lieutenant governor will serve as the “eyes and ears” of the governor
with respect to the business of the Senate, but the lieutenant
governor normally does not direct the business of the Senate.
The true power in the Connecticut Senate is found in the
several leadership posts elected by the two party caucuses. These
posts include the president of the Senate pro tempore (usually
referred to as the pro tem), the majority leader, majority whip,
minority leader, and minority whip. The senate pro tem presides
over the Senate when the lieutenant governor is absent. The pro tem
is elected by the majority party caucus at the start of a new
legislative session, and normally steers the agenda of the majority
party. Although the pro tem at times is expected to speak for the
entire Senate, the reality of the matter is that he or she is the leader
of the majority party. The pro tem has considerable control over
Senate committee appointments, exercises control over the
legislative agenda, and without a doubt is the pivotal and most
powerful figure in the entire Senate chamber.
The majority leader, majority whip, minority leader, and minority
whip perform functions similar to their counterparts in the House
chamber. Elected by their respected party caucuses, the leaders and
whips represent, guide, and help manage their party’s legislative agenda.
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The majority leader and majority whip work closely with the pro tem in
advancing the agenda of the majority party. Like the House chamber,
there are also several deputy and assistant leaders in the state Senate.
Tools of Legislative Leadership
The days of party bosses operating “behind-the-scenes” and
controlling legislative voting behavior with patronage jobs and party
organization money are no longer present in Connecticut politics.
The new era is marked by candidate-centered politics, which
manifests itself in elected lawmakers who do not feel beholden to
party leaders. George Gallo was the chairman of the Republican
Party in Connecticut, yet Gallo did not control the voting behavior
of Republican state lawmakers. Nancy DiNardo is the chairwoman
of the Democratic Party in Connecticut, yet DiNardo does not
control the voting behavior of Democratic state lawmakers. State
legislative leaders elected in party caucuses are also limited in terms
of persuading and influencing the voting behavior of rank-and-file
lawmakers. There is only so much the Speaker of the House, Senate
pro tem and the majority and minority leaders can do to foster party
teamwork in the Connecticut General Assembly.
Nevertheless, despite the decline of party authority in the
lawmaking process, there are mechanisms or “tools” that a party’s
legislative leaders can employ to cultivate a network of political
support among party members. Such tools, when skillfully and
strategically employed, can have the effect of drawing rank-and-file
lawmakers closer to the goals of the party hierarchy. Two important
sources of persuasion appear to be preferential appointments to
legislative standing committees and the distribution of campaign
dollars to legislative candidates.
Committee Appointments
Appointments to legislative standing committees remain one of
the most important sources of leverage exercised by party leaders in
both chambers of the General Assembly. By serving on key standing
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committees, House and Senate members can often serve the needs
of their constituents in a most direct fashion. Indeed, the policy
areas that fall under the jurisdiction of standing committees often
have direct bearing on a representative’s or senator’s constituents. A
House or Senate member with many teachers in his or her legislative
district would necessarily want to serve on the legislature’s
Education Committee. A lawmaker who represents a legislative
district with many small businesses would most likely prefer an
appointment to the legislature’s Commerce Committee. At the
same time, there are standing committees that go well beyond the
unique needs of individual districts and affect the state’s population
as a whole. The Appropriations Committee and the Finance,
Revenue, and Bonding Committee are examples of legislative
committees that have statewide impact. Lawmakers who support
the goals of legislative leaders are thus rewarded with choice
committee assignments.
Campaign Finance Committees
Another leadership tool for House and Senate leaders emanates
from the campaign finance committees that have been established
by both parties in the House and Senate chambers. Campaign
finance committees were established in the Connecticut state
legislature to help finance the costs associated with House and
Senate campaigns. To help alleviate the increasing demands of fund
raising, campaign finance committees were established for the
express purpose of supplementing the campaign budgets of House
and Senate candidates. Legislative campaign finance committees are
under the control of legislative leaders and the leaders determine
which legislative candidates will be the recipients of campaign
dollars. This is not to suggest that legislative candidates depend
exclusively on legislative campaign committees to win election or
reelection. This is now an era of candidate-centered politics, and
legislative candidates depend on their own network of individual
contributors and special interest groups to finance campaigns.
Nevertheless, party leaders in the legislature do distribute
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substantial sums of money to legislative candidates, normally to
those candidates in highly competitive contests. By distributing
campaign dollars to candidates in closely contested elections,
legislative leaders are able to cultivate a network of loyalists who
feel obliged to support the agenda of the legislative hierarchy.
There is a sense of appreciation and indebtedness that follows from
campaign assistance.
Legislative campaign finance committees in the Connecticut
General Assembly exist in two different forms. One form is directly
associated with and established by individual legislative leaders.
These are the legislative leadership PACs (LLPs) that appear to
have proliferated within the state Capitol. The leadership PACs
normally have partisan titles, yet the reality of the matter is that
they have been established to serve the goals of individual
legislative leaders. Legislative Leadership PACs are a growing
presence in the Connecticut legislature, as well as legislative
assemblies in other states.14
The second form of campaign finance assistance emerges from
the broader and more party-oriented legislative campaign finance
committees. Such committees have been formed by both parties in
both legislative chambers. The legislative campaign finance
committees are different from the Legislative Leadership PACs in
that campaign dollars are normally distributed among a broader
array of legislative candidates, as opposed to a select group of
candidates. Some legislative candidates are the recipients of more
assistance than others, but in general there seems to be more
concern with improving the strength and competitiveness of the
party as a whole compared to the more selective contributions from
the Leadership PACs. Taken together, campaign dollars from the
legislative leadership PACs and dollars distributed from the
legislative campaign finance committees are instrumental in
cultivating allegiance to the party’s legislative hierarchy. When
added to the power over committee appointments, it becomes clear
that legislative leaders, while by no means omnipotent, still have
political tools at their disposal to lead and direct the internal affairs
of the Connecticut state legislature.
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The Lawmaking Process
Lawmaking in the Connecticut General Assembly, as in all
legislatures, is an intriguing affair. Practically all bills introduced
into the state legislature encounter hurdles, unexpected obstacles,
and in most cases “brick walls.” Indeed, it is more common for bills
to die in the Connecticut General Assembly than to be passed. To
surmount political opposition, proponents of bills must skillfully
forge legislative coalitions, negotiate compromises on key sections
of bills, and be willing to cut deals to placate and appease the
political opposition. No textbook description can ever completely
capture what happens behind the scenes during the passage of a bill,
and at times it is perhaps better not to know. Indeed, one is
reminded of the old adage often attributed to the German
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck: “If you like laws and sausages, you
should never watch either one being made.”15
As described in Chapter One, the Tenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution reserves to states those powers that are
not delegated to the federal government, as well as those that are not
specifically prohibited to the states. The policy areas in which the
Connecticut state legislature can legislate are not specifically
enumerated in the state constitution, thus allowing the state
legislature considerable latitude to legislate on a wide variety of
issues, albeit within constitutional limits. The policies of education,
housing, transportation, criminal justice, and environmental
protection are examples of policy areas that belong to the
Connecticut state legislature. Policy areas such as taxation and
appropriations also belong to the state legislature, although such
powers are exercised concurrently with the federal government. The
Connecticut state legislature, in other words, can pass many laws in
many policy areas, as long as such policies do not belong exclusively
to the federal government. The state legislature, for example, cannot
pass laws that regulate interstate commerce or trade with foreign
nations, nor can the legislature pass laws involving foreign policy.
Such areas, as defined in the federal constitution, are the domain of
the federal government, not the states.

116

THE STATE LEGISLATURE

Table Two documents the number of proposed House and
Senate bills in the Connecticut state legislature from 2000 through
2005, as well as the raw number and percentage of bills eventually
signed into law by the governor. The reader should be aware that
the Connecticut state legislature during odd-numbered years is in
session from the Wednesday following the first Monday in January
to the Wednesday following the first Monday in June, slightly more
than five months. In even-numbered years, the state legislature is
in session from the Wednesday following the first Monday in
February to the Wednesday following the first Monday in May,
slightly more than three months. Sessions conducted during evennumbered years are commonly referred to as “short sessions.”
Legislative sessions during odd-numbered years are thus longer and
hence the volume of proposed bills tends to be greater compared to
the sessions in even-numbered years. It should also be noted that
only bills related to fiscal matters may be introduced in the evennumbered years.
Table 2
Proposed Bills and Public Acts
2000-05 Regular Session
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Proposed Bills
1812
3765
1812
3648
1618
3655

Public Acts
402
470
382
274
518
481

% Passed
22%
12%
21%
8%
32%
13%

Source: Law Department, Connecticut State Library.

As the data show, whether it is a large volume of proposed bills
in the odd-numbered years or the smaller number of bills in even
numbered years, a relatively small percentage of proposals are ever
enacted into law. From 2000-05, an average of 18 percent of
proposed bills eventually made it into law.
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The number of proposed bills tends to be greater in the House
chamber because the House contains 151 members, compared to 36
members in the Senate. Hence there is more legislative business
transacted in the House. However, although the number of proposed
bills is higher in the House, and while the House chamber tends to
pass a greater quantity of bills, the percentage of bills that are passed
in the House is quite similar to that of the state Senate. Table Three
documents the number of proposed bills in both chambers, as well
as the number and percentage of bills passed by each chamber.
Table 3
Proposed and Passed Bills in the House and Senate Chambers
2000-05 Regular Session
House
Proposed Passed
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

930
2051
811
1969
690
2004

146
146
108
161
162
167

%

Proposed

Senate
Passed

%

16%
7%
13%
8%
23%
8%

640
1459
677
1333
633
1386

98
163
126
113
189
137

15%
11%
19%
8%
30%
10%

Source: Law Department, Connecticut State Library.

The Committees
Although bills can die in several places, it is clear that the
legislative standing committees in the Connecticut General
Assembly are the “graveyard” for the vast majority of legislative
proposals. Most proposed bills die in legislative standing committee
and never make it to the House or Senate floors. As Swanson notes:
It is often surprising to the new lawmaker to see the
number of bills referred to committees that are never
discussed and simply die in committee. The time factor in
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the legislature is such that committees, in conjunction
with leadership, must select the bills which they
consider the most important, denying to the “less
important” legislation a place on the committee’s
agenda. It often takes a number of assembly sessions for
a bill which the leadership considers to be of “marginal
importance” to get a committee hearing. The new
legislator should not be discouraged if his bills do not
make it out of committee the first time that they are
introduced.16
Legislative standing committees in the Connecticut General
Assembly are joint committees. Membership on standing
committees consists of members from both the House and Senate
chambers. Each standing committee is headed by co-chairpersons.
One co-chairperson is appointed from the House by the House
Speaker, while one is appointed from the Senate by the Senate
president pro tempore. The co-chairpersons alternate as presiding
officers over committee hearings. Each co-chairperson is a member
of the majority party in his or her respective legislative chamber.
Appointments to joint committees are based on a proportional
formula, with seats allocated to members based on the strength of
both parties in the House and Senate.
At present, there are twenty-five joint committees in the
Connecticut General Assembly. This number includes the
permanent standing committees responsible for passing bills, the
small number of permanent committees that do not process bills
but instead are assigned specific non-legislative tasks, as well as the
non-permanent select committees established to perform very
special functions related to narrow policy areas.
True power in the General Assembly lies within the legislative
standing committees. Lawmakers normally serve on two or perhaps
three legislative standing committees during a legislative session.
Examples of legislative standing committees include the
Appropriations Committee, the Commerce Committee, and the
Transportation Committee. The political careers of state lawmakers
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are advanced by serving on key standing committees, and it is
within the standing committees that the laws affecting the state of
Connecticut are ultimately shaped.
Legislative Procedure
Proposed bills have many origins.17 Bills can originate with the
governor, individual lawmakers, lobbyists, executive branch
officials, or individual constituents. For a bill to be introduced into
either the House or Senate chamber, there must be a lawmaker or
group of lawmakers who sponsor the bill. A bill can be introduced
into either chamber of the state legislature.
Once a bill is introduced, it is then forwarded to one of the
legislative standing committees cited above. Assuming that the bill has
a modicum of support, the committee will schedule a public hearing
on the bill in one of the committee rooms within the Legislative Office
Building. The general public is allowed to attend such hearings and
individuals along with group representatives are allowed to voice their
concerns before committee members. Following the committee
hearing and often much discussion and debate among committee
members, the committee will vote on the bill. Should the committee
vote against the bill, it will issue an “Unfavorable Report.” Should the
committee vote in favor of the bill, it will issue a “Favorable Report,”
or “JF” (“Joint Favorable”) Report. Should the committee decide to
take no action on the bill, the bill will be “boxed” and automatically
die. When the committee decides to box a bill, it will issue “No
Report.” A simple majority vote among committee members is needed
for the bill to pass a standing committee.
Once a bill has passed the committee stage of the lawmaking
process, it is then placed on the legislative calendar. Bills deemed noncontroversial by members of the standing committee and that are
expected to pass the House and Senate floors without discussion are
placed on the Consent Calendar. All other bills are assigned to the
regular legislative calendar and scheduled for floor action.
Bills that pass the standing committee stage of the process and
that require funding, as most do, are forwarded to the
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Appropriations Committee or the Committee on Finance, Revenue,
and Bonding. The “money committees,” as they are known, decide
whether or not to authorize funds for the program outlined in the bill.
Practically all legislative programs require funding, and it is the
responsibility of the money committees to explore and discuss the
financial ramifications of the proposed policy. The money committees
have the authority to pass or reject the bill. Should funding be denied,
the bill will die at this stage of the process. Should the money
committees approve funding for the proposed program, the bill will
then be forwarded to the Office of Fiscal Analysis for a detailed
financial analysis. Once the work of the Office of Fiscal Analysis is
completed, the bill will proceed to the House and Senate floors for a
vote. Prior to the floor vote in both chambers, amendments might be
added to the bill and lawmakers can engage in extensive floor debate.
Should the bill pass the House and Senate floors in two different
versions, a conference committee will be convened to resolve House
and Senate differences. A conference committee is a special joint
committee assembled from both chambers to iron out the differences
between the two legislative chambers. Should the bill pass the
conference committee and be approved by both legislative chambers,
it is then forwarded to the governor for executive action.
The Governor’s Desk
The concept of checks and balances is most evident when a bill
passed by the legislature is sent to the governor. During a normal
legislative session, the governor has a total of five calendar days to
respond to a passed bill. During this period, the governor can sign
the bill into law, in which case the bill will become an official Public
Act, or the governor can veto the proposed legislation. Should the
governor veto the bill, it will be returned to the legislature with the
governor’s veto message. A gubernatorial veto can be overridden by
a two-thirds vote of each legislative chamber, although this is
extremely difficult to do. If the governor does not take any action
within five days of receiving the bill, and the legislature is still in
session, the bill will automatically become law without his or her
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signature. Should the governor not take action after the legislature
had adjourned, then the bill will automatically become law without
his or her signature after fifteen days.
In addition to exercising a regular veto, Connecticut’s governor
is afforded the constitutional power to exercise the line-item veto.
The line-item veto can be employed only in conjunction with
appropriations legislation. The governor can veto specific spending
items in an appropriations bill, while signing the remainder of the
bill into law. Forty-five state governors can exercise the line-item
veto. Like the regular veto, the line-item veto can be overridden by
a two-thirds vote of both legislative chambers. In theory, the lineitem veto is supposed to allow state governors the opportunity to
more carefully scrutinize and control wasteful state spending.
Although a constitutional power of the Connecticut governor,
Connecticut governors rarely exercise the line-item veto. However,
much to the surprise of many lawmakers, on June 4, 2007,
Governor Rell exercised the line-item veto in conjunction with a
proposed energy bill. The governor signed the energy bill into law,
but vetoed two of the bill’s sections concerning appropriations
The veto is one of the most powerful tools exercised by the
Connecticut governor, and is perhaps one of the most direct
methods of constraining the actions of the state legislature. Table
Four documents the extent to which the gubernatorial veto has been
employed in Connecticut from 2000-05.
Table 4
Gubernatorial Vetoes: 2000-05
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Vetoes
3
3
3
2
12
9

Overridden
0
0
0
0
0
0

Source: Law Department, Connecticut State Library.
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As the evidence suggests, despite the fact that the governorship
has been under the control of a Republican governor for many years
and the legislature dominated by Democrats, the veto has been used
somewhat sparingly. Years 2004 and 2005 appear to be the
exception, rather than the norm. Both recent Republican governors,
Rowland and Rell, have governed the state of Connecticut from the
center of the political spectrum. Compromising, bargaining, and
cooperating with a Democratic-controlled legislature, rather than
antagonizing the opposition has been the norm at the state Capitol.
The governor of Connecticut plays a pivotal and equal role in
the lawmaking process, and the veto power is one of the most
important methods of shaping and controlling the outcome of
public policy. At the same time, however, the veto is not by any
means the only power exercised by the governor. Indeed, the scope
of gubernatorial power has clearly grown in recent decades to the
point where the governorship in Connecticut now resembles the
American presidency, only on a smaller scale. The centrality of the
state governorship within the context of state politics and the multifaceted nature of the modern governorship are addressed in the
following chapter.
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“get more done” compared to the federal level of government.
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CHAPTER SIX

The Governor’s Office and Judiciary

The State Governorship

T

he governor presides over the executive branch. Elected for a
four-year term, with no limitation on reelection, the
Connecticut governor, now more than ever, is expected to be the
driving force behind the policy-making process. In recent decades,
the citizens of Connecticut have come to expect a governor who is
creative, energetic, and an imaginative problem solver. Like public
expectations of the American president, the American people have
high expectations of those who occupy state governorships. The
following summary succinctly captures this orientation:
Governors are expected to be the leading cheerleaders for
their states. They are expected to attract business and jobs,
to set the political tone, to manage state affairs. They serve
as the primary face and voice of government during natural
disasters or other crises. With this much power, of course,
comes a great deal of expectation. If a state is not doing well
– if it is losing more jobs than its neighbors during a
recession, for example, or is running a budget deficit –
voters and the media will hold the governor responsible.
They are like mini-presidents in each state.1

The Connecticut governor’s formal powers unfold from the
state constitution. Moreover, the constitutional duties of the
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Connecticut governor described in Article IV are quite substantial,
and in many ways parallel those of the American president. The
parallel is common in most states. As Louis W. Koenig states, “If a
typical early governor were compared with a typical contemporary
governor, the influence of the presidency upon gubernatorial change
would become evident.”2 Similar to that of the president, the
governor in Connecticut is expected to “wear many hats” and have
the ability to perform several tasks simultaneously. The 1965
Constitution was crafted in such a way as to create an empowered
governorship.
To begin with, the state constitution assigns an important
legislative duty to the governor. In this capacity, the governor is
allowed to introduce bills to the state legislature, sign bills into law,
and exercise the power of veto. The constitution also requires the
governor to deliver a “State of the Government” address to the state
legislature. This address, more popularly known as the “State of the
State” address, attracts extensive media coverage. Like the
president’s “State of the Union” message, the “State of the State”
address broadly outlines the governor’s legislative agenda for the
forthcoming legislative session. The governor’s address is what sets
the legislative process in motion.
In addition to broad legislative responsibilities, the constitution
requires the governor to perform a range of executive duties. As the
state’s chief executive officer, the governor is expected to “faithfully”
execute the laws of the state. In this regard, it is the governor’s legal
responsibility to oversee the implementation of state laws and state
judicial rulings. Gubernatorial appointments within the executive
branch are crucial in this respect, as the successful execution of laws
depend heavily on the ability, motivation, and orientation of
personnel working within executive agencies and commissions.
Under the Rell administration, approximately thirty individuals are
directly appointed by the governor to serve on the governor’s
personal staff. Such staff positions include, among others, the chief
of staff, deputy chief of staff, legal counsel, press secretary, legislative
director, and director of constituent service. Beyond the personal
staff, the governor in Connecticut appoints thirty-seven

126

THE GOVERNOR’S OFFICE AND JUDICIARY

commissioners, all of whom require legislative confirmation, and
approximately 1,800 individuals to serve on numerous boards,
commissions, and committees.3 The Connecticut governor therefore
has considerable appointment power, which in turn allows the
governor to exercise control over executive branch activity. If needed,
the governor can issue executive orders to subordinates that provide
detailed instructions and guidelines for the execution of laws.
The Connecticut Constitution also identifies the governor as
the “captain of the state militia.” In conjunction with this quasimilitary role, the governor has authority over the Connecticut
National Guard. The Guard can be deployed by the governor to
assist the state during times of natural disasters, such as devastating
hurricanes and floods. The governor can also mobilize the National
Guard in the interest of preserving law and order. However, should
the Guard be needed to bolster the regular army during time of war
or national emergency, the president of the United States can
federalize the National Guard and deploy units according to the
national interest. Thus, while the governor can direct the Guard to
perform a variety of state-wide functions, the National Guard is
ultimately under the jurisdiction of the president. The governor’s
military power is therefore subject to limitations. The deployment
of Connecticut National Guard units to Iraq in recent years is an
example of how the Guard can be federalized.
A quasi-judicial role is also afforded to the governor by the state
constitution. The governor has the sole authority to grant a reprieve
to persons after they have been convicted of a crime. According to
the state constitution, a reprieve issued by the governor is valid only
“until the end of the next session of the general assembly, and no
longer.” Gubernatorial reprieves in Connecticut are thus a
temporary and somewhat short-lived respite from punishment. The
power to grant reprieves is seldom exercised by the governor.
A ceremonial role for the state governor is not explicit in the
state constitution, although such duty is most certainly implied in
Article IV. In this regard, the governor is expected to engage in a
wide range of symbolic activity, which includes cutting ribbons and
making speeches at the opening of new schools, bridges, and
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highways. The governor is also expected to participate in Memorial
Day parades, issue proclamations during state or federal holidays,
attend the funerals of political dignitaries, and meet with student
field trips to the state Capitol. Public image, poise, and style are
important to the performance of ceremonial duties.
Like the president of the United States, the governor of
Connecticut is expected to participate in several tasks not
designated by the state constitution. Perhaps the most important
task in this respect is that of party chief. It is expected that in
addition to performing several constitutional duties, the governor
should devote time and energy to promoting the goals and
objectives of his or her political party. As party chief, the governor
appoints the chairperson of the party’s state central committee. The
governor is also expected to raise funds for the party, appoint party
loyalists to several administrative posts and judgeships, and
campaign for the party’s candidates during state, and local elections.
Although no governor can possibly perform every duty with an
equal amount of vigor and skill, it is reasonable to expect occupants
of the governor’s office to be flexible and multi-talented individuals.
Much to the advantage of the Connecticut governorship is the
absence of term limitations in the state constitution. The
Connecticut Constitution does not impose term limits on the office
of governor, which tends to protect a governor from becoming a
“lame duck.” This of course is to the advantage of the governor, as
state lawmakers often perceive an outgoing governor as “old news”
and somewhat powerless. Hence there is less incentive on the part
of lawmakers to support an outgoing governor’s legislative agenda.
In the absence of term limits, the governor can thus maintain
political leverage throughout his or her term of office.4
Job Approval Ratings
Although a deep reservoir of constitutional power is to the
advantage of a state governor, no governor can depend on
constitutional power alone to effectively lead a state. Equally, if not
more, important is the extent to which a governor can cultivate a
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high level of support from among the state’s population. A
governor’s popularity among the general electorate is a critical
source of power, particularly for those governors with an aggressive
legislative agenda.5
Governors, like presidents, depend on popular support to
exercise legislative leadership. State lawmakers are more inclined to
support the legislative agenda of a governor with high job approval
ratings, as opposed to one who has little support or respect among
the general public. High job approval ratings are therefore essential
to working effectively with the General Assembly. A state governor
might very well be afforded a broad set of constitutional powers, but
in the absence of high job approval ratings such authority is for all
intents and purposes diminished. High approval ratings are
especially important to those governors who do not enjoy the luxury
of a partisan majority in the state legislature.
At the time of this writing, Governor M. Jodi Rell’s job approval
ratings have consistently hovered above 70 percent,6 the highest
approval ratings sustained by any Connecticut governor during the
past twenty-five years.7 The governor’s unprecedented approval
ratings are the principal reason why she has had a successful working
relationship with a Democratic-controlled state legislature. A
generally healthy state economy, an unemployment rate slightly
below the national average, an express commitment on the
governor’s part to restoring ethics in government, an image of
confident, but not arrogant, leadership, a down-to-earth personality,
along with the support of popular issues in Connecticut, such as civil
unions, the right to abortion, stem cell research, and campaign
finance reform, are among the key reasons why Governor Rell, a
Republican, has enjoyed such extraordinary approval ratings.
The State Judiciary
Article Five of the Connecticut Constitution establishes the state’s
judicial system. Over the years, the structure of the state’s judicial
system has been reorganized and streamlined into what is now a unified
and efficient system of courts. The state’s judicial system is
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professionally administered and staffed. Courts in Connecticut perform
a vital role, and since the Constitution of 1818 the judiciary has
functioned as an independent and equal branch of state government.
Like the legislative and executive branches of government, it is apparent
that the state judicial system has also been modernized and equipped to
confront the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Superior Courts
Any discussion of Connecticut’s judicial structure must begin
with the state superior courts. These are the courts located at the
base of the judicial system. Superior courts are trial courts of
original jurisdiction. Superior courts are located throughout the
state, and it is within the superior courts that the vast majority of
day-to-day and routine judicial activity takes place. Superior courts
are truly the “workhorses” of Connecticut’s judicial system. In 2006,
the superior court division included 13 judicial districts, 20
geographical areas, and 13 juvenile districts. A total of 179 superior
court judges were working at this level of the state’s judicial system.8
As a result of recent court reform efforts, superior courts are
subdivided into five divisions, with cases processed into one of the
five divisions depending on the class of the case.9 The Civil Division
of superior court is where personal disputes are resolved. Lawsuits
that seek monetary compensation are often the subject of civil cases.
Insurance claims resulting from automobile or motorcycle
accidents, claims regarding contract violations, charges of libel and
slander, and claims concerning faulty appliances or purchased goods
are typical of cases routinely heard in the Civil Division of superior
court. A jury can be impaneled in civil court, or the case can be
decided by the judge assigned to the case. In Connecticut, as in
other states, financial settlements are normally reached before the
case is formally tried.
The Criminal Division of the superior court system is where
individuals are prosecuted for committing crimes against the state of
Connecticut. Punishment in criminal cases can range from
community service or probation to a lengthy prison sentence. In a
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murder case, the person convicted can be sentenced to life in prison
without parole or even sentenced to death. At the time of this
writing, five individuals in Connecticut are awaiting execution on
death row. In 2004, Connecticut executed convicted serial killer and
rapist Michael Ross by lethal injection after Ross waived his rights
to further appeal. This was the first execution in Connecticut since
1960, when “Mad Dog” Joseph Taborsky was executed by electric
chair for his murder of package store clerks. Connecticut is one of
thirty-eight states that still provides for the death penalty.
Assault with a deadly weapon, murder, grand theft, drug
possession, arson, sale of liquor to a minor, and drunken driving are
examples of cases heard in criminal court. As in civil cases, a jury
can be impaneled or a case can be tried before a judge. Like other
states, plea bargaining is very common in Connecticut with the vast
majority of criminal cases resolved in this manner.
The Family Division of superior court resolves conflicts involving
divorce, alimony, and child custody disputes, while the Juvenile
Division handles cases involving young persons who are accused of a
crime. In Connecticut, a “child” is defined as a person under the age
of sixteen, while a “youth” is defined as an individual sixteen to
eighteen years of age. Cases involving children and, in most instances,
youths are heard in juvenile court. Court records involving juveniles
are kept confidential and juvenile cases are not open to the public.10
The Housing Division of superior court decides cases concerning
rental disputes that erupt between landlords and tenants. Although
family, juvenile, and housing courts normally do not hear the most
intriguing or publicized cases, such courts are nevertheless essential to
the administration of justice within the state of Connecticut.
Intermediate Appellate Court
Decisions rendered in superior court are normally final and in
most instances bring closure to a particular case. In some cases,
however, one of the parties, either the defendant or plaintiff, might
choose to appeal the jury’s or judge’s verdict. Should this occur, an
appeal will be processed to the state’s intermediate appellate court.
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A special category of cases can be appealed directly from superior
court to the state supreme court, although in most instances the case
will first be appealed to the intermediate appellate court. In
Connecticut, a person is normally granted one appeal.
Established in 1982 by Amendment XX of the state
constitution, the intermediate appellate court was created to relieve
the heavy and growing workload of the state supreme court. Prior
to the establishment of the intermediate appellate court, cases
would be appealed directly from state superior court to the state
supreme court. Although the supreme court was under no
obligation to grant a hearing to every appeal, the court’s docket was
nevertheless overcrowded. The intermediate court has thus served to
reduce the workload of the supreme court, thereby allowing
supreme court judges to concentrate on the most important and
difficult judicial issues that arise in the state.
The intermediate appellate court, like the state supreme court,
is located in Hartford. Nine judges are assigned to the intermediate
court. One appellate judge, designated by the chief justice of the
state supreme court, serves as the chief judge of the intermediate
court. A three-judge panel normally hears an appeal, although in
special cases the court will sit en banc (full bench; that is, all nine
judges will hear the case).11 A majority of judges on the appellate
panel will decide whether or not to sustain the superior court
verdict or reverse the lower court’s judgment.
When a panel of judges is evaluating a case on appeal, the
panel’s primary concern is not with the facts of the case, nor with
the guilt or innocence of the person appealing the case. The court
instead is concerned with matters of law and constitutional
procedure. The intermediate appellate court does not call
witnesses, nor is a jury impaneled. The main concern is whether
or not the lower court’s decision was based on proper rules of
constitutional procedure. Should a majority of the panel
conclude that constitutional procedure was not followed,
regardless of the facts, then the lower court’s decision will most
likely be reversed and either a new trial will be ordered or the case
will be dismissed. Should the panel conclude that the lower
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court’s decision was reached fairly and properly without
constitutional infringement, then the judgment of the superior
court will be sustained.
State Supreme Court
The court of last resort in Connecticut is normally the state
supreme court. The supreme court hears cases that are appealed
from the intermediate appellate court, and as previously noted, will
hear a very select body of cases that are appealed directly from the
superior courts. The Connecticut Supreme Court consists of seven
judges, which includes six associate justices and the chief justice.
Five justices will sit for a case, although in certain instances the
chief justice will request that the court sit en banc. Like the
intermediate appellate court, the state supreme court is not a trial
court. There are no witnesses called to testify, there is no jury, and
the justices are not particularly concerned with the facts of the case.
Rules of evidence, constitutional procedure, and matters of law are
what the state supreme court is primarily concerned with when
hearing an appeal.
Cases arrive at the state supreme court in several different ways.
One method is for an individual to appeal the ruling of the
intermediate appellate court directly to the state supreme court.
This is known as “petitioning for certification.” Should two of the
seven supreme court justices upon review of the petition decide that
the appeal is worthy of a hearing, the court will grant the petition
and request that all records of the case be forwarded to the court.
With regard to petitions for certification, the supreme court has full
discretion whether or not to grant the appeal.
The second way for a case to arrive before the supreme court is
for the court to transfer a pending case that is before the
intermediate appellate court. Any case filed in the intermediate
appellate court can be directly transferred to the state supreme court
upon the supreme court’s request. A third route of appeal is for the
decision of a superior court to be appealed directly to the state
supreme court. State law carefully identifies which body of cases can
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be appealed directly to the state supreme court. Such cases include
rulings involving the death penalty, legislative reapportionment, or
those in which interpretation of the state constitution is required.12
When a case is brought before the state supreme court, there is
a well-established system of procedure that unfolds. Lawyers for
both sides of the case are allowed to argue their positions before the
court. Both parties are allowed a half-hour for “oral argument.” The
court hears oral arguments during eight two-week sessions between
the months of September and June of each year. The supreme court
listens to as many as three or four cases during days scheduled for
oral argument. During oral argument, the justices ask the lawyers
representing the two parties a wide range of probing questions
pertaining to judicial precedent and matters of law. Lawyers for
both sides are expected to be well-prepared for oral argument and
ready to field difficult questions from the sitting justices.
Following oral argument, the justices meet in the conference
room located within the supreme court building to discuss the case.
A preliminary vote is taken during the conference. One of the
justices who is in the majority will be asked to draft a “majority
opinion.” Writing the court’s majority opinion can be a difficult and
delicate task, as the final opinion must be deemed acceptable to
those justices who originally voted with the majority.
One or more of the justices who voted with the minority might
feel compelled to draft a dissenting opinion, although this is not a
formal requirement. A dissenting opinion reflects points of
disagreement with the court’s majority. Moreover, in addition to
majority and dissenting opinions, one or more of the justices who
voted with the majority might decide to draft a concurring opinion.
A concurring opinion will be written by a justice who agrees with
the majority’s position with respect to the outcome of the case, but
not necessarily with the specific reasons expressed in the majority
opinion. One of the justices in the majority might agree with the
majority view that a statute passed by the Connecticut state
legislature is in violation of the Connecticut Constitution and
should therefore be deemed unconstitutional. At the same time,
however, the justice might not agree with the reasons expressed in
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the majority opinion regarding the invalidation of the law. In this
instance, the justice may write a concurring opinion.
Drafts of majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions are
circulated to the justices involved in the case. The justices will
carefully read the drafts and evaluate the legal arguments. After the
opinions have been circulated, read, and digested, the justices will
meet once again in the conference room to cast their final vote. It is
possible, but not probable, that a member of the majority might
have been so impressed with the logic of the dissenting opinion that
he or she will part company with the majority and affix his or her
name to the dissenting opinion. Conversely, a justice who originally
sided with the minority might be pulled to the side of the majority
as a result of a compelling and persuasive majority opinion. Only
after the separate opinions are drafted and reviewed does the
position of the supreme court solidify. When supreme court rulings
are issued, they are immediately made public by way of the
Electronic Bulletin Board. Shortly thereafter, the decision is printed
in the Connecticut Law Journal.13
Table Five documents the workload of the Connecticut
Supreme Court during two recent terms.
Table 5
Supreme Court Caseload
July 1, 2002 – June 30, 2003
Caseload
Appeals
Disposed

Civil
291
135

Criminal
169
63

Total
460
198

July 1, 2003 – June 30, 2004
Civil
Criminal
Total
Caseload
Appeals
Disposed

296
161

168
76

464
237

Source: Biennial Report of the Connecticut Judicial Branch:
http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/BiennialStats2002-04.pdf.
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As the data show, the state supreme court’s yearly docket
currently consists of approximately 460 cases. This figure includes
fresh appeals as well as appeals carried over from the previous term.
The data also show that the court will issue rulings for
approximately 40-50 percent of the cases on the docket. In a typical
term, approximately two-thirds of the rulings involve civil appeals.
The state supreme court is normally, but not always, the court
of last resort. If a case involves interpretation of the federal
constitution, the losing party has the right to appeal the case directly
to the United States Supreme Court by petitioning the high court
for a writ of certiorari. In essence, the party appealing the case is
asking the Supreme Court to “make more certain” of the lower
court ruling. It is doubtful, however, that the Supreme Court will
agree to hear the case, as approximately 98 percent of petitions for
certiorari are routinely denied.14 Should the case involve
interpretation of the state constitution, the decision of the state
supreme court is final. As discussed in Chapter Three, the United
States Supreme Court cannot review the ruling of a state supreme
court regarding interpretation of the state constitution.
Judicial Selection
The judicial selection process in Connecticut was at one time a
political and partisan process. The governor would nominate judges
and the state legislature would confirm or reject the governor’s
choice. Judicial posts were part of the patronage system, with party
affiliation and political loyalty at the heart of the selection process.
The judicial selection process in Connecticut was very similar to
that of the federal judicial selection process.
Connecticut’s judicial selection system underwent significant
reform in 1986 with passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
state constitution. Passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
reflected a national trend regarding court reform at the state level of
the federal system. In many states, the process of judicial selection
had theoretically been depoliticized, reflecting the public’s antipathy
toward politics, patronage, and political parties. Reform proposals

136

THE GOVERNOR’S OFFICE AND JUDICIARY

were adopted across the land that placed greater emphasis on the
merit of judicial nominees as opposed to partisanship and political
connections.
The roots of the reform effort can be traced to Missouri’s
pioneering efforts in 1940 regarding state judicial selection
procedures. The “Missouri Plan” established a system that
incorporated a mixture of merit and gubernatorial involvement, as
well as popular referendum in the selection of state judges.15 A
number of states, Connecticut included, have since followed the
lead of Missouri by either adopting the Missouri Plan in its entirety
or certain elements of the system.
The Twenty-Fifth amendment to the Connecticut Constitution
established a Judicial Selection Commission for the purpose of
developing a short-list of potential judicial nominees. The Selection
Commission is required to review and evaluate the credentials of
lawyers and sitting judges who have expressed an interest in serving
on either the superior, appellate, or state supreme court. The
Commission will narrow the list of qualified candidates to three or
four and present the list to the governor. The governor will then
select a candidate from the Commission’s short-list and forward the
name to the state legislature for confirmation.
The process in the state legislature begins with hearings in the
Judiciary Committee, which is one of the standing committees in
the General Assembly. The hearings are followed by a Committee
vote. Should the Judiciary Committee recommend the nominee,
the state legislature will then vote to confirm or reject the candidate.
Judges in Connecticut must have earned a law degree and be a
member of the Connecticut bar. Superior, appellate, and supreme
court judges are appointed to eight year terms and are eligible for
reappointment. State judges must retire at the age of seventy,
although judges seventy or older can serve as state referees.
The screening of judicial candidates by the Judicial Selection
Commission and the development of a short-list based on merit is
an important departure from the previous system of judicial
selection. Under the current system, the governor still has some
discretion in deciding which name to send to the legislature for
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confirmation, but is formally obligated to nominate a judge from
among the list of candidates proposed by the Commission. The
governor’s role in the selection of state judges has been somewhat,
but by no means entirely, diminished.
The Judicial Selection Commission is a twelve-member bipartisan
commission. The Commission is at all times politically balanced, with
equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans. Among the twelve
Commission members, six are lawyers appointed by the governor and
six are persons outside of the legal profession appointed by party
leaders within the state House and state Senate. More specifically, the
Speaker of the House appoints two members, the Senate pro tempore
appoints two, and the minority leaders in both chambers each appoint
one. Commission members are appointed for six years.16
It would of course be naive to think that all politics has been
removed from the judicial selection process in Connecticut as a result
of the Twenty-Fifth amendment and the creation of the Judicial
Selection Commission. Moreover, there is very little evidence to
suggest that state judges in Connecticut since 1986 have been more
competent, meritorious, and objective than judges chosen under the
former selection process. The current procedure for appointing
Commission members inherently lends itself to political favoritism,
and Commission members undoubtedly have strong political
opinions about legal issues. Moreover, those individuals
recommended by the Commission and eventually appointed to the
bench have often been involved in one form or another in state or
local politics. It is important to note in this regard that comparative
studies of state judicial recruitment have concluded that different
selection methods do not alter the characteristics and quality of
judges.17 State judges are strikingly similar to one another, regardless
of which judicial selection system is in place.
Judicial Support Staffs
Like state lawmakers and the state governor, judges in
Connecticut depend on a number of support personnel to assist
with the day-to-day operation of the judicial system. Support
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personnel range from law clerks and high-level judicial
administrators to clerical personnel who process forms and file
documents.
Law clerks are central to the functioning of the state’s judicial
system. Fourteen law clerks currently serve the state supreme court.
Law clerks are selected by the individual justices and serve for a
period of twelve months. Law clerks are normally fresh out of law
school and are in the top tier of their graduating class. The job
description for a state supreme court law clerk suggests that an
applicant be among the top quarter of his or her graduating class. In
Connecticut, as in other states, it is considered an honor to serve as
a law clerk for the state supreme court. The position is also
perceived as a stepping stone for a successful career in law. Needless
to say, the selection process is highly competitive. Law clerks
perform a number of critical functions. These include helping
justices screen and review petitions for certification, researching
legal precedents, preparing justices for oral argument, and writing
and editing drafts of judicial opinions.
Eighteen law clerks are assigned to the intermediate court of
appeals. Like law clerks for the state supreme court, such individuals
are screened and personally selected by the individual appellate
court judges. Several of the law clerks also work as “shared clerks”
for the court and for retired appellate court judges. The functions of
law clerks who serve the intermediate appellate court are very
similar to those of supreme court law clerks. Screening cases,
researching precedent, preparing judges for oral argument and
assisting with opinions are among the normal duties of appellate
court law clerks. Appellate court law clerks are expected to be
among the top third of their law school graduating class.18
Law clerks are also hired to serve the needs of the state’s superior
courts. Superior court law clerks are not personally chosen by
superior court judges, but rather are assigned to various superior
courts based on the needs of superior court judges. Such law clerks
assist judges by performing tasks similar to those of law clerks
working in the intermediate appellate court and the state supreme
court. Assistance with opinion writing and legal research are among
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the principal duties associated with being a superior court clerk.
Superior court law clerks are hired for twelve months, and while
class standing is considered relevant to the hiring process, no
specific tier is designated in the job posting.19 In addition to law
clerks, the Connecticut judicial system is supported by several
administrative divisions that fall under the direction of the chief
court administrator. The various administrative divisions are
responsible for managing the state judicial system and for
implementing the decisions of the courts. The Administrative
Services Division is responsible for managing judicial facilities,
processing data, and handling personnel matters. The Affirmative
Action/Employment Discrimination Division is responsible for
ensuring that citizens have equal access to the courts and that
affirmative action guidelines are followed with respect to staffing the
administrative components of the judiciary. The Court Support
Services Division includes the Office of Adult Probation, Office of
Alternative Sanctions, Bail Commission, Family Services Division,
and the Division of Juvenile Detention Services. The various
components of the Court Support Services Division work very
closely with superior courts regarding terms of probation,
rehabilitation programs, bail requirements, and issues involving
family relationships and juvenile delinquency.
The public arm of the state’s judicial system is the External
Affairs Division, which is responsible for educating the public
through programs regarding the structure and function of the
judicial system. The Superior Court Operations Division includes a
wide range of subdivisions responsible for implementing court
rulings, providing legal services to superior court judges, and for
ensuring ethical conduct on the part of attorneys who practice law
in Connecticut.20
Generally speaking, many offices and divisions have been
established for the purpose of processing judicial cases,
implementing judicial rulings and helping judges with the task of
deciding cases and issuing opinions. Approximately 4,000 full and
part-time employees work in various capacities within the judicial
branch of government.21 While on paper elements of the judicial
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administrative structure might appear unnecessary, there can be
little doubt that the administrative components of the state
judicial system have in multiple ways helped, rather than
hindered, the efficiency of the judiciary. In many states, the
judicial system seems to lag far behind that of the legislative and
executive branches of government with regard to efficiency,
modernization, staffing, and support services. This does not
appear to be the case in Connecticut. The recent reorganization of
the state superior court system, the addition of an intermediate
court of appeals, the establishment of the Judicial Selection
Commission, along with the addition of staff personnel and
support services clearly suggest a judicial branch of government
well prepared to face the many unexpected and multidimensional
legal challenges of the future.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

Connecticut’s Watchdogs

T

he role of media in covering Connecticut politics was not one
of the topics in the first edition of this book. This was not due
to a lack of respect for the media on the part of the author. Instead,
at the time the first edition was written it seemed as if the media
were essentially reporting and describing developments in
Connecticut politics, rather than aggressively investigating what
issues were behind or beneath reported stories. However, between
the writing of the first and second editions, a period of
approximately six years, the media in Connecticut appeared to
assume a new and quite different role in their coverage of
Connecticut politics. “Investigative journalism,” a term associated
with reporters such as Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of the
Washington Post, now seemed to characterize the reporting of several
media outlets in Connecticut. Unearthing and exposing political
scandals now became a fairly common activity for political reporters
in Connecticut, with newspapers in particular at the forefront of
this intriguing development.
Much to their credit, newspapers, more than any other
information source in the state of Connecticut, appear to be serving
as the true “watchdogs” over Connecticut’s political system. Thus, it
would be remiss for a fresh text on Connecticut government not to
devote a chapter to the challenging tasks and noble efforts of those
individuals known as investigative journalists. Quite frankly, were it
not for the work of investigative newspaper journalists employed by
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local newspapers, deceitful and corrupt public officials, several of
whom have wielded extraordinary power at the state and local level
government, would continue to degrade and blemish Connecticut’s
long tradition of good government.
Newspapers
Although the raw number of newspapers as well as the
percentage of persons who read newspapers have severely declined
in states across the land, due primarily to the advent of television as
a news source, there are still several daily newspapers published in
Connecticut that provide readers with an in-depth and substantive
look at state and local politics.1 Among the two hundred newspapers
with the widest circulation in the United States, four are based in
Connecticut. The Hartford Courant, which proudly claims credit on
its front page as “America’s Oldest Continuously Published
Newspaper” has a Sunday circulation of 272,919. The New Haven
Register’s Sunday circulation is 90,389, followed by The Connecticut
Post’s Sunday circulation at 85,772. The fourth largest circulation
belongs to The Waterbury American-Republican with a Sunday
circulation of 61,100.2
In addition to the four newspapers with the widest circulation,
a number of newspapers in Connecticut with a more limited
circulation also devote considerable space to politics and
government. The Danbury News Times, Meriden’s Record Journal,
the Norwalk Hour ,and the Stamford Advocate are examples of such
informative and politically penetrating publications. Currently,
there are a total of sixty-nine newspapers with varying degrees of
circulation published in Connecticut, along with a variety of
creative and captivating campus newspapers. There is certainly no
shortage of print press in the state of Connecticut. For those who
prefer reading a newspaper online, practically all of the newspapers
in Connecticut can be read on the Internet. The information one
reads is identical to hard copy, although the reader will have to
contend with a plethora of advertisements and pop-ups interspersed
in the body of articles.
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Television and Radio Stations
Television and radio stations are also present in Connecticut
and provide the citizenry with yet another source of political
information, albeit less substantive than stories in the print press.
The ABC (Channel 8, New Haven) CBS (Channel 3, Hartford)
NBC (Channel 30, Hartford) and Fox (Channel 61, Hartford )
affiliates employ political reporters and routinely provide
informative and easily digestible political newscasts on a daily basis.
Cablevision 12 in Norwalk also devotes a considerable amount of
time to Connecticut politics, despite a regional audience confined
to a portion of New York state and Fairfield County in Connecticut.
For those who prefer to watch their government in action
without narration, cable channel CT-N is ideal for this purpose.
This is Connecticut’s equivalent of C-Span. Committee hearings at
the state Capitol in Hartford, reports from commissioners, speeches
by the governor, and a variety of activity on the floors of the General
Assembly are available for uninterrupted viewing on CT-N.
FM and AM radio stations located in Connecticut also provide
a degree of coverage concerning unfolding political events in
Connecticut. The stations vary in their attention to political stories,
but one can find several that probe the political landscape in
considerable depth. AM stations such as WELI (960 AM), WICC
(600 AM), and WTIC (1080 AM) do a good job of covering state
and local politics, while the National Public Radio affiliates,
WEDW (88 FM), WNPR (89.1), and WSHU (91.1) are clearly the
best in terms of detailed reporting and commentary concerning the
Connecticut political scene. There are currently 101 radio stations
located in the state of Connecticut.3
Blogs
For those who prefer non-traditional and purely citizen-based
political reporting, the blogosphere offers yet another medium for
political news. Politically-oriented blogs are often created by citizens
to promote a particular point of view regarding candidates and
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political issues, although some blogs are created for the purpose of
facilitating political dialogue and discussion. Although blogs (short
for web logs) should not be viewed in the same light as newspapers
and other forms of journalism, they do serve to inform citizens
about important developments within government and the
political arena. Young political activists in particular are the most
familiar with and attracted to blogs. Indeed, many seem to depend
on blogs for their daily political information and perhaps even
voting cues. The political impact of blogs with regard to shaping
political information as well as the motivations of those who create
and maintain blogs, i.e., the “bloggers,” calls for extended research
and analysis.
There are currently 57 million blogs on the web, with 1.3
million posts recorded each day and 54,000 posts recorded per
hour.4 Among the 57 million blogs, however, it is estimated that
only 55 percent can be classified as “active” blogs. Blogs have
become a global phenomenon, and appear in many different
languages as well, most notably English and Japanese.5 Not all blogs
are political and one can find blogs devoted to an extraordinary
array of subjects well beyond that of politics. Nevertheless, the
political “blogosphere” is what has attracted the most attention.
Blogs made their debut in American politics during the
emotionally charged presidential campaign of the former
Democratic governor of Vermont, Howard Dean. Although Dean
failed in his bid to win the Democratic Party’s presidential
nomination, blogs continued to proliferate across the land. As noted
in Chapter Three, blogs were credited with propelling the 2006
Connecticut senate campaign of insurgent Democratic challenger
Ned Lamont. The blogosphere was often cited by pundits as one of
the contributing factors behind Lamont’s primary victory against
Senator Joe Lieberman. During the 2006 general election, bloggers
both inside and outside the state devoted a great deal of their energy
to supporting Lamont and other Democratic candidates in hotly
contested Connecticut races.
In addition to campaign reporting in newspapers such as the
Hartford Courant and Connecticut Post, one could follow campaign
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developments on a daily basis by reading Connecticut-based and
non-Connecticut-based blogs. In the state, for example,
Connecticut Bob, My Left Nutmeg, Connecticut Blue, and Cup of
Joe were exceptionally active with regard to posting comments and
views concerning Connecticut election contests. The extent to
which the traditional media trolled blogs looking for leads and late
breaking developments in campaigns is difficult to assess, although
there is reason to believe that newspaper reporters scanned blogs
with some regularity, searching for fresh information and leads.
Regardless of how one perceives the information value of blogs, the
fact of the matter is that an increasing number of citizens are
receiving political information from this Internet phenomenon.
Any person can create a blog at virtually no cost.
Investigative Journalism: A Challenging Task
Working as an investigative journalist for a newspaper is not an
easy task in this day and age. Although a large majority of
Americans support the media’s role as a watchdog over the political
process, many Americans are nevertheless skeptical of the media’s
motivations. In a 2001 survey of 1,012 adults conducted by the
Center for Survey Research and Analysis housed at the University of
Connecticut, 82 percent of citizens surveyed indicated that it was
important for the media to watch over government. At the same
time, however, 71 percent of persons surveyed believed that it was
desirable for the government to hold the media in check.6 When
asked if they were more concerned with the freedom afforded to the
media or government censorship of the press, 41 percent of the
respondents expressed concern with the former, while only 36
percent indicated a concern with the latter. Moreover, 46 percent of
respondents in the survey stated that the press has been allowed “too
much freedom.”7
The survey data presented above are not the only reason why
working as an investigative journalist is a daunting profession in this
day and age. Additionally, newspapers across the country are
currently downsizing their journalistic staffs, which further impedes
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investigative efforts.8 According to Howard Kurtz, a respected staff
writer for the Washington Post, declining revenues resulting from a
decrease in newspaper circulation appear to be the basis for such an
unfortunate development. Moreover, a desire on the part of
corporate CEOs to maximize profits has further contributed to staff
downsizing. Examples of downsizing cited by Kurtz include the
Dallas Morning News and Cleveland Plain Dealer, two major
newspapers that suffered severe staff cutbacks of 19 and 17 percent
respectively. The newsroom staff of the Philadelphia Inquirer was
also trimmed by 15 percent, while 8 percent of the newsroom staff
at the Washington Post accepted early retirement packages. The
cutbacks, according to Kurtz, will inevitably result in “fewer bodies
to pore over records at City Hall, the statehouse or federal
agencies.”9 How newspapers can generate future revenue and hire
staff writers to cover politics and government are clearly among the
serious challenges facing the newspaper industry in the twenty-first
century. The continued staff cutbacks and loss in revenue, according
to Kurtz, are “bad news for serious journalism, and good news for
corrupt politicians.”10
However, irrespective of cutbacks in the number of investigative
journalists employed by newspapers along with public skepticism
towards media reporting, the print press in the state of Connecticut
has still been able to investigate and report the malfeasance of public
officials in great detail and with amazing persistence. Newspaper
revelations of illegal activity involving the mayor’s office in the city
of Bridgeport, as well as in the office of state governor, demonstrate
quite clearly that investigative journalism is alive and well in the
Constitution State.
The Ganim and Rowland Scandals
The reporting of the Connecticut Post regarding the scandalous
activity of Bridgeport Mayor Joseph P. Ganim, as well as the
investigative reporting of the Hartford Courant concerning the
illegal activity of Governor John G. Rowland were journalistic
efforts worthy of a Pulitzer Prize. The investigative reporting of both
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newspapers underscores why a free, fierce, and unbridled press is
essential to the preservation of the American republic.
It is not the intention of this chapter to chronicle the
investigative reporting of the Connecticut Post that resulted in the
federal conviction and imprisonment of Bridgeport Mayor Ganim.
Nor is there any need to review in detail the investigative work of
the Hartford Courant, which led to Governor Rowland’s resignation
from office and federal imprisonment. For those interested in the
sordid details of the two separate scandals, the archives of both the
Post and the Courant should provide a treasure-trove of information.
Suffice it to say, investigative journalists for both newspapers were
able to assemble a puzzle – piece-by-piece and day-by-day – that
depicted a pattern of greed, deceit, preferential public contracts,
various forms of bribery, and sinister cabals of so-called “public
servants” who used their power in ways that not only broke the law
but also violated the public’s trust. Although some might argue that
both newspapers piggybacked on the work of federal investigators,
the sequence of events which led to the downfall of Mayor Ganim
and Governor Rowland suggested that the Post and Courant
reporters were the first to unearth their scandalous activity. The
tireless work of reporters is what provided federal agents with the
signposts necessary for an effective investigation.
After a lengthy trial in federal district court, Mayor Ganim was
found guilty under sixteen separate counts, including, among
others, tax evasion and racketeering. The five-term Democratic
mayor and former candidate for lieutenant governor, who had been
mentioned quite often as a possible gubernatorial candidate, was
sentenced to nine years in federal prison. Associates of Ganim were
also convicted and received prison sentences that varied in length.
For those who closely watched the Ganim scandal unfold, it was
clear that the investigative reporting and coordination of reporting
on the part of Bill Cummings of the Connecticut Post was primarily
responsible for Ganim’s downfall. Cummings’s reports and
journalistic queries always seemed to be one step ahead of the
F.B.I.’s undercover investigation. A veteran and seasoned journalist,
Cummings is known for his objective, thorough, and
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uncompromising reports concerning government corruption in the
city of Bridgeport. Cummings described his work as an investigative
journalist in these terms:
When people ask me what I do for a living I usually tell
them that I’m a government cop. I’m the guy who asks
what government is doing and why. It’s not always easy, and
government does not like to reveal its secrets. But the clues
are there if you look, in the piles of documents and paper
that government generates. Those are a reporter’s tools,
along with the sources who offer information. I checked
out dozens and dozens of tips during the Ganim
investigation. Many went nowhere. Others were right on
the mark. It can be a tedious and time-consuming process,
but that’s the way it goes. You keep digging and sooner or
later the truth, or at least a version close to it, emerges.11
Unlike Ganim, who chose to face a federal trial, Governor Rowland
agreed to plead guilty to the minor federal criminal charge of
depriving the state of Connecticut of honest services. Rowland, a
Republican who had recently been elected to the state governorship
for an unprecedented third term, was sentenced to one year and one
day in federal prison followed by four months of house arrest.
Although the work of federal investigators was central to Rowland’s
demise, it was more than evident that investigative journalists
employed by the Hartford Courant were the individuals unearthing
and exposing the governor’s illegal actions. Like the Connecticut
Post’s investigation of Mayor Ganim, stories published by the
Courant seemed to structure the federal investigation. David
Altimari, one of the two lead investigative journalists for the
Courant during the entire Rowland episode, described the
relationship between the stories published by the Courant and the
investigative activity of federal agents as follows: “The stories led
federal investigators, who seemed reluctant to go after Rowland, to
start an investigation of the governor, and ultimately he plead guilty
in federal court. None of it would have happened without the
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Courant’s stories exposing Rowland using the power of his office for
personal gain.”12 Members of Rowland’s administration and close
associates involved in the sandal were also convicted of various
crimes and received prison sentences.
The Spirit of Jefferson
Generally speaking, the investigative work of the Connecticut
Post and Hartford Courant provides special meaning to the
perspective of Thomas Jefferson, one of our nation’s foremost
Founding Fathers and a staunch advocate of a free press. Writing to
Archibald Stuart in 1799, Jefferson had this to say concerning a free
press: “Our citizens may be deceived for a while, and have been
deceived; but as long as the presses can be protected, we may trust to
them for light.”13 Much to their credit and much to the benefit of the
Connecticut citizenry, the Connecticut Post and the Hartford Courant
have served as sources of “light” in their reporting of political
corruption at both the local and state level of government. The
thoughtful words of Bill Cummings concisely summarize the critical
importance of objective and aggressive investigative journalism:
“Reporters don’t set policy; we examine it. We have no special license
or privilege. But without people who are willing to poke and probe,
democracy does not work. It will only benefit those in power.”14 For
those who care about the exercise of political power, and who believe
that ethics and good government are inseparable, it should be
gratifying to know that there are still individuals employed by
newspapers who keep a watchful eye over the conduct of government
and who report corruption when they see it. Thomas Jefferson would
most certainly applaud the efforts of Connecticut’s watchdogs.
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Conclusion

I

n his inaugural address delivered on the east side of the United
States Capitol on January 20, 1961, President John F. Kennedy
summoned the American people to the cause of public service.
Kennedy’s inaugural speech, regarded as one of the most thoughtful
and dynamic inaugural speeches in the history of the United States,
is especially remembered for one simple yet eloquent sentence. The
newly-inaugurated, youthful, and charismatic president proclaimed:
“And so my fellow Americans ask not what your country can do for
you, ask what you can do for you country.” Public service in
Kennedy’s view was a noble calling, and serving a cause greater than
oneself was the mark of a patriot.
As a young boy, I personally witnessed JFK deliver a riveting
speech on the New Haven town green during the highly
competitive 1960 presidential contest Although I was raised in a
politically active family, I truly believe that JFK’s positive impact on
American politics, as well as his short-lived presidency, contributed
in several ways to my own interest in politics and government.
There was something very special about President John F. Kennedy,
which to this day continues to set him apart from other presidents
and political figures.
In some respects, the spirit of JFK is present throughout the
pages of this textbook. At the risk of sounding like an idealist, my
intent in writing this work was not only to educate students
concerning the mechanics and nuances of Connecticut government,
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but also to motivate college students to participate in the political
process. I do not and will not subscribe to the view expressed by
many cynical Americans that the political process is a closed
system, open to only wealthy and powerful individuals. I will
never surrender to this line of thinking as long as I teach political
science. I contend instead that the political process, especially at
the state and local level of government, is not only a porous
process, but also in desperate need of young, educated, and ethical
public servants. Put differently, the door to the political arena is
open to those who wish to take advantage of it. Any person,
irrespective of income, race, ethnicity, or religion, can directly
participate in the political process and make an important
contribution. Consider, for example, the four following excellent
opportunities in the state of Connecticut for college students to
participate in the affairs of government:
Elected Office: In Connecticut, a resident only has to be 18
years of age to run for a seat in the General Assembly. The same
is true for a seat on a local town council, a local school board, or
a local commission. The participation of young persons between
the ages of 18-21 in the state legislature or in elected positions at
the local level would not only enrich the quality of political
discourse but also elevate the political voice of young adults.
Imagine the extraordinary difference that a caucus of young
persons could make in the Connecticut General Assembly, or
perhaps on a town council. Think of the difference that young
and perceptive lawmakers could make with respect to formulating
Connecticut’s $36 billion biennial budget. Or consider the
impact young town councilors could make regarding a proposal
to cut spending for the high school athletic program or the town’s
music curriculum. There are 151 seats in the Connecticut House
of Representatives and 36 seats in the state Senate. Moreover,
there are thousands of elected posts, ranging from council seats to
commissions, in the 169 local communities across the state of
Connecticut. Numerous opportunities exist therefore for young
adults to hold public office and to make a serious difference in the
policy process.
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Party Politics: Young persons of college age can also influence
the political process in ways other than holding elective office. For
example, an individual who is 18 years of age or older can register
with a political party and through the proper contacts become a
member of a local town committee. Although the power of political
parties has receded over the years, local party committees in
Connecticut are still in many ways integral to the functioning of
state and local politics. The local party organization is the ideal
mechanism for persons who prefer to work behind the scenes. And
let’s not forget that membership on a town committee can also lead
to an appointment on a local or state commission and eventually a
nomination for public office. My own research and discussion with
party leaders has discovered that many vacancies exist on local town
committees. I have also learned that Democratic and Republican
town chairpersons are very interested in having young and
enthusiastic individuals join the town committees. Those who wish
to participate in the political process would be wise to remember
that membership on a local Democratic or Republican party
committee is still the gateway into Connecticut politics. Although
committees for third parties are not always present in local
communities, opportunities do exist to participate in third-party
movements. Like the Democratic and Republican parties in
Connecticut, the Green Party, Libertarian Party, Concerned
Citizens Party, and Working Families Party are all looking for young
volunteers to advance their party’s cause.
Interest Groups: Special and public interest groups are also in
need of motivated and thoughtful activists. Joining an interest
group and fighting for a particular interest can be an exhilarating
political experience. Moreover, such activity will inevitably result in
direct contact with state and local policy makers. Participation in
an interest group can also lead to employment as a lobbyist at the
Connecticut state Capitol. Although the term “lobbying” has a
somewhat negative connotation in the minds of many Americans,
the fact of the matter is that economic, social, and political
interests need to be represented when lawmakers are passing a bill.
Whether the interest represented is that of an insurance company,
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a labor union, or handicapped citizens, it is my contention that
interest group activity and lobbying are valuable and noble forms
of public service.
Voting: The most nominal yet vitally important way in which
young persons can make a difference is through the simple act of
voting. There is an election every year in Connecticut, for federal,
state, or local public office. As in other states across the land, a
person has to be only 18 years of age or older and a state resident to
cast a vote on election day. Once again, imagine the extraordinary
impact 18-21 years olds could make in both primary and general
elections if they voted in large numbers. Unfortunately, voter
turnout is distressingly low among young persons in this particular
age bracket. Reasons given by young persons for not voting include
a lack of information about candidates, registration difficulties,
unfamiliarity with absentee voting procedures, negative perceptions
towards politicians, time constraints, and a feeling that one vote
doesn’t make a difference, along with the attitude that “things never
really change” regardless of which party wins an election. I take issue
with many of the reasons, or excuses, expressed by students for not
voting. I also stress to my students that election results do matter
and that it does make a difference which political party controls the
government. American foreign policy, spending priorities on the
part of government, tax rates and tax cuts, interest rates, health
insurance, environmental protection, and transportation policy, as
well as the guidelines that regulate student loans for higher
education are among the many policies directly affected by election
outcomes. As I often tell my students, persons who do not vote are
essentially allowing those who do vote to determine their future.
Quite frankly, there are no longer any obstacles to voting in the
United States. The property, race, gender, age, and residence barriers
have all been lowered and practically any American citizen who is
the resident of a state and has a home address can vote in a local,
state, or federal election.
One of my favorite maxims, attributed to the English
philosopher Sir Francis Bacon (1526-1626), states rather simply
that “knowledge is power.” This, in my view, is a very accurate
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statement, particularly as it applies to political power. Needless to
say, it is virtually impossible for a person, or group of persons, to
influence the course of government without first acquiring
knowledge regarding the structure and mechanics of the political
system. At the same time, however, I also believe that knowledge
must be accompanied by political action. Indeed, a person can have
a detailed working knowledge of the political system, but without
political action such knowledge for all intents and purposes is
inconsequential. Thus, I have written this introductory textbook
with a dual purpose in mind. My intent was to not only increase the
reader’s knowledge of Connecticut government, but also to
stimulate participation, particularly on the part of college students, in
the political process. I sincerely hope that the readers of this text
have acquired useful political knowledge, and as a result feel
prepared to apply this knowledge within the political arena.
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